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# **History of the 4th Marine Division 1943 - 1996**

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## **FOREWORD**

This book will close the gap in the distinguished history of the 4th Marine Division, from the post-WWII period, to reactivation of the Division as part of the Marine Corps Reserve, through the most current date of publication. The original book on the 4th Marine Division is a landmark in documenting the rich history of the 4th Marine Division during World War II. This book seeks to provide the chronology of not only the 4th Marine Division since World War II, but in part, the role of the Marine Corps Reserve in the intervening years.

The recent history of the 4th Marine Division, as the Ground Combat Element of the Division/Wing/FSSG team, and now Marine Forces Reserve is a testimony to the selfless sacrifice of our Reserve and Active Duty Marines and Sailors who have filled our ranks throughout the years. Their dedication and professionalism has positioned the 4th Marine Division to the forefront of readiness and proficiency. The Division has evolved from a decorated combat veteran of World War II, through deactivation in 1945, reactivation in 1966, and now three decades of unparalleled growth and maturation. The mobilization, deployment, and combat efficiency of the the 4th Marine Division units in Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm clearly demonstrates the superior training and readiness levels of our Reserve.

With the end of the Cold War and the resultant downsizing of the Active Component, the combat capability of the United States more and more depends on the strength of our Reserve. The traditional view of the Reserve and 4th Marine Division has changed from individual and small unit provider, to a major force provider with a warfighting capability at any level, as part of the Total Force combat power of the United States Marine Corps. At the same time, the Division and Marine Forces Reserve is proactive in our local communities, providing support where needed and informing citizens about the mission of the Marine Corps. No small task, this multiple mission requirement calls for Marines and Sailors of extraordinary ability with a dedication and zeal that stands as a proud demonstration of our core values.

This book stands as a tribute to the New Breed, the Marines and Sailors, their families, the Commanders, of the 4th Marine Division with thanks for their sacrifice to Corps and country. Semper Fidelis.



Brigadier General, United States Marine Corps Reserve  
Commanding General, 4th Marine Division

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Col. John McGill, USMC (Ret) and his staff at MTU CA-4 wrote a scholarly, unpublished history of the 4th Division in 1977 covering the period 1962-1977. Their dust-covered manuscript was found in New Orleans in 1995 and came to life as our primary research source for the first two decades of reactivation. Thanks for your outstanding writing/research effort.

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# ***Chapter I***

## ***Creation - World War II: 1941-1945***

When the United States entered World War II in December 1941, the Marine Corps had an authorized strength of only 45,000 men.<sup>1</sup> The Corps had only two operational divisions, the 1st and 2d, and they had been in existence less than a year. A few months after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, both of these divisions were in combat, engaged in desperate jungle fighting on the islands of Guadalcanal and Tulagi. The 3d Marine Division, which was formed in September 1942, was immediately marked for combat operations in Bougainville, in the northern Solomon Islands. Additional combat divisions would be necessary if the Marine Corps was to support the projected amphibious operations in the Pacific envisioned by Navy and Marine Corps planners. By July of 1943, the active duty strength of the Marine Corps had risen dramatically to 21,938 officers and 287,621 Marines, allowing the Commandant to order the formation of an additional division and air wing.<sup>2</sup>

### ***4th Marine Division: Activation and Training***

The World War II Marine Corps did not create its new divisions from whole cloth, but started them from a core of existing units staffing them, as much as possible, with veteran combat Marines. New enlistees, draftees, and reservists then filled out the ranks. The nucleus for the new 4th Marine Division was the 23d Marines, under the command of Colonel Louis R. Jones. This regiment had been activated on July 20, 1942 as part of the 3d Marine Division but was detached on February 15, 1943 and assigned to the 4th Division. The following month, the 24th Marines was activated and also assigned to the new division. The final rifle regiment, the 25th Marines, was formed in May 1943 from elements of the 23d Marines. That same month, the 4th Service Battalion, the Ordnance Company, the Divisional Headquarters Company, and the 4th Signal Company were all activated.<sup>3</sup> In June, the 14th Marines was reactivated to provide artillery support and the 20th Marines was formed to become the Division's engineer element.<sup>4</sup>

Still just a division on paper, these newly created combat units of the 4th Marine Division were not even assigned to the same base. The 24th Marines, the 4th Tank Battalion, the 2d Battalion, 14th Marines, one battery and four other headquarters and support companies had formed at Camp Pendleton, California while the remainder of the Division was three thousand miles away training at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina.

The East Coast units of 4th Marine Division traveled west from Camp Lejeune to Camp Pendleton starting on July 9, 1943. The 25th Marines traveled to the West Coast aboard transport ships through the Panama Canal. The remainder of the East Coast Echelon traveled to California by train. The Division was formally activated at Camp Pendleton under the command of Brigadier General James L. Underhill on August 16, 1943. Two days later, the former Assistant to the Commandant, Major General Harry Schmidt, assumed command of the Division, with Brigadier General Underhill serving as his assistant division commander.<sup>5</sup> By September, the last units had arrived from the East Coast and the entire division was together for the first time.<sup>6</sup>

Conditions at the recently created Camp Pendleton were primitive. Established on the vast Santa Margarita cattle ranch, the huge California amphibious training base had only been in existence since March

1942. Because the base was only intended to serve as a temporary facility, it was built to minimum standards throughout.<sup>7</sup> Faced with the pressing demands of the looming Pacific campaign, priority was given to the construction of training areas, a hospital, a boat basin, and the installation of water and sewer lines. Little consideration was given to the comfort of Marines who would train there. The Marines of the 4th Marine Division lived in hastily constructed tent camps, had no messhalls, and washed and shaved in cold water.<sup>8</sup> Few roads had been built. The ones that existed were unpaved and so were muddy when it rained and dusty the rest of the time. Crowded training schedules and limited transportation ensured that there were few opportunities for liberty. The austere living conditions and demanding training unknowingly proved ideal to prepare the 4th for the rigors of combat which lay ahead.

The 4th Division began training as a complete unit in September 1943. Elements of the Division trained in the vicinity of the beaches and canyons of Camp Pendleton during the remainder of 1943. Assault elements focused on combat drills, ship-to-shore movement, demolitions, pillbox clearing, and coordination of supporting arms. The new division held its first division level amphibious landing exercise on Aliso Canyon beaches on December 14 and 15th, 1943.<sup>8</sup> The division held a final rehearsal for upcoming amphibious combat operations on San Clemente Island off the coast of Southern California on January 2nd and 3rd, 1944. Under live supporting fire, the Marines landed and "captured" the island the first day, reembarked aboard their ships and repeated the entire operation the next day.<sup>9</sup> Although few knew it at the time, the 4th Marine Division's training had been geared toward preparing them for a specific amphibious operation that awaited the Division in the Pacific. The Division's amphibious training would soon be put to the ultimate test.

Within days of the completion of their training, the 4th Marine Division, now fully equipped and numbering 17,086 men, was combat-loaded aboard ships of Task Force 53 in San Diego harbor. The 4th was no longer in training but was a fully operational Marine Corps amphibious division off to war in the Central Pacific as part of the 5th Amphibious Corps. In all of World War II, the 4th Marine Division would have the distinction of being the only Marine division that was mounted out and staged into combat directly following training in the continental United States.<sup>10</sup>

For most of the men, this was their first time at sea, an introduction to the discomforts and tedium commonly found aboard naval transport ships which were crammed with men and equipment. The Division left San Diego on January 13, 1944, stopping in Lahaina Roads, Maui on the 21st to refuel before sailing to the Marshall Islands the next day. The 4,400 mile sea voyage from California to the Marshalls required 25 days to complete. Shipboard days were filled with physical conditioning, letter writing, weapons cleaning, sleep, card playing, and, of course, thoughts of what lay ahead.

## ***Roi-Namur: Kwajalein Atoll***

Even before the 4th Marine Division had completed their training in California, its first combat assignment had been determined. By mid-October 1943, Admiral Chester Nimitz, the Commander-in-Chief Pacific Ocean Area (CinCPOA), selected the 4th Division to participate in the upcoming Operation Flintlock.<sup>11</sup> The 4th Division was designated as the Northern Landing Force and traveled west aboard ships of Task Force 53 under the command of Rear Admiral Richard L. Conolly.

The Division's assault objectives were the heavily defended Japanese occupied twin islands of Roi-Namur in the Kwajalein Atoll of the Marshall Islands in the Central Pacific. Roi-Namur were two tiny islands

in the northern part of the atoll. The island of Roi was the site of a major Japanese three-runway airbase. The airbase's hangers, machine shops, and other supporting facilities were located on the island of Namur. The two islands were so close to each other they were connected by a narrow strip of sand and a 500 yard long causeway. Some 2,100 miles southwest of Pearl Harbor, the Roi-Namur islands were important objectives in the American drive across the Pacific. This Japanese airfield threatened vital lines of communications in the area. Nearby Kwajalein island to the south served as the Japanese's major naval base in the Marshalls. That island, and Ebeye island, would be the objective of the Army's 7th Infantry Division, veterans of the Aleutians campaign. The 22d Marines and the Army's 106th Infantry Regiment, of the 27th Division, were held in reserve.

If the principal islands of Kwajalein atoll were captured, the United States would not only be displacing the Japanese from valuable air and naval bases, but it would also secure a strategic staging point for the continued prosecution of the war to the Marianas and through the rest of the Central Pacific. The assault on Kwajalein Atoll would represent the first time the United States attempted to capture territory which the Japanese had controlled before the war.

The Japanese gained possession of the Kwajalein Atoll, with its 97 islands and islets, from Germany in 1914. As the largest atoll in the world, approximately 65 miles long and about 18 miles wide, Kwajalein had an expansive lagoon. Japanese ownership of Kwajalein was formalized under the Covenant of the League of Nations shortly after the end of the First World War. Under the provisions of Article 22 of the Covenant, the atoll was not to be used for military or naval installations. In all likelihood, however, the Japanese began militarizing the islands sometime after 1935, when they left the League.<sup>12</sup> By the time World War II began, the atoll had become the major Japanese base of operations in the Marshall and Gilbert Islands. It was the headquarters for the Japanese's 6th Base Headquarters and was the hub of all Japanese military activity in the Marshall and Gilbert Islands. To those who controlled the islands, the atoll had the potential to be an outstanding forward naval base. Wrestling control of the islands from the Japanese would not be easy.

In the Kwajalein Atoll, Roi-Namur were the most heavily defended islands. Armaments included four 12.7cm twin-mounted dual-purpose guns, four 37mm guns, nineteen 13.2mm single-mount dual-purpose guns, and ten 20mm anti-aircraft guns. The Japanese defenders had skillfully employed their weapons which were protected by more than fifty pillboxes, machine guns nests and rifle pits. These defensive positions in turn were improved by barbed wire and antitank ditches.<sup>13</sup> In Japanese tradition, the 3,500 to 3,800 man garrison on Roi-Namur, most belonging to the 24th Naval Air Flotilla and the 4th Fleet Construction Department Detachment, had been ordered to defend the island to the last man.<sup>14</sup>

At the time of the American attack on the Kwajalein atoll, Japanese island defense doctrine still dictated that an amphibious assault was to be resisted violently when it came ashore and then counterattacked during the initial vulnerable stages of the landing.<sup>15</sup> These defensive tactics were intended to prevent the Americans attackers from establishing a secure beachhead. The costly amphibious assault on the tiny Betio Islet in the Tarawa Atoll by the 2d Marine Division, just a few weeks before the planned assault on Kwajalein, demonstrated the bloody price these Japanese tactics could exact. The 76 hour Battle of Tarawa cost the Americans well over three thousand casualties, including 1,085 dead. Tarawa's appalling casualty figures had a sobering affect on Navy and Marine Corps planners working out the final details for Operation Flintlock. Before the landing, Admiral Turner predicted that Roi-Namur would be more difficult than the Tarawa landing.<sup>16</sup> Roi-Namur appeared to be no easy assignment for any Marine division. It appeared especially difficult for one like the 4th which was going into combat untested.

One of the lessons learned from Tarawa was the need for greater and more accurate fire support before and during all phases of the amphibious assault. Japanese defenders on Roi-Namur were, therefore, subjected to a withering rain of fire from the sea, the air, and from neighboring islands. The new battleship North Carolina, with her nine 16-inch guns, fired on Roi on January 29 and 30, 1944.<sup>17</sup> For two days before the planned invasion, naval gunfire from the aging battleships Maryland, Tennessee, and Colorado, along with five cruisers and nineteen destroyers, systematically bombarded targets on Roi-Namur. Approximately 25,000 shells of all sizes rained down on the beleaguered islands before and during the assault. Carrier based naval aircraft and Army B-25 medium bombers flying from the Gilbert Islands contributed bombs and heavy machine gun fire to the pre-invasion devastation.<sup>18</sup>

Units of the 14th Marines landed on neighboring islands, Mellu, Ennuebing, Ennubirr, Ennumennet, and Ennugarret. The artillerymen emplaced their 75mm and 105mm howitzers to provide additional fire support on Roi-Namur. Rockets blasting off from off-shore LCI(G)'s (Landing Craft Infantry, Gunboats) added further noise and fury to the withering pre-invasion bombardment of the Japanese held islands.

The 4th Marine Division's primary assault on Roi-Namur began on February 1, 1944. Slightly before noon, the 23rd and 24th Marines each landed two battalions abreast on the beaches from the lagoon side of the islands, where Japanese defenses were believed to be less well developed.<sup>19</sup> The 23d Marines attacked Roi while the 24th Marines landed on Namur. On Roi, initial Japanese resistance was so light, the 23d Marines had to purposely slow down its advance to keep from advancing into their own supporting naval gunfire. The commander of the 23d Marines reported by radio, "*No opposition near the beach.*"<sup>20</sup> The first four waves of Marines assaulting Roi landed and advanced standing up.<sup>21</sup> Marine M4 medium tanks raced ahead of the infantry and maneuvered through and around Japanese defenses to reach the northeast corner of the island by early afternoon. By evening, Roi was firmly in the possession of the 4th Marine Division.

On Namur, Japanese resistance was better organized and considerably stronger than it had been on Roi. Still the 24th's progress was steady, if not as rapid as the 23th's advance on the open and lightly defended Roi. In addition to having the majority of the Japanese defenders and more natural obstacles, Namur had been better prepared with anti-tank ditches and several heavily reinforced blockhouses. Compared to Roi, Namur was also heavily overgrown with vegetation including palms, breadfruit trees, and shrubs.<sup>22</sup> Fortunately for these Marines, the furious naval bombardment of the island, coupled with aircraft strikes and artillery barrages from the 14th Marines, had so weakened the Japanese defenders, that the Marines were able to move steadily forward. An after-battle assessment later concluded that between 50 and 70 per cent of the Japanese defenders had been killed by the pre-invasion bombardment.

Many of the Marines who died in the assault on Namur were killed when one of their demolition charges ignited a Japanese munitions bunker that contained aerial bombs and torpedo warheads. The blast killed 20 Marines and wounded another 100.<sup>23</sup> The massive explosion occurred at 1305 on February 1, 1944 and temporarily halted the advance. The blast made the entire island shudder and produced a cloud of black smoke that rose a thousand feet into the air. The force of the explosion was so great that it knocked an artillery spotter aircraft from the 4th Battalion, 14th Marines, out of the air.<sup>24</sup> Major Charles F. Duchein, an assistant operations officer for the 4th Division, who was in another aircraft over Namur exclaimed, "*Great God Almighty! The whole damn island has blown up.*"<sup>26</sup> As the dust settled and the smoke cleared, the dug in Japanese defenders resumed their tenacious defense of the remainder of the island.

Spirited fire fights continued as the Marines moved steadily northward. As night fell, the Marines dug into defensive positions and waited for the inevitable nighttime Japanese counterattacks. After an eventful

night of Japanese attacks and hand-to-hand combat, the 24th Marines advanced the next day. The island was secured by 1215 on February 2, 1944.

Brief as the battle for Roi-Namur islands was, 199 Marines died in battle and another 547 were wounded. Four members of the 4th Marine Division were awarded the Medal of Honor for their actions in the battle. Japanese dead and captured numbered 3,563.<sup>25</sup> In addition to capturing assigned objectives, Marine casualties were considered remarkably low when compared to other amphibious assaults.

American naval and Marine commanders also learned many valuable new lessons about amphibious warfare including the role of air and naval artillery support. The Battle of Kwajalein demonstrated that, done correctly, amphibious warfare could secure fortified objectives quickly and with a minimum loss of life. Amphibious battles did not have to be protracted affairs, as they had been in the Guadalcanal, Bougainville, and Cape Gloucester campaigns. Nor did an amphibious assault have to result in the prohibitive casualties associated with landings like Tarawa. Much of what had been learned at Kwajalein by the 4th Marine Division and other participating units would be applied in future combat in the Pacific.

The American victory at Kwajalein cost the Japanese some of their most valuable bases in the Central Pacific. The loss of these bases cut Japanese communication with Wake Island. Japanese garrisons on Mille, Wotje, Maloelap, and Jaluit had been bypassed and isolated. The United States, in turn, gained both a forward air base within striking distance of the Japanese stronghold of Truk and excellent fleet anchorage in the atoll's 60-mile-long lagoon. The conquest of the Kwajalein Atoll had been considered so rapid and successful that a planned future assault on Eniwetok, planned for May, 1944 was moved up to the middle of February, 1944.<sup>26</sup>

The battle for Kwajalein Atoll bloodied the 4th Marine Division and forever transformed it from an untested green unit to a combat veteran in one engagement. Major General Holland M. Smith, commanding general of the 5th Amphibious Force, said, that before the Marshall Islands campaign the 4th had been "*a new, untried division*," and that after the battle, "*it now takes the place with the First, Second and Third Marine Divisions*."<sup>27</sup> The 4th Marine Division's quick success with Roi-Namur, however, could not have prepared them for what they would face in their next major combat operation, the invasions of Saipan and Tinian.

## ***Camp Maui***

Before returning to combat, Marines of the 4th Division needed time to join replacements for the Division's casualties on Kwajalein Atoll, reequip themselves, and train for their next amphibious assault. In February 1944, surviving veterans of the Division arrived at the sleepy port of Kahului, on the northern shore of Maui in the Hawaiian Islands. At this point in the war, their new Pacific forward base was still in the preliminary building stage with little more than muddy roads and half-finished tent foundations amid green fields of pineapples and sugarcane.<sup>28</sup> Still, Maui did offer the 4th Division a place to rest, relax and rebuild prior to their next battle. While at their forward camp on Maui, the 4th Division also held formations to present awards, mostly Purple Hearts, which had been earned during the battle for Roi-Namur. As the Division recovered from battle, training continued with renewed emphasis on attacking fortified positions.<sup>29</sup> In May, 1944, the 4th Marine Division embarked aboard ships for their next operation. This time their objective would be in the Mariana Islands deep within the Japan's inner defensive perimeter.

## *Saipan and Tinian*

The Mariana Islands, including Saipan and Tinian, were more than 3,200 miles from Pearl Harbor but only 1,250 miles from Tokyo. Possession of these islands, along with Guam, would provide the United States with naval and air bases from which it could control the Marianas and the surrounding ocean. The islands were also big enough for airfields that could support the Army Air Force's new long-range B-29 Superfortress heavy bombers coming into service in mid-1944. Early attempts to base B-29s at remote and primitive bases on the Chinese mainland failed because of insurmountable logistic and maintenance problems.<sup>30</sup> Marianas based B-29s, however, could be easily supported by sea and would be able to bomb military and industrial targets on the Japanese mainland. Not surprisingly, the Japanese were zealously committed to their defense.

The island of Saipan was a linchpin in the Japanese defense of the Central Pacific. It was the headquarters for the Japanese Central Pacific Fleet, the 31st Army, and the Northern Marianas Defense Force. Given its importance, the island was defended by an impressive force including Japan's 43d Division (reinforced), the 47th Mixed Brigade, a tank regiment, an infantry battalion, an antiaircraft regiment, two regiments of engineers, and two transportation companies. In all, the Japanese Army had 22,702 combat troops on Saipan at the time the 4th Division was to attack. The Japanese Navy also had substantial forces on Saipan, including the 55th Naval Guard Force and the 1st Yokosuka Special Naval Landing Force which, along with miscellaneous other units, totaled 6,960 men. The total Japanese military force defending Saipan was a formidable 29,662 men, entrenched in well-prepared defenses.<sup>31</sup> To make an amphibious assault even more difficult, Saipan also had several towns and a civilian population of about 20,000.

The Saipan landing was part of a larger American assault on the Marianas. Along with Saipan and Tinian, Guam was also to be captured by a total American landing of more than 165,000 troops. These Marines and soldiers were supported by some 800 ships belonging to the United States 5th Fleet under the command of Admiral Raymond A. Spruance. The American amphibious assault plan for Saipan called for three full divisions: the 4th and 2d Marine Divisions landing eight battalions abreast on a 4,000 yard stretch of the island's southwestern beaches, and the U.S. Army's 27th Division, a former New York National Guard unit, as a floating reserve. The 4th, still under the command of Major General Schmidt, was responsible for the capture of the airfield at Aslito, outside the town of Charan Kanoa, on the southern portion of the island. The 23d and 25th Marines were the primary assault elements and the 24th Marines was assigned as the division reserve.

Using the lessons learned at Roi-Namur, intensive pre-invasion naval bombardments and air strikes on Japanese positions began on June 11, 1944. To one Japanese defender, the American invasion fleet, "*looked like a large city had suddenly appeared offshore*."<sup>32</sup> The American attackers began landing across the southwest beaches of Saipan at 0840 on June 15, 1944. 8,000 Marines were ashore within twenty minutes.<sup>33</sup> At the time of the landing, the 24th Marines conducted a demonstration landing from the north to draw Japanese forces away from the real landing beaches in the south. Marines storming ashore were immediately met with intense and accurate fire from Japanese mortars, howitzers, and antiboat guns. Enemy resistance proved far more spirited and deadly than it had on Roi-Namur and, very quickly, commanders decided to land the reserve 27th Infantry Division.

During the first 24 hours of the landing, the 4th Marine Division had its hands full getting Marines and equipment ashore while simultaneously fighting off determined Japanese counterattacks and infiltration attempts. By June 17, 1944, the beachhead was secured so that the 4th Marine Division, supported by the

newly arrived 27th Infantry Division, launched an offensive against Aslito Field. On June 18, 1944, the combined (Army and Marine) force had captured the field and reached the eastern side of the island, cutting Japanese defenses in two. On June 20th, the 4th and 27th Divisions joined with the 2d Division and turned northward toward the bulk of the remaining Japanese forces. During this phase of the advance, the 4th Division was responsible for moving up the eastern side of the island and capturing the Kagman Peninsula.

As the island narrowed to the north, the final assault was conducted by the 27th Infantry on the left, the 4th on the right, with the 2d now in reserve. On July 4, 1944 the northern towns and ports had been recaptured by a fierce Japanese banzai charge that broke through the Army positions. This setback prompted the decision to reintroduce the 2d Marine Division into battle. Saipan was finally secured on July 9, 1944. The Japanese took their orders about fighting to the end literally. Of the 43,682 Japanese defenders on the island at the beginning of the assault, 41,244 died in the battle.<sup>34</sup>

The Battle of Saipan cost the 4th Marine Division 5,981 casualties and left the survivors in need of rest and reorganization.<sup>35</sup> They would have little time for either, however, since the Division had already been scheduled to conduct another amphibious assault on Tinian, a little more than three miles away, on July 24, 1944. The surviving Marines of the Division received a new commander, Major General Clifton B. Cates, on July 12, 1944. The Division completed mopping up on Saipan on July 16, 1944 leaving only a week for them to get ready for their amphibious landing on Tinian. Fortunately for the Marines of the 4th Division, Tinian was smaller in size and reportedly less well-defended than Saipan had been. Japanese defenses, however, could not be under-estimated. The island was defended by the Japanese 50th Infantry Regiment. In all, there were about 9,000 Japanese defenders dug in on Tinian.

The 4th Marine Division was selected to lead the American assault on Tinian with the 2d Marine Division following in trace. The Army's 27th Infantry Division would remain on Saipan as the reserve. Starting on July 11, 1944, the defenders of Tinian experienced the terror of the now familiar pre-invasion naval gun fire and aerial bombing and strafing. Napalm incendiary bombs were used for the first time against Japanese fixed positions on Tinian. After the fall of Saipan, American field artillery from the island was added to the destructive barrage. Army Air Force P-47 fighter-bombers of the 194th and 73d Squadrons, based at Isley Field on Saipan, unloaded their ordinance on Japanese defensive positions on Tinian. The rain of steel and explosives built to a crescendo as H-hour approached.

Before the first elements of the 4th Marine Division stepped onto the beach, Tinian's Japanese defenders came under the fire of eleven battalions of shore-based artillery, two battleships, a heavy cruiser, and two destroyers. The landing beaches were so obscured by smoke from the incoming fire, that guide planes had to lead the first waves of landing craft ashore. This overwhelming preparatory fire proved extremely effective. Assault elements of the 24th and 25th Marines met only limited small arms fire when they reached the beach at 0750 on July 24, 1944.<sup>36</sup>

By day's end, it was apparent that the landing was successful. The entire division was ashore, units established communications with one another, supplies were arriving, and enemy resistance remained weak.

With nightfall, however, came the expected Japanese counterattacks. In heavy, continuous, and coordinated assaults that lasted from 0200 to 0700 on July 25, 1944, the Japanese attacked the Marine positions with furious Banzai charges, tank assaults, artillery barrages, and infiltration attempts. Yet when morning came, the 4th Marine Division's lines remained unbroken. The bodies of 1,241 dead Japanese along Marine lines evidenced the ferocity of the previous night's assaults.<sup>37</sup> The loss of so many Japanese troops so early in the battle made the Japanese's continued defense of the island very difficult.

As the Marines moved inland, they discovered that Tinian was far better suited to offensive operations than Saipan had been. The terrain was flatter and the roads were better, making the Marine's mechanized operations more effective. Best of all, Japanese resistance was greatly weakened. On July 27, 1944, the Marines advanced 1,800 yards. The following day, the Marines advanced an additional 6,000 yards and captured one of the island's airfields. With the backs of the Japanese defenders to the sea, their resistance stiffened. Using recent training at Camp Maui to good affect, 4th Division Marines employed flame throwers, demolition charges, and automatic weapon's fire to route Japanese soldiers out of caves, bunkers, and other defensive positions on the southern portion of the island. One of the most difficult aspects of the final phase of the battle was convincing surviving Japanese soldiers and the thousands of civilians on the island to surrender. As had happened on Saipan, however, many chose suicide rather than to surrender.

In many ways, the Marianas campaign signaled the beginning of the end for Japan. In addition to losing the islands of Saipan, Tinian, and Guam, the Japanese also suffered a crushing defeat at sea when remaining units of their fleet vainly attempted to fight off the American assault on the Marianas. In the epic Battle of the Philippine Sea, the largest carrier battle in history, the Japanese lost three fleet aircraft carriers. Also during the battle, in what has been called the "*Great Marianas Turkey Shoot*," the Japanese lost approximately 480 aircraft. After the battle, Prince Higashikuni, Commander in Chief of Home Defense Headquarters, testified that, "*the war was lost when the Marianas were taken away from Japan and when we heard the B-29's were coming out.*"<sup>38</sup>

Within a few months, the islands of Tinian, Saipan, and Guam were transformed into major air bases that would support the 20th Air Force's campaign against Japanese industry and cities. Guam also became the site of an advanced submarine base and the headquarters for Admiral Nimitz and his staff. The loss of the Marianas created a major crisis within the highest levels of Japanese government. Prime Minister Hideki Tojo, who had declared that Saipan was "*an impregnable fortress*" and was the original architect of Japanese aggression in Asia and the Pacific, was forced to resign and was replaced by a more moderate government headed by General Kuroha Kiyotaka.

## ***Return to Camp Maui***

By August 14, 1944, the 4th Marine Division had put the Marianas campaign behind it. Once again, the Division needed time to recover before being committed to battle again. The landing on Tinian cost the Division 290 dead, 1,515 wounded and 24 missing. Counting the casualties from Saipan, more than a quarter of the 4th Division had been killed, wounded, or declared missing during the Marianas campaign. For their action on Saipan and Tinian, the Division was awarded the Presidential Unit Citation. More appreciated at the time, however, was the period of rest the Division had earned at the now familiar Camp Maui. The camp itself became more civilized as the war progressed. By this time it offered a post exchange, movie screens, stages, buildings for officers and tents for enlisted Marines, libraries, officer and non-commissioned officers (NCO) clubs, chapels, electric lights, and a public address system.<sup>39</sup>

In addition to rest and reorganization, the 4th Marine Division's stay at Camp Maui provided them with an opportunity to begin training for their next combat operation, the landing and seizure of Iwo Jima. The beach at Maalaea Bay was used to practice amphibious landings. The island's rugged terrain was ideal for conditioning hikes and tactical field problems. Marine and Army units on the island constructed elaborate training areas, including all sorts of weapon's ranges, a jungle fighting center, a village fighting course, a cave fighting course, an infiltration course, a demolition area, and even an area to train motor transport drivers.<sup>40</sup>

## *Iwo Jima*

The fourth and final amphibious assault the 4th Marine Division would participate in during World War II was the monumental Battle of Iwo Jima in February 1945. Iwo Jima was only 750 miles from Tokyo and was their next major objective on the way to the Japanese mainland. The island itself had little to recommend it, a barren and waterless volcanic rock that had largely been ignored by history before World War II. Possession of the strategically located island by the United States, however, would shorten the war.

Iwo Jima had three airfields, two which were operational and one which was under construction. The Japanese used these to launch bombing raids against the new American bases in the Marianas and fighter attacks against the B-29 formations traveling to and from Japan's mainland. However, under American control, Iwo Jima's airfield could be used to provide an emergency landing strip for B-29s that were either damaged or low on fuel after flying. The island airstrips could also be used to station long-range P-51 Mustang fighters to escort the bombers to their targets. The Japanese were painfully aware of the strategic importance of Iwo Jima and had prepared extensive and formidable defenses.

The American attack on Iwo Jima began in August 1944 when B-24 Liberator bombers, of the newly formed Strategic Air Force, Pacific Ocean Areas, first bombed the island defenses. Many more bombing raids followed. From December 8, 1944 until the Marine landing on February 19, 1945, Iwo Jima was bombed every day by American warplanes taking off from Saipan. Naval bombardment also added to the devastation of explosives falling on the island fortress. In all, even before the landing force arrived off the island, the Navy fired some 23,000 rounds of naval gunfire, ranging from 5-inch to 16-inch shells.

The impacting bombs and shells might have been more effective had it not been for the foresight and thoroughness of the 23,000 Japanese defenders. Under the command of Lieutenant General Tadamichi Kuribayashi, the Japanese troops had dug themselves into the island's steaming black volcanic soil and rocky base. The Japanese commander fully appreciated the importance of his mission when he wrote his son, that "*this island is the gateway to Japan.*"<sup>41</sup>

In addition to the island's many natural caves which the Japanese defenders pressed into service as underground shelters, they also added coastal gun emplacements. The defensive positions consisted of more than 240 light and heavy antiaircraft weapons, at least 434 blockhouses, covered artillery positions, and pillboxes.<sup>42</sup> The Japanese also had twelve light and twelve heavy tanks, huge mortars, and rockets launchers, some of which could fire eight inch projectiles weighing 200 pounds.<sup>43</sup> One historian wrote that Iwo Jima's defenses were, "*in all probability the most elaborate in construction, the most numerous in density, and the best integrated of any in the Pacific, if not in all World War II.*"<sup>44</sup> While the air and naval bombardment would certainly smash some of these defenses, most would have to be individually captured or destroyed by Marine infantry.

By now a veteran division with several amphibious landings behind it, the 4th Division was assigned, along with the 5th Marine Division, to land in the first assault wave. The 3d Marine Division was held in reserve. Altogether, the Marine landing forces within the 5th Amphibious Corps, numbered 70,647 troops and was under the command of 4th Division's first commander, Major General Harry Schmidt.<sup>45</sup> The 23d and 25th Marines would lead the Division with the 24th utilized as the division reserve. The 23d Marines, commanded by Colonel Walter W. Winsinger, was ordered to seize the critical Motoyama Airfield Number 1 and then turn northeast toward the Motoyama Airfield Number 2. The 25th Marines, under the command of Colonel John R. Lanigan, was to protect the landing's right flank, support the 23rd Marines in the capture of Airfield Number 1, and seize additional landing beaches on the islands southeast coast.

Early on the morning of February 19, 1945 under the umbrella of air strikes and naval gunfire, the amphibious tractors and landing craft of the first wave started toward the beaches of Iwo Jima. Initial Japanese resistance was light as they waited for the beaches to become congested with men and supplies. As soon as the American naval gunfire lifted, the Japanese defenders opened up with intensive and accurate mortar, artillery, and small arms fire on the beaches and incoming boats. High seas and heavy surf made getting men and equipment ashore even more difficult and dangerous. The sand of island itself contributed to the Marines' problems as the loose volcanic soil made movement off the beaches difficult even for tracked vehicles.

Still the 4th managed to overcome these obstacles, getting tanks ashore by 0950 and two battalions of artillery on land by 1500.<sup>46</sup> By nightfall of February 19, 1945, the 4th and 5th Divisions were in full contact with each other and had secured a beachhead 3,000 yards long and about 1,500 yards deep. The cost was steep at 2,300 casualties.<sup>47</sup> Some units were particularly hard hit. Battalion Landing Team (BLT) 3/25 lost a staggering 50 percent of its men.<sup>48</sup>

By 1600, February 20, 1945, the 23d Marines had made good progress capturing its first major objective, the Airfield Number 1 in the central part of the island. For the 25th Marines, progress was slower and more difficult. The rugged terrain it encountered, coupled with mines, prevented the use of tanks. The Japanese defense continued to make the 4th Division Marines pay a heavy price for every yard they advanced. By the end of the second day, the 4th had suffered an additional two thousand casualties.<sup>49</sup>

During daylight, the Marines commenced preparatory artillery barrages and launched attacks against the seemingly endless array of mutually supported minefields, dug-in tanks, pillboxes, blockhouses, and machine gun emplacements. By night, the Japanese attempted to infiltrate the American lines and launched determined counterattacks.

By the night of February 21, 1945, the continuous brutal fighting had reduced the 4th's combat efficiency to 68 percent.<sup>50</sup> Still they continued forward, advancing, on average, 150 to 250 yards a day against fanatical resistance. By the end of February 22, units of the 4th Marine Division had reached their second major objective, the Airfield Number 2. Fighting did not, however, become any easier as progress was made. The Japanese had expertly organized their defense so as the 4th Division's Marines advanced, they found themselves faced with one heavily defended line after another.

Although the 4th Marine Division steadily advanced, it was experiencing horrific casualties. On March 3, the 25th Marines lost so many men in action that it had to be relieved. That same day, the 4th's overall combat efficiency had fell to a dangerously low 50 percent. Still, the 4th continued its pressure on the Japanese defenders, forcing them out of their defensive positions and into making costly and futile counterattacks. By March 11, the Division had succeeded in crossing through the center of the island. It battled through the heart of the Japanese defenses to reach the southeast coast of the island. With the exception of a few remaining small pockets of resistance, the 4th Marine Division had crushed the resolute and entrenched enemy in its zone of action in only twenty days. The entire island was declared secured on March 16, 1945. Three days later the Division returned to its ships and left Iwo behind.

Remarking after the Battle of Iwo Jima, Admiral Raymond Spruance concluded that *"in view of the character of the defenses and the stubborn resistance encountered, it is fortunate that less seasoned or less resolute troops were not committed."*<sup>51</sup> Fleet Admiral Nimitz noted, that, *"among Americans who served on Iwo Island uncommon valor was a common virtue."*<sup>52</sup>

The Battle of Iwo Jima cost the 4th Marine Division 9,090 casualties, including 1,731 killed in action.<sup>53</sup> Casualties in this one battle represented more than 40 percent of the division. The cost of the human sacrifice was not in vain. Before the war ended, more than 20,000 American airmen in crippled planes landed safely on Iwo Jima's airfields.<sup>54</sup> In recognition of its contributions and sacrifices in the Battle of Iwo Jima, the 4th Division was awarded both a Presidential Unit Citation and a Navy Unit Commendation.

After Iwo, the 4th returned to its home base at Camp Maui, to once again rest and reorganize for future combat. At this point in the war, the 4th Division was preparing for what was expected to be its most difficult and costly combat to date, Operation Coronet. This final battle was to have been the second stage of the invasion of the Japanese mainland that was planned to land on Honshu's Tokyo Plain in March 1946. Once again the Division went through its familiar cycle of rest, reorganization, resupply, and training. Individual replacements from the United States filled the billets of those killed or wounded on Iwo Jima. New equipment arrived to replace what had been damaged or destroyed in combat. Fortunately, however, this preparation turned out to be unnecessary when the Japanese government finally surrendered after B-29s, taking off from the island of Tinian, destroyed the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki with atomic bombs.

## ***Return to Camp Pendleton and Deactivation***

When the Japanese finally announced their willingness to surrender, on August 14, 1945, the 4th Division was selected to be the first Marine division to be sent back to the United States, with the first units arriving on October 6, 1945. As the first of 4th Division's units arrived in San Diego, they traveled by truck to Camp Pendleton for demobilization. The 25th Marines was billeted in 16 Area while the rest of the Division was assigned to 17 Area.<sup>55</sup> On November 9, 1945, Major General Cates and the "rear echelon," of the Division, including 52 officers and 846 enlisted Marines, arrived in San Diego Bay aboard the escort aircraft carrier *Kassan Bay*.<sup>56</sup> Once again, the Division was re-united at the place it had been originally activated.

On November 28, 1945, the 4th Marine Division was officially deactivated. Career Marines and those with time remaining on their enlistments were reassigned to other units while many Marines, who had accumulated enough points for discharge, were sent to separation centers and returned to civilian life. Many former members of the 4th Marine Division retained an affiliation with the Marine Corps by staying in the active Reserve.

In its short but eventful two years, three months, and 13 days of wartime activation, the 4th Marine Division participated in four of the most significant amphibious assaults of World War II -- Roi-Namur, Saipan, Tinian, and Iwo Jima. Created as an amphibious fighting force, the Division spent approximately five months at sea traveling to and from its battles. Its artillery regiment, the 14th Marines fired almost 350,000 rounds of artillery fire.<sup>57</sup> Eight members of the division earned Medals of Honor and the Division itself was awarded the Presidential Unit Citation Streamer with One Bronze Star (Saipan and Tinian; Iwo Jima), a Navy Unit Commendation Streamer (Iwo Jima), the Asiatic-Pacific Campaign Streamer with Four Bronze Stars, and the World War II Victory Streamer. In the course of its brief existence, 3,298 members of the 4th Division were killed in action and another 14,424 were wounded.

## Notes


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# The 4th Marine Division Patch

*Worn on Saipan, it had a gold "4" on a scarlet background, the official colors of the U.S. Marine Corps. The emblem was designed by SSgt John Fabion, a member of the Division's Public Affairs Office before the Marshalls Campaign. His commanding officer was astonished to find that when the Division attacked Roi Islet in Kwajalean Atoll in the Marshall Islands (January 1944), the layout of the runways on the airstrip there were an exact replica.*

*Chapin, John C., Captain, U.S. Marine Corps Reserve (Ret), Breaching the Marianas: The Battle for the Saipan; Marines in World War II, History and Museums Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, Washington, DC, 1994.*



**ROI - NAMUR ISLANDS**



***Sniper hunting on Roi Islet airfield during the first battle test of the 4th Marine Division.***



***4th Marine Division Marines pinned down on the beach at Namur, during the Battle of the Marshalls.***



***Many Marines died in the assault on Namur when one of their demolition charges ignited a Japanese munitions bunker that contained aerial bombs and torpedo warheads. The blast killed 20 Marines and wounded another 100.***



*A half-track rumbles forward over splintered trees and rubble, heading for battle on Namur.*



*BGen. S. C. Cumming, Assistant Division Commander, 4th MARDIV (left) discusses observations from near Hill 500 on Saipan (June 1944) with 25th Marines Commanding Officer, Col. M. Batchelder.*



*Marine infantryman and light tank move up Namur Island, while communications men (right) set up to keep in touch with headquarters that was established on beachhead.*



***Marines from the 25th Marines are pinned down as they hit the beach at Iwo Jima on D-Day. Making their fourth assault in 13 months, the veteran fighters are ready to secure the beachhead's right flank***



***General Cates with executive staff and regimental commanders in final conference aboard ship before landing on Iwo Jima, February 1945.***



***Telephoto view of U.S. supplies moving in on Iwo Jima beach's, from volcano Suribachi.***



*Marine flame-throwing tank goes into action, along with Marine snipers from the 4th Marines, as the battle for possession of Iwo Jima rages on.*



*D plus 4, 24th Marines waiting for tanks to move forward to blast pillboxes. G Company has 40% casualties already.*



*4th Marine Division Marines charge the beaches on Iwo Jima.*



*Despite the battle, the mail goes through to the front lines on Iwo Jima.*



*Dinah Might, a crippled bomber makes the first emergency landing on Iwo Jima as the fighting still rages on.*



***1987 reunion of the 3rd & 4th Marine Division Navajo code talkers at Iwo Jima's commemoration ceremonies at Camp Pendleton, California.***



***U. S. Navy cruiser lays down salvo on Tinian as Marines from 4th Marine Division head for the beach in amphibious tractors. This team work of shelling and manpower took the island in nine days.***

# ***Chapter 2***

## ***Reactivation & Designation***

### ***Adapting to Peace and the Cold War***

In 1945, with the unconditional victory over Japan and Germany at the end of World War II, a war-weary United States demobilized its military forces with speed and little initial thought about the future national security requirements of terrorism. Since the United States had, at the time, a monopoly on nuclear weapons and there was no immediate threat on the horizon, many believed that there was little need for the enormous numbers of military personnel that filled the ranks during the war.

From a wartime manpower peak of more than twelve million men and women on active duty, the American military shrunk to less than 1.6 million members by 1947.<sup>1</sup> The number of active duty Marines fell from a wartime high of nearly half a million to fewer than 75,000 by 1950. Three of the Marine Corps' wartime divisions, the 4th, 5th, and 6th, were deactivated entirely and one, the 3d, was reduced to brigade strength. This left only two divisions and two aircraft commands divided between Camp Lejeune, Camp Pendleton, and Guam. Of these units all were dangerously undermanned.<sup>2</sup> The Marine Corps Reserve experienced similar reductions in force, from a wartime high of more than three-hundred thousand to fewer than ten-thousand members of the Organized Reserve in 1947.<sup>3</sup>

Along with the demobilization, a general reorganization and unification of all of the military services was also carried out during the years right after the end of World War II. Taking into account the dramatically changed international situation, new developments in weapons' technology, and the lessons of World War II, American national security policy-makers had to address questions of what would be the future requirements and roles of the military. Many people even openly questioned the continued need for the Marine Corps at all. Some concluded that the existence of nuclear weapons, and long-range strategic bombers to carry them, made the prospect of the classic amphibious assault as outmoded and useless as horse calvary or wooden warships. International events in the late 1940s and early 1950s, however, clearly demonstrated the inherent limitations of nuclear weapons and the continued need for strong and flexible conventional capabilities, including the Marine Corps specialty, amphibious operations.

The peace that followed the end of World War II turned out to be a very uneasy one. Germany and Japan had been unconditionally defeated and were no longer a threat, but an aggressive and militarily powerful Soviet Union quickly rose to challenge American leadership in the world. Troublesome Soviet actions in the late forties included the blockade of West Berlin, the continued military occupation of Eastern Europe, the development of nuclear weapons, and their support for international communist movements in the Third World, and their leaderships' bellicose anti-American rhetoric, all appeared to directly threaten the security of the United States and its democratic allies in Western Europe. The successful communist revolution in China, the outbreak of the Korean War, and ever increasing Soviet military aid to surrogates in the Third World also served to demonstrate the communist bloc's willingness to use conventional armed forces to advance their hegemony around the world. The United States responded with a policy of containment, supported by multilateral collective-defense alliances, nuclear deterrence, economic and military aid for allies, and a limited commitment to conventional forces that offered flexible alternatives to full-scale nuclear war.

Fortunately for the Marine Corps, its continued existence through these turbulent years was assured by public and congressional support that led to the passage of the National Security Act in 1947.<sup>4</sup> The Marine Corps was further strengthened on June 28, 1952 when Public Law 416 guaranteed that the Marine Corps would consist of at least three combat divisions and three aircraft wings. The law also gave the Commandant a co-equal status with the members of the Joint Chiefs in matters related to the Marine Corps.<sup>5</sup>

Although suffering the same sorts of dramatic manpower reductions as the active duty Marine Corps, the Reserve maintained an important mission to integrate "*into the Fleet Marine Force (peace strength) to bring that Force to war strength.*"<sup>6</sup> The wisdom of retaining the Marine Corps, and its Reserve, quickly became evident as the Cold War erupted into open warfare. The Marine Corps' traditional commitment to readiness and adaptability served it and the country well in the military confrontations of the Cold War, starting with its unexpected employment on the mainland of Asia.

## ***Korean War: Marine Reserve Mobilization***

When the North Korean People's Army (NKPA) unexpectedly invaded South Korea on June 25, 1950, the United States, and the United Nations, had to meet a conventional threat with conventional forces of their own. A strategic nuclear strike against Moscow, Beijing, or P'yongyang was not deemed to be an appropriate reaction to tanks and infantry rolling across the 38th Parallel into South Korea. Conventional ground, air, and naval forces had to be employed much as they had during World War II.

The Marine Corps in particular demonstrated its value in this first major military confrontation of the Cold War both because it was combat ready and because it had the tactical expertise to maneuver decisively in the Pusan Perimeter and to conduct a difficult amphibious landing on Inchon.

Certainly one of the principle reasons for the Marine Corps' success in Korea was its ability to rely on the Reserve to rapidly and effectively reinforce its undermanned active duty units in a time of crisis. When planning began for the Inchon landing, the Camp Pendleton based 1st Marine Division had only a fraction of its peacetime authorized strength, just 3,386 officers and men.<sup>7</sup> General Douglas MacArthur requested a war-strength Marine division to spearhead his Operation Chromite, the Inchon landing. In order to meet this need, the 1st Division required a massive infusion of combat-ready Marines to bring it up to a wartime strength of around 20,000.

In addition to being undermanned, the inflexible operational schedule meant that there would be little time to train any new arrivals before the division embarked for combat. This was an especially difficult situation since the 1st Division would have to execute one of the most complex and challenging of all military operations, an amphibious assault against a prepared enemy in a large urban area. Reassigning Marines from other active duty Marine Corps units, was impractical because those units would be unable to meet their own operational commitments elsewhere. While the draft could fill the Marine Corps ranks eventually, the obvious answer to the immediate need for trained Marines was to draw on the nearly 130,000 Marines in the Reserve.<sup>8</sup>

Mobilization of the Marine Corps' "*Minute Men of 1950*" was authorized on July 19, 1950. Approximately 21,000 members of the Organized Reserve were ordered to immediately report to Marine Corps Base, Camp Pendleton and another 5,800 to Marine Corps Base, Camp Lejeune as the first wave.<sup>9</sup> By July 31, 1950, the

influx of reservists began to arrive at Camp Pendleton and, by the end of the first week, 13,703 had reported aboard. Reservists continued to arrive in such numbers that, by September 11, 1950, 33,528 members of the Organized Reserve, or more than 90 percent of its total strength had come on active duty. The Volunteer Reserve provided an additional 51,942 Marines for active service. In addition to the impressive numbers of incoming reservists, the quality of these citizen-Marines was also generally very high. The overwhelming majority of reservists called to active duty, 99 percent of the officers and 77.5 percent of the enlisted, were veterans of World War II.<sup>10</sup> Approximately half of these Marine reservists were classified as "combat-ready," either by virtue of their training status in the Reserve or by past active duty experience, when they reported aboard.<sup>11</sup> Many of the recalled Marine reservists went directly from civilian life to the combat-bound 1st Marine Division. Others filled active duty billets elsewhere in the Corps to relieve active duty Marines so that they could be reassigned to the division or to other combat missions. Wherever they served, the Marine reservists were largely responsible for meeting the critical manpower needs of the Marine Corps during initial stages of the Korean War.

By March 1951, the Marine Corps had tripled in size since the start of the war and reservists accounted for 45 percent of that growth. In Korea, 38 percent of the officers and 48 percent of enlisted Marines in Korea were reservists.<sup>12</sup> Major General Oliver P. Smith, Commanding General of the 1st Marine Division, reflected on the contributions of the Marine Corps Reserve when he commented that, *"without reservists, the Inchon landing on September 15 would have been impossible,"* and that the reservists, *"needed no particular refresher course to renew the amphibious skills they had learned during World War II."* He continued, *"Reserves were quickly integrated into the division and they all became Marines with as splendid a Marine spirit as the regulars."*<sup>13</sup>

The mobilization of combat ready reservists for the Korean War demonstrated not only the need for a strong and effective Marine Corps Reserve, it also brought to light a number of serious problems with existing Reserve policy. While the Reserve call-up eventually did fill out the ranks of the Marine Corps, the mobilization had not been as rapid nor as smooth as it should have been. As Reserve units and individual reservists arrived by the thousands at Camp Lejeune and Camp Pendleton, they had to be billeted, classified, medically examined, and assigned to units as quickly and efficiently as possible in the limited time available. Consequently, there was little time to review training records, perform interviews, or conduct tactical training. Only those individual Marines who were quickly determined to be "combat-ready" when they arrived could be assigned to the 1st Division. The rest had to be assigned additional training or non-combat billets.

As reservists arrived for active duty, Reserve units were disbanded. Individual Marines were hastily assigned where ever they were needed most. Some reporting reservists were not uniformly qualified for immediate combat employment. Many of the incoming reservists, who were not World War II veterans, had not been properly trained within the Reserve establishment and were of little use when ordered to active duty.

At the time, Organized Reserve drill meetings were held one evening a week and summer camps were not well attended and offered little realistic training. New enlisted recruits were not even required to attend boot camp.<sup>14</sup> Volunteer Reserve members were not required to participate in any organized training program. Fully half of the reservists coming on active duty were deemed not "combat-ready.\*" Approximately 18 to 20 percent of the incoming reservists were so deficient in training that they were assigned to the Recruit Class. The problems of properly classifying incoming reservists was made even more difficult since many of them had incomplete or missing records.<sup>15</sup> Of all of the thousands of reservists called to active duty, only 2,891 were assigned to the combat-bound 1st Marine Division.<sup>16</sup> As it had in World War II, the Marine Corps was eventually forced to rely on draftees to fill out its ranks during the Korean War.

\*Combat-ready reservists were those who had served ninety days on active duty or who had been members of the Organized Reserve for two years and had attended one summer camp and seventy-two drills or two summer camps and thirty-two drills. All others were considered non-combat-ready.

As bad as the Marine Corps problems were with the Korean War mobilization, they would have been far more acute had it not been for the large numbers of World War II veterans who were still in the Reserve. The Reserve structure itself was simply not producing the sort of self-sustaining, combat-ready force to augment the active duty Marine Corps that was expected of it. Addressing the reserves in all the services in 1953, the National Security Training Commission reported to the president that "*our present reserve system is unsatisfactory.*"<sup>17</sup> Clearly, the Marine Corps and all of the services had to do a better job to meet the future challenges.

## ***Post-Korean War Reorganization of the Reserve***

Even before the Korean War was over, Congress and the Marine Corps began a series of major reforms designed to correct some problems that became evident during the mobilization and to make its Reserve a truly combat ready force. While fighting was still going on in Korea, Congress passed the Universal Military Training and Service Act of 1951. This law reaffirmed the principal of universal military obligation for all young men. The Armed Forces Reserve Act of 1952, required each of the services to commit themselves to establishing strong reserve forces organized into three components, a Ready Reserve, a Standby Reserve, and a Retired Reserve. In an effort to rebuild reserve manpower levels and to provide for long-term planning, these acts obligated new members of the military to a combined eight year commitment of active duty and reserve participation and affiliation. The legislative branch was not alone in initiating Reserve reforms.

Elected to the presidency in 1952, Dwight D. Eisenhower initiated a "*New Look*" at American defense policy with an eye toward "*security with solvency.*" The new president wanted to meet the Soviet threat in the long-term while keeping the American domestic economy strong through decreased defense spending.<sup>18</sup> Eisenhower believed that "*the foundation of military strength is economic strength,*" and did everything in his power to keep money in the economy and out of the defense budget. Central to this policy, was the reduction of expensive active duty units as much as possible, while placing greater reliance on nuclear weapons, allied ground troops, and American Reserve forces. National Guardsmen and reservists were especially attractive to Eisenhower's "*New Look*" defense policy. It was estimated that ten reservists cost about the same as a single active duty serviceman.<sup>19</sup>

On August 9, 1955, citing the "*essential need to build strong reserves,*" President Eisenhower signed the Reserve Forces Act of 1955 which called for even greater readiness, increased the reserve manpower ceiling from 1.5 million to 2.9 million, and gave the president the option to order up to one million Ready Reservists to active duty on his own authority.<sup>20</sup> As an incentive for young men to join the dramatically expanding reserves, volunteers could enlist directly into the service Reserve of their choice, serve two years on active duty, and then complete their obligation with three years in a reserve unit. They could also serve from three to six months on active duty and serve out the remainder of an eight year obligation as a reservist.<sup>21</sup> Being in the reserves also meant that they could not be drafted, a measure that would have a profound affect on the Vietnam-era Reserve, a decade later. The Marine Corps leadership embraced the law's reemphasis on Reserve training and readiness.

Permanent Organized Marine Corps Reserve staff groups were created, headquartered at each Marine Corps District. Throughout the second half of the 1950s, training opportunities increased in both quantity and variety for both the Ready Reserve and the Volunteer Reserve. Category A units, those required to have the highest state of readiness, were authorized forty-drill periods a year and a fifteen day annual training

period. Along with the growth and reorganization of the Ready Reserve, the Volunteer Reserve also played an increasingly important role. In July of 1955, the Volunteer Reserve included more than twenty-thousand officers and more than one-hundred thousand enlisted reservists. In all, there were 133 Volunteer Training Units (VTUs). As much as possible, reservists increasingly had the chance to receive the same types of training their active duty counterparts received.

## ***Reactivation of the 4th Marine Division: Background***

The early 1960s was another period of profound change for the nation's defense policy, and for the Marine Corps, and its Reserve. International communism showed no sign of dying. Indeed it appeared to once again be on the march, seizing control of Cuba, only ninety miles from the American mainland, and threatening other Third World countries in Latin American, Africa, and especially Southeast Asia. The Berlin crisis of 1961 reminded American policy-makers of the Soviet Union's tendency to opportunism when it saw unpreparedness and any lack of will on the part of the West. Also during this period, rapid developments in the destructive power of ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons increasingly made their use in war an unthinkable option, thus forcing American security policy makers to put even more faith in their conventional military forces.

The early 1960s was also a period of significant change in the political leadership of America. With the election of John F. Kennedy in 1960, the steady and experienced hand of President Dwight D. Eisenhower had been replaced by a younger Commander in Chief who also proffered new ideas about defense policy and the importance of conventional forces.

While Eisenhower had consistently favored the deterrence value of strategic nuclear weapons, cut conventional military spending, and warned the nation about the dangers of a growing "*military-industrial complex*," President John F. Kennedy promised to revitalize the American military in the face of serious external threats. In a bit of campaign speech, President Kennedy characterized the Cold War as nothing less than "*a struggle for supremacy between two conflicting ideologies: freedom under God versus ruthless, godless tyranny.*"<sup>22</sup> In the face of this serious and unambiguous threat to the United States, Kennedy not only wanted to "*close the missile-gap*," a promise he had campaigned on, he also wanted to insure that the West had the ability to employ strong and effective conventional forces in wars short of all-out nuclear exchanges.

A doctrine of "*massive retaliation*," based on a devastating nuclear counter-attack on the Soviet Union, had dominated American foreign policy during the 1950s. This deterrence policy, however, was only useful when the security of the United States or its closest allies were directly and immediately threatened by a Soviet nuclear attack. In the early 1960s, Kennedy, his advisors, and his successors developed and articulated a doctrine of "*flexible response*" to deal with lower level conflicts.<sup>23</sup>

This new national security doctrine relied on a proportional response to aggression with a full spectrum of military power from the limited use of conventional forces to the all-out use of strategic nuclear weapons. The president warned "*any potential aggressor contemplating an attack on any part of the Free World with any kind of weapon, conventional or nuclear, must know that our response will be suitable, selective, swift and effective.*"<sup>24</sup> For this new policy to work, the United States had to reinvigorate its conventional forces. With its long history of adaptability and readiness, the Marine Corps, including its Reserve, was exceptionally well suited to the demands of the new policy.

President Kennedy quickly came to appreciate how important the Marine Corps, as the nation's force in readiness, was to his new "*flexible response*" policy. In the spring of 1962, the president had already ordered 3,000 combat-ready Marines ashore in Thailand to protect that country's territorial integrity. During the Cuban Missile Crisis in October 1962, President Kennedy also directed Marine forces in the Caribbean to reinforce Guantanamo Bay and to rehearse amphibious landings designed to topple Fidel Castro from power.<sup>25</sup> The Cuban Missile Crisis was eventually defused, through tough diplomacy backed by the use of a naval blockade in concert with other conventional military forces. Particularly in Cuba, a "*flexible response*" with conventional forces demonstrated its value in helping to avert a nuclear confrontation between the Superpowers.

For the "*flexible response*" doctrine to be effective, strong conventional forces have to be both capable and adaptive to constantly changing requirements. As always, economic costs proved to be a major consideration as Washington policy-makers sought the greatest "*bang for the buck*." President Kennedy, a naval reservist himself during World War II, saw as a central goal of the "*flexible response*" doctrine a large and well prepared Ready Reserve to augment the regular forces at a moment's notice. Early in his administration, in October 1961, Kennedy demonstrated his faith in the reservists and National Guardsmen by calling 150,000 of them to active duty in a show of strength intended to dissuade the Soviets from carrying out their threats against West Berlin.<sup>26</sup>

Only a few months before the crisis in West Berlin, on July 25, 1961, Kennedy addressed the nation and called for a series of improvements in the readiness of conventional forces, including an "*increase in the size of the Marine Corps*," and "*improved readiness of our reserves*."<sup>27</sup> He saw the Ready Reserve as vitally necessary to create a force "*large enough to make clear our determination and ability to defend our rights at all costs--and to meet all levels of aggressor pressure with whatever levels of force are required*."<sup>28</sup> It was not realistic, politically or economically, for the United States to attempt to match the Soviet Union in the numbers of ground troops they had on active duty. Through a large and effective reserve program, however, Kennedy hoped to offset the Soviet's numerical advantage. For this policy to be effective, the Ready Reserve had to be truly ready and have capabilities comparable to their active duty counterparts.

Army Reserve and National Guard units began to reorganize in 1961 under the "*One Army*" concept. The goal was to create a Reserve and National Guard that was "*so organized, trained and equipped as to permit their rapid integration in the active Army*," The implicit goal of this program was to eliminate units that did not have missions under contingency war plans and to significantly increase the levels of manning, equipping, training, and overall combat readiness of priority reserve forces.<sup>29</sup>

The Marine Corps Reserve reorganization would follow much the same path, deactivating some units and reorganizing others. As much as possible, reserve units in the Marine Corps also had to be trained and equipped to the same level as regular Marine Corps units. Additionally, reserve units needed to be organized like the active duty units to facilitate their immediate activation and integration with the regular forces when they were needed.

## ***Reactivation of the 4th Marine Division: Concept***

The Kennedy administration's new emphasis on conventional forces and reserve forces directly impacted the Marine Corps in several important ways. For example the president ordered increases in the authorized strength, from 178,000 to 190,000, of the active duty Marine Corps while placing additional require-

ments on the Marine Corps Reserve. In early 1962, Kennedy's Secretary of Defense, Robert McNamara, called on the Marine Corps to be ready to provide four division-air wing teams, one of them formed from the Ready Reserve, for the next five years.<sup>30</sup> This was not a new concept to the Marine Corps but, instead, simply formalized a more general readiness and reorganization program that planners had been working on for some time.

During the summer of 1961, as a result of a study conducted by Colonel R.M. Wood, the Marine Corps launched an extensive public relations campaign to reemphasize its Reserve as "ready" for mobilization in the nation's defense.<sup>31</sup> This simple message was carried on billboards, on matchbooks, and on A-frame signs on city sidewalks. The goal was to inform all Marine reservists and the American public, that the Marine Corps Reserve could be called up at any time and that reservists were expected to be ready in every way. That same year, the Organized Marine Corps Reserve (Ground) began its reorganization to provide the basic elements for the potential mobilization of a fourth Marine division.<sup>32</sup> This was a marked departure from the way reserve Marines had been employed in the past.

Colonel Wood also headed a committee that was examining the Marine Corps' reserve structure with an eye toward a major reorganization to improve mobilization readiness and capabilities. His report recommended the Marine Corps Reserve be restructured to support the basic elements of a Reserve Division/Wing team. Colonel Wood's recommendations were intended to make the Reserve more comparable to the active duty Fleet Marine Force units and capable of mobilization in thirty days.<sup>33</sup>

Before the reorganization of the Organized Marine Corps Reserve which established the 4th Marine Division/Wing team, individual Marine reservists were trained to fill specific vacancies within existing regular Marine Corps units or to be available to form new units if they were needed.<sup>34</sup> In the Korean War call up, for example, an individual reservist reporting for active duty at Camp Pendleton in the summer of 1950 might find himself assigned to the 1st Marine Division embarking for the coming Inchon landing, or assigned to fill a billet at the Marine Barracks at Mare Island Naval Shipyard, or assigned to remain at Camp Pendleton to support further mobilization. In these situations, his training and experience could, at best, only generally meet the requirements of his new assignment. Calling up reservists on an individual replacement basis and assigning them as fillers to existing units also created serious problems by disrupting unit cohesion\*.

After World War II, Army historical teams led by Colonel S.L.A. Marshall studied hundreds of small-unit actions and the role unit cohesion played.<sup>35</sup> Marshall concluded what military commanders have intuitively known throughout history, that "*one of the simplest truths of war*" was that, "*the thing which enables an infantry soldier to keep going with his weapon is the near presence or the presumed presence of a comrade.*"<sup>36</sup> Other scholars, including Morris Janowitz, Edward A. Shils, Samuel A. Stouffer, Richard Gabriel, and Trevor N. Dupuy, came to much the same conclusion, in their studies of the American military services and those of other countries as well.<sup>37</sup> Fighting men simply perform best in combat situations when they know and care about other members of what they feel is "*their*" unit.

Psychologists have even reported that the fighting man's greatest fear in battle is not death or injury, but letting his friends and his unit down in the face of the enemy.<sup>38</sup> Randomly plugging individual Marine reservists into existing active duty units, as had happened during the Korean War, was not the most effective way to maintain unit cohesion and combat effectiveness. It was unfair to both the units and the individual Marines. Colonel Wood's report offered a solution to many of these problems by creating combat organizations within the Reserve that would be called to active duty as units.

\*Cohesion of a military unit has been defined as "the bonding together of members of a unit or organization in such a way as to sustain their will and commitment to each other, their unit, and the mission." (Cohesion in the US Military, p. ix)

## ***Creation of the 4th Marine Division: Implementation***

The formal reorganization of the Marine Corps Reserve and the initial formation of the 4th Marine Division began on July 1, 1962 when the Director of the Marine Corps Reserve, General W.T. Fairbourn adopted Colonel Wood's recommendations. Under the direction of June 8, 1962 Marine Corps Order (MCO) 5400R.2, the newly reestablished 4th Marine Division was to be manned by ten percent regulars and ninety per cent reservists. The reorganization effected all reserve units, not just those assigned to the new division. Ten Reserve rifle companies were deactivated and another fifty-three were transferred into the new Reserve division.

The broad concept was for these rifle companies, and other units in the new division, to work and train together while in a reserve status and to be assigned together as a unit during mobilization. To facilitate this, the reservists would train together on a quarterly basis and they would be equipped with enough weapons and equipment to train together at their drill centers. It was intended that the reserve units would receive their full allocation from one of the Marine Corps Supply Depots (Barstow, California or Albany, Georgia) in the event they were mobilized. This general reorganization of the Marine Corps Reserve had a number of advantages over the old system.

Reserve units in the 4th Division were defined as either regimental or non-regimental, with most being in the former category. Command relationships and responsibility for administration for the units, defined in MCO 5400.36B, were complex, divided between the division itself, Headquarters, Marine Corps, and the Marine Corps districts where the Reserve units were activated. Contact between the units and the District Directors, the senior officer in command of a Marine Corps district, was channeled through the existing Inspector-Instructor staffs.

It was believed that Mobilization of a Marine Corps Reserve unit as a standing organization, with its unit cohesion, familiarity with personnel and command structure, was desirable. This type of system was believed to be far better than assigning individual reservists to existing active duty units or creating entirely new units in time of desperate need. The training the reserve units received before being mobilized was more effective and relevant as it directly prepared the individual Marines for the jobs they would be expected to do on active duty. It also trained the units to work as teams. Unit cohesion was enhanced along with professional proficiency. Individual reservists also benefited since they were no longer simply generic "fillers" with no idea of where they might end up or what they might be doing when they were ordered to on to active duty. They would train with and get to know other Marines in their unit and come to understand what their officer and non-commissioned leadership expected of them. Marines assigned to the new reserve division could also count themselves as members of the illustrious 4th Marine Division and have the unit pride that comes from being part of a combat unit with such an enviable record of combat achievements during World War II.

It was appropriate that it was the 4th Division that became the new home for so many Marine reservists. The division had first been created during the middle of World War II and it was the first Marine division to be deactivated after the war was over. The majority of the Marines who served in the wartime 4th Marine Division, were not career Marines, but real "*citizen-soldiers of the sea.*" A wartime reservist himself, Brigadier General Lewis C. Hudson noted that "*without the Reserves, we simply would not have had the 2d battalion, 25th Marines,*" and that "*thirty-six of the 38 officers of this battalion were Reserves and upon them fell the burdens of combat duty.*"<sup>39</sup> He noted too that, "*as the war progressed, increasingly large numbers of the combat NCO's were Reserve,*" and that "*it was largely a war of Reserves during the latter period of World War II.*"<sup>40</sup> These wartime

reservists served their country and the Marine Corps in the time of need and then, like their division, demobilized and returned to their civilian lives once the war was over.

As advanced as the general idea was, the concept of a reserve division would take several years before it would become a reality. A 1963 report to the Secretary of the Navy admitted that, "*simply promulgating a reorganization order redesignating many units we did not overnight attain the readiness required to raise the Marine Corps to a 4-Marine Division/Wing Team force structure effectively responsive to mobilization requirements.*"<sup>41</sup> Under the reorganization of the Marine Corps Reserve, fifty-four drill-pay units would become part of the 4th Marine Division. Another ninety-five went to the Force Troops, fifty-six remained in their independent status to serve as a source of trained reservists for the Fleet Marine Force, and thirteen were to be deactivated. As it had been during the Second World War, the reactivated 4th Marine Division was again made up of the 23d, 24th, and 25th Marines, serving as its infantry regiments. The 14th Marines again provided artillery support. All of the companies within each battalion had drill sites located close enough to one another to allow training together, normally at least once each quarter and during their summer field training. For example, the companies of 3d Battalion, 23d Marines were all located in the San Francisco Bay area and companies of the 2nd Battalion, 25th Marines were all located near New York City. The individual battalions, however, were located throughout the continental United States.<sup>42</sup> Artillery units were assigned to areas of the country that allowed them to practice firing their weapons.

Under the reorganization, most 4th Marine Division units had the same Tables-of-Organization and Tables-of-Equipment as their regular counterparts. Generally, however, they were not authorized to have full Table-of-Organization (T/O) strength and only had enough equipment and weapons on hand for training purposes. Battalion commanding officers remained responsible for training only, with individual company commanders retaining responsibility for all administration, supply, and other duties. Headquarters Marine Corps was responsible for publishing an annual field training cycle since, at the time the Division was reestablished, there were no provisions for a division headquarters.<sup>43</sup> The ultimate goal was for the Marine Corps to be able to mobilize 4th Division/Wing units within five to thirty days. To facilitate rapid mobilization, the Marine Corps had eighty specially trained teams located throughout the United States.

Brigadier General R.R. Van Stockum, who became Director of the Marine Corps Reserve on June 12, 1962, welcomed the reorganization of the Reserve and the reactivation of the 4th Division. He noted, the changes gave the "*Reserve for the first time a longer range training goal at which to aim,*" and that it offered a view on where the Reserve would be "*five to eight years from now.*"<sup>44</sup> A major part of this was the integration of the new reserve division to train more like their regular counterparts. Ideally, each unit with the 4th Division was scheduled to conduct battalion level training at least four times a year, exclusive of their normal summer training.<sup>45</sup>

## ***Training and the New 4th Division***

The first major test of the new 4th Division/Wing Team came with the three day Operation Trident, held at Camp Lejeune in 1962. Some 3,000 reservists from nineteen separate units and from eighteen different states participated in the exercise. On the West Coast, a similar training exercise, Operation Tiger, with approximately 10,000 Marine reservists, trained at six installations including Twenty-nine Palms. For the first time too, Marine reservists participated in annual field training that was conducted in Puerto Rico. Six ground units, with more than 1,000 Marine reservists, participated.<sup>46</sup> In the summer of 1963, two more large-scale reserve exercises were conducted, Operation Unity at Camp Lejeune and Operation Scorpion in

the desert of Southern California. Again these exercises were planned, staged, and staffed by reservists. In all, 34,075 reservists participated in these exercises.

The reorganization of the reserve and the reactivation of the 4th Marine Division provided a vital back-up to active duty Marine Corps forces who were increasingly being committed to combat in Vietnam in the mid-1960s. In a January 3, 1963 talk to his staff, the Commandant, General David M. Shoup, likened his 4th Marine Division to the division reserve of a corps commander. He continued "*it is something to be committed at the vital moment.*"<sup>47</sup> As the nation's strategic reserve, the 4th Marine Division and the rest of the Reserve provided the promise of a ready and capable force to meet unexpected emergencies. This was particularly important as Marine Corps and other active duty military units were committed to Southeast Asia in the coming months.

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
*On April 13, 1963, members of Company B (Rein), 4th Tank Battalion, Force Troops, Mattydale, NY completed a 50 mile hike in 13 hours and 15 minutes. From left to right; Major Edward Kaish, First Lieutenant Paul Liddell, Sergeant Dick Driggs, Cpl Thomas Marzinski, LCpl Harold Thompson.*



*PFC's T Reed, Jr. (right) and T. Quinn, reservists from G Company, 2/23, prepare to reload a M-60 machinegun during a field problem.*



*During Company B, 8th Tank Battalion's annual training in August 68, M-103 heavy main battle tanks fire at tank gunnery tables in 29 Palms, California. Tanks were on loan from Delta Company, 1st Tank Battalion.*



*On the move a lone M-103 heavy main battle tank takes aim and fires on tank firing ranges in 29 Palms, California.*



*Reverend Father Kenneth A. Mitchell, commissioned in the Chaplain Corps sits atop tank to observe the 96th Rifle Co. during annual 2-week field exercises at Camp Pendleton. Before his commission he traveled to twice to California at his own expense to take part in company's exercises.*



*Color Guard team of 12th Infantry Battalion, USMCR, Treasure Island, San Francisco, marches into cemetery for Memorial Day ceremonies on May 30th, 1947.*



*First wave of Marines from Company I, 3rd Battalion, 25th Marines, hit Onslow Beach at Camp Lejeune, NC during RESMEBLEX-69.*



*Men of the 4th Marine Division scurry across sand dunes on Red Beach at Camp Pendleton, CA during Operation "Golden Slipper".*

# Chapter 3

## Vietnam War Era

### The Vietnam War

On the morning of March 8, 1965, elements of the 9th Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB), under the command of Brigadier General Frederick J. Karch, USMC, waded ashore across RED Beach 2 to the northwest of Da Nang, in the Quang Nam province of South Vietnam.<sup>1</sup> Unlike their counterparts in World War II and Inchon, these Marines faced no hostile fire and were instead greeted by the mayor of Da Nang, by schoolgirls who presented them with leis of flowers, and by four American soldiers bearing a sign: "*Welcome Gallant Marines.*" Once ashore, 9th MEB Marines quickly moved inland over roads that had been secured by South Vietnamese troops to Da Nang Airbase, to the southwest of the city. These ground combat Marines had been requested by U.S. Army General William C. Westmoreland, the commander of the U.S. Military Assistance Command in Vietnam (MACV), on February 22, 1965. They were assigned to protect Da Nang's vulnerable airbase from approximately six thousand Vietcong guerrillas believed to be in the vicinity.<sup>2</sup> This first step of America's entry into the ground war in Vietnam was modest in both size and mission.

The Marines of the 9th MEB had a limited mission to establish a secure American enclave and provide "*local, close-in security*" for the vital airfield, freeing up South Vietnamese troops to conduct offensive operations against the Vietcong. Westmoreland was specifically concerned that the Vietcong might retaliate against the base at Da Nang in response to Operation Rolling Thunder, the American bombing offensive against North Vietnam.<sup>3</sup> The American general viewed the Marines as a stop-gap to "*secure a vital airfield and the air units using it*" and not necessarily as the start of a larger overall American escalation of the war.<sup>4</sup> Whatever the original intent, however, these first Marine Corps ground units were only the first in what would become the longest and one of the most costly of all the wars in the nation's history.\*\*

The United States had long been actively involved in the undeclared war in Southeast Asia, supporting the anti-Communist government of South Vietnam with military advisors, air support, and economic and military assistance. Before 1965, a few Marines had been assigned there as military advisors, as members of two Hawk missile anti-aircraft batteries, and with HMM-162 and -163 helicopter squadrons, all supporting the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) in its operations against the Vietcong and the North Vietnamese Army. The commitment of 9th MEB, however, signaled a new phase in the war in which the United States, and its Marine Corps, became progressively more committed to offensive ground combat against the Vietcong and the North Vietnamese army.

By the end of 1965, the number of Marines deployed in South Vietnam grew to approximately 38,000. Direct American participation in the ground war would ultimately last six years, from 1965 to 1971, and cost the Marine Corps more than 100,000 dead and wounded. Some 794,000 Americans served as Marines during the Vietnam War with as many as 85,755 assigned there at one time.<sup>5</sup> The conflict so dominated the Marine Corps during that period that it prompted General Chapman, commandant from January 1968 to December 1971, to state, "*there were just three kinds of Marines; there were those in Vietnam, those who had just come back from Vietnam, and those who were getting ready to go to Vietnam.*"<sup>6</sup> This highly unconventional and unpopular war placed tremendous strains on the very fabric of the Marine Corps and its Reserve both during the war and for years afterwards.

\*When the 4th Marine Division landed on Roi-Namur in World War II, Major Frederick J. Karch was the operations officer for the 14th Marines.

\*\* Marine casualties in Vietnam totaled 101,574 killed and wounded, a figure approximately 4,000 greater than World War II. A total of 12,983 Marines died in the Vietnam War, compared to 19,733 deaths in World War II.

Marines in Vietnam faced hostile terrain and climate, a committed and skilled enemy, an unreliable ally, and an unfamiliar mission. For decades, the Marine Corps had perfected the art of amphibious warfare and organized itself as the world's premiere amphibious assault force only to be assigned to a protracted defensive mission in a war of attrition. At the same time, the Marine Corps was also expected to meet its strategic commitments elsewhere in the world. As active duty Marine Corps units were assigned in increasing numbers to combat operational commitments in Vietnam, the role of the Marine Corps Reserve and the 4th Marine Division became that much more critical. The Marine Corps Reserve, however, would play a far different role during the Vietnam War than it had played during World Wars I and II, or in Korea.

## ***Mobilization of the 4th Marine Division***

In all of the American wars of the 20th century, the Reserve has played a major role in support of the active duty forces. The Marine Corps Reserve was created during the First World War on August 29, 1916. It was intended to augment the active duty force for the coming combat in Europe. In the autumn of 1940, more than a year before the United States entered World War II, the Organized Reserve of the Marine Corps was mobilized in response to Hitler's aggression in Europe and bellicose Japanese moves in Asia and in the Pacific. During World War II, the Reserve comprised well over sixty percent of the Marine Corps with 30,074 officers and 307,340 enlisted Marines.<sup>7</sup> The Reserve was also called up within weeks of President Harry Truman's commitment of American forces in the Korean War in 1950. The Marine Corps Reserve was, however, not mobilized for the war in Indochina.

Within the Marine Corps' leadership, during the initial build-up of American forces in Vietnam in 1965, there was some expectation, and even desire, to mobilize the newly organized 4th Marine Division/Wing Team for combat in Vietnam. In hearings before the House Armed Services Committee on 18 August, 1965, General Wallace M. Greene, Jr., Commandant of the Marine Corps, stated that he saw no reason to have the 4th Division/Wing Team sitting unemployed on the West Coast while active duty Marine Corps units were assigned to combat in Vietnam. He expressed confidence that, if they were mobilized, they would respond quickly and well.<sup>8</sup>

Mobilization of the 4th Marine Division/Wing Team in 1965, at the same time a major build-up of the active divisions and wings was underway, would have resulted in grave problems of competing demands for equipment and personnel.

The recently formed 4th Division/Wing Team had only modest levels of equipment on hand that had been authorized under the Reserve Table of Equipment. This system provided the Reserve units with only enough equipment for limited training purposes. The equipment they did have was often obsolete, old, and worn out. Before the 4th Division/Wing Team could have been effective in combat, they would have needed virtually a complete issue of all new weapons and equipment. This would have placed severe strain on the Marine Corps' already overtaxed supply system.

Personnel shortages would have proved to be an equally challenging problem. The 4th Division/Wing Team would have required significant numbers of augmentees to flesh out its ranks. There would have been a serious problem too in maintaining the Reserve's authorized manpower strength after a mobilization. By law, any Marine reservist brought on to active duty, for any length of time, would have fulfilled his obligated service. General Greene's successor as commandant, General Leonard F. Chapman, likened the Reserve to "*a huge [piece] of artillery that has only one round,*" which "*you can fire once, and then it will be 20 years, proba-*

bly, before you can fire it again."<sup>9</sup> Even partial mobilization of the Reserve for the prolonged Vietnam War would have created serious manpower shortages.

During the Vietnam War, there were legitimate concerns within the Marine Corps that, if units from the 4th Division/Wing Team had been called up piecemeal, the combat integrity of the team would have been undermined to the point where it would not be able to meet strategic responsibilities elsewhere. Some other method had to be found to reach the increased Marine Corps strength of 223,000 that was authorized in August 1965. Expansion demands became even more acute as Marine Corps involvement in Indochina escalated. On July 1, 1967, the authorized strength of the active duty Marine Corps was again increased, this time to 278,184.<sup>10</sup> Before the war started winding down in 1969, the total strength of the active duty Marine Corps grew to post World War II high of 309,771.<sup>11</sup>

The question of whether or not to mobilize the Reserves and how to otherwise increase the size of active duty forces in Vietnam was eventually decided by the president. After visiting South Vietnam in the summer of 1965, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara recommended to President Lyndon B. Johnson the mobilization of 235,000 Reserve and National Guard members for a period of one year. This, Secretary McNamara reasoned, would give the regular forces time to expand to meet the requirement of the fighting in Vietnam. McNamara's recommendations to the president included a call for 75,000 Marine reservists.<sup>12</sup> General Earle G. Wheeler, U.S.A, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, also counseled the president that a mobilization of the reserves would be necessary to bring the war in Vietnam to a favorable conclusion. Army planners especially favored mobilization since their active duty force structure counted heavily on Reserve and National Guard units to provide much of their combat service support in the event of a major war.

On July 21, President Johnson and his civilian and military national security advisors discussed the future role of the United States in Vietnam and whether or not to mobilize the reserves. In addition to practical military considerations, the president was also concerned with the costs of a general mobilization of the reserves, both in terms of money and domestic and international reaction. Johnson appreciated that a mobilization would *"require a great deal of money and a huge sacrifice for the American people"* and wanted to review McNamara's *"proposal with the greatest care."*<sup>13</sup>

In a July 28 news conference, President Johnson finally announced his decision to increase the number of American troops in Vietnam to 125,000, that there would not be a call up of the reserves, and that any unmet manpower requirements would be realized through an increased draft.<sup>14</sup> It was believed that the president was unwilling to order a general mobilization for fighting in Indochina for a number of national security and political reasons.

The Vietnam War may have been the most conspicuous and immediate national security threat to the United States, but there were also any number of other potential trouble spots around the world where serious armed conflict might have erupted at any moment. During this unsettled and confrontational period of the Cold War, conflict could have flamed in West Berlin, Cuba, Cyprus, the Caribbean, the Middle East, Korea, or a dozen other places without warning. The president and other American policy makers had to consider that the Vietnam conflict could have been a strategic feint on the part of the Communist bloc to prompt the United States to commit its conventional forces there to allow aggression elsewhere.

The month after the 9th MEB landed across the beaches of Da Nang, for example, President Johnson also ordered the 6th Marine Expeditionary Unit (6th MEU) and major portions of the 4th Marine Expeditionary Brigade (4th MEB) ashore in the Dominican Republic to prevent *"another Cuba."* Had the coun-

try's reserves been committed to Vietnam, along with major portions of the regular forces, little would have been available to meet this or any other crises. This need to maintain the Reserve and National Guard as the nation's strategic reserve was well understood, even in 1965, as the Johnson administration knew that the Vietnam War would require a long-term commitment. President Johnson was also very reluctant to call up the reserves for fear of signaling to the American people and foreign governments an unwelcome escalation in the war.<sup>15</sup> Domestically, Johnson attempted to maintain the appearance of a limited conflict in Vietnam to bolster public support for his foreign policies and to protect his administration's ambitious domestic "*Great Society*" programs. Ironically, as the war and domestic opposition to it grew, National Guard units, which were not federalized, were needed to maintain order in many American cities and on college campuses. Internationally, the American president wanted to avoid provoking the Soviet Union or China while reassuring America's allies, especially those in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), that they had not been forsaken.

## ***The Marine Corps Adapts to the War and the Draft***

With President Johnson's decision not to mobilize the reserves and instead rely on increased conscription, the Marine Corps once again had to accept draftees into its ranks. During fiscal year 1966, the Marine Corps assimilated 19,573 draftees.<sup>16</sup> Marine Corps training was also streamlined to speed new enlisted Marines and junior officers to the operational Fleet Marine Force (FMF). Recruit training was reduced from twelve to eight weeks and The Basic School for officers was cut from twenty-six to twenty-one weeks.<sup>17</sup> To insure a steady infusion of voluntary recruits, Headquarters Marine Corps also shifted from the usual three and four year enlistment's to two year enlistment's. This allowed individual volunteers to serve their obligated military duty with only one tour in Vietnam.

Although each of these measures helped, Marine Corps manpower shortages were so severe that by 1966 "*Project 100,000*" was initiated to enlist individuals who had previously been considered unfit for service because of educational deficiencies or physical defects.<sup>18</sup> This highly controversial program required the Marine Corps to enlist 24 percent of its total accession from Mental Group IV.\* Because of their limited mental abilities, 90 percent of these recruits were limited to only 12 of the 34 Marine occupational fields.<sup>19</sup>

To absorb these ever increasing numbers of incoming Marines and to create new combat units for rotation to Vietnam, in December 1965, Secretary McNamara approved the reactivation of the 5th Marine Division. Like the 4th Division, the 5th had been created during World War II only to be demobilized at the end of the war. The decision to reactivate the 5th was officially announced by the Department of Defense on March 1, 1966.<sup>20</sup> Starting from scratch, it would be a full year before the 5th Division was fully operational and combat ready. Even then, it did not deploy to Vietnam as a division, but instead provided two regiments, the 26th and 27th Marines, to join the Marine divisions already there. While the active duty Marine Corps grew to meet the demands of increasing requirements in Vietnam, the Reserve, especially the 4th Marine Division continued its work toward becoming a truly combat ready force.

## ***4th Division Supports Marines in Vietnam***

While not mobilized, Marine Corps reservists in the United States did play a number of important roles in providing support to active duty Marines deployed to Vietnam.

\*The Mental Group Classification System is based on standardized written examinations designed to determine if an individual is allowed to enter the service and his aptitude to perform certain tasks. Mental Group IV is the second lowest group and is equivalent to an IQ of approximately 70 to 91.

In an effort to "*win the hearts and minds*" of the South Vietnamese people in the III Marine Amphibious Force (MAF) area of operation, U.S. Marines in Vietnam initiated an ambitious civic action program. [see Marine Corps Order 5710.4 in 1965] The object of this effort was to provide money, tools, food, clothing, medical care, housing, schools, and other basic items to needy South Vietnamese. The direct purchase of these supplies was prohibited by Marine Corps policy and shipping space to South Vietnam was always at a premium. As a solution, members of the 4th Division and other Marine Corps Reserve units worked through the Cooperative for American Relief Everywhere (CARE) in raising money to purchase the needed materials. Marine reservists did not directly collect donations but instead made people aware of the need and encouraged donations through CARE. The money collected was then sent to the III MAF area in Vietnam for the purchase of the needed supplies there. This method avoided the bottleneck in shipping, brought money into the South Vietnamese economy, and best of all, provided invaluable assistance to the Vietnamese people.<sup>21</sup>

The Marine Corps program, which tied into the Navy's successful Operation Handclasp, was officially launched on September 13, 1965 by the Commandant of the Marine Corps with positive and immediate results. Within five months, nearly a hundred and twenty thousand dollars had been collected.<sup>22</sup> The money went to work supporting programs like the Medical Civic Action Program (MEDCAP); it provided medical aid to local hamlets, and the School Building Program.<sup>23</sup> Money from this program also paid for school supplies, orphanages, religious institutions, and, in a quintessential American gesture, Little League equipment. Aside from the general altruistic motivation, the project was designed to encourage the Vietnamese people to believe in the good will of the United States and that she had their best interests at heart.

## ***The 4th Marine Division Works Toward Readiness***

On the eve of the Marine Corps' major commitment of ground forces in Vietnam, the Marine Corps Reserve was experiencing serious personnel shortages while undergoing major organizational and operational changes associated with the recent formation of the 4th Marine Division and the 4th Marine Aircraft Wing.

As of June 30, 1964, the total Reserve strength, not on active duty, was only 136,001, and well over half of these were in an inactive status. The Department of Defense considered this number, "*inadequate for the desired rate of mobilization expansion.*"<sup>24</sup> If the 4th Marine Division/Wing Team had been ordered to mobilize during this period, it would have been necessary to call up significant numbers of the normally inactive Class III reservists to fill many of its billets. The problem was exacerbated by the growing commitment of active duty units to Vietnam which made the likelihood of a Reserve mobilization much more probable.

An effort was made to bring the Reserve up to strength and continue its reorganization into the newly created 4th Division/Wing Team. An exhaustive effort sought to match personnel and equipment in an effort to mirror the Regular establishment.<sup>25</sup>

Serious personnel shortages within the Marine Corps Reserve were aggressively addressed during the mid-1960s. In 1965 the authorized strength of the Organized Reserve was increased by 2,500.<sup>26</sup> Reorganization during this period was geared to create three major sections within the Organized Reserve. Most units were assigned as part of the newly reactivated 4th Division/Wing Team. Other Reserve units were intended to support a Marine Corps force structure. The remaining Reserve units were designed to train individuals to augment existing units of the regular establishment and mobilized reserve units. Before Vietnam developed into a major Marine Corps commitment, 4th Marine Division units enjoyed manning

levels of 80 percent. The war would have a significant impact, both good and bad, on efforts to revitalize the Reserve and bring the 4th Division up to a true combat-ready status.

To help Marine Corps planners understand and measure the personnel, training, and logistics of the Organized Reserve, the Readiness Reporting system was established. This reporting system was instead to become a cohesive readiness reporting system designed to augment the active duty's FMF Operational Effectiveness Reports.<sup>27</sup>

While units of the 4th Division or the rest of the Marine Corps Reserve were not mobilized during the Vietnam War, individual reservists were asked to volunteer to for extended active duty. Within the regular Marine Corps there were severe shortages of junior officers, non-commissioned officers, and enlisted men with "*hard*" technical skills. Qualified reserve officers were offered Standard Written Agreements (SWAG) for a one year period, with an opportunity for extensions. Enlisted Marine reservists too were actively sought for regular units. With the active duty Marine Corps and its Reserve competing for the same individuals, it became necessary for the Reserve to become more aggressive in its recruiting efforts. One method employed was assigning Reserve Liaison and Training officers to major Marine Corps installations. The goal of this program was to counsel every Marine leaving active duty about the benefits of continuing their Marine Corps affiliation by joining the Reserve.

President Johnson's early decision in the war not to mobilize the reserves, coupled with the increasing levels of conscription as the war escalated, actually eased recruiting efforts for the Marine Corps Reserve. During the height of the war in 1968, nearly 300,000 American men were drafted into the service. To avoid involuntary service, highly qualified young men could join the Reserves or National Guard and fulfill their military obligation without having to go to Vietnam. During this period the quality of enlisted Reserve recruits was significantly higher than their active duty counterparts. Between July 1, 1967 and June 30, 1969, 80 percent of the enlisted reservist recruits scored in highest Mental Groups I and II, while only 32 percent of active duty recruits scored as high. Reserve recruits were also very well educated compared to their active duty counterparts. Only seven percent of the Reserve recruits lacked a high school diploma and ten percent of them had graduated from college.<sup>28</sup> Many others either had professional or graduate degrees or were currently working toward advanced degrees. It was not unheard of during this period to find a junior enlisted Marine reservist with a law degree or a Ph.D.

The war in Indochina benefited the Marine Corps Reserve in all existing personnel shortages but exacerbated the issue of equipment shortages. While the number and quality of people wishing join the Reserve remained high, chronic equipment shortages remained a serious problem. The Marine Corps Reserve had long had shortfalls both in the quality and quantity of its authorized equipment. Reservists had to make-do with whatever old, worn, and outdated equipment was no longer used by active duty Marine Corps units. This proved to be a serious problem for mobilization and training. Obsolete or broken equipment had little value in battle and reservists could not be considered properly trained if they had not trained with the weapons and equipment they would ultimately use in combat. The obvious, but expensive solution was to provide the Reserve with the same equipment as their active duty counterparts and in quantities adequate for operational use.

Starting in the mid-1960s, the 4th Marine Division units were gradually reequipped with modern M14 rifles, M60 machine-guns, M109 155mm self-propelled howitzers, M50 106mm self-propelled rifles (ONTOS), M110 8-inch self-propelled howitzers, and LVTP5-A1 tracked landing vehicles. Efforts were also started to address the limited quantities of equipment that the Reserve units were authorized.

Up until the mid-1960s, the Organized Marine Corps Reserve received equipment in accordance with the Reserve Table of Equipment. Under this policy, each Reserve unit had only enough equipment to conduct their regular training. They were also constrained by the amount of space and maintenance facilities that were available at drill sites. There was not an expectation that the equipment Reserve units had on hand would be adequate in the event the unit was mobilized. Instead, the general plan was for mobilized units to receive all new equipment and supplies at the time of mobilization through the Marine Corps Supply System. There were, however, all manner of problems associated with this concept.

There was little uniformity between units. A unit's Instructor/Inspector (I&I) and its commanding officer had widely differing ideas of what were adequate levels of equipment for training. Not all drill sites had the ability to store and maintain equipment. While some units supported significant amounts of equipment, others had almost none. In any event, the Marine Corps Supply System lacked the ability to support a large mobilization of the 4th Division/Wing Team with War Reserve Material while simultaneously equipping the expanding active duty divisions, who were to see ground combat commitment in Vietnam.

By 1968, the Reserve equipment problems began receiving official attention. Moving away from the old Reserve Table of Equipment, Organized Reserve Units were authorized, for the first time, to receive and train with as much up-to-date equipment as they could store and maintain at their drill sites. Flexibility was the key to the new policy, with Organized Reserve units responsible for storing and maintaining all equipment that they could reasonably handle. They were accountable for everything on hand, and determining what they needed under the new table of equipment (T/E) to accomplish their training requirements. Division headquarters was ultimately responsible for the allocation of their equipment.<sup>29</sup>

## ***Unit Training***

Recruiting, reorganization, and the issuance of new equipment were vitally important to the 4th Marine Division during the mid-1960s, however, the keystone to military effectiveness of any combat unit remained realistic combat training. The goal of the new Reserve training program was "*to produce the strongest, most effective Reserve force possible at an economical cost.*"<sup>30</sup>

Understanding this, Brigadier General Joseph L. Stewart, the Director of the Reserve, pushed for increased unit training with an emphasis on air-ground skills and counter-guerrilla warfare. The 23d Marines, for example, participated in Operation Scarecrow in early February, 1965 against an aggressor "*guerrilla force*" in defensive positions west of the Naval Auxiliary Air Station, Crow's Landing, California. During the two day exercise, these reserve units from Stockton and San Bruno practiced their combat skills.

In April, nearly 1,000 Marine Reservists of the 1st Battalion, 24th Marines, from Toledo Ohio, and the southern Michigan area, participated in a similar exercise, Operation Lancer, at Fort Custer near Battle Creek, Michigan. Companies B and D of the 4th Tank Battalion similarly conducted unit exercises at Camp Drum, New York. The 3d Battalion, 14th Marines from Pennsylvania, traveled to Fort Sill, Oklahoma for their annual training.

While ground combat units of the 4th Marine Division practiced their skills, so did the division's combat support units. The 10th Engineer Company of Portland, Maine traveled to Camp Garcia on Vieques to assist in base development programs. Other Reserve engineer units were involved in construction projects at 29 Palms and San Clemente Island.<sup>31</sup>

Ambitious training programs for units of the 4th Marine Division were not limited to weekends and summer training periods. In Operation Tampa during January 8-9, 1966, Company A, 4th Amphibious Tractor Battalion in Tampa Bay conducted a joint amphibious landing exercise with other Marine Corps Reserve, Air National Guard, and the Coast Guard Auxiliary.<sup>33</sup> In RESMEBLEX-68, over five thousand Marine reservists took part in the largest Reserve exercise ever held on the East Coast at Camp Lejeune in August.<sup>32</sup>

During the second half of the 1960s, a symbiotic relationship increasingly developed between the newly formed Reserve division and active duty units. With the pressing requirements of normal operational commitments coupled with the increasing demands of the Vietnam War, active duty Marines were frequently hard pressed to provide the needed Marines to conduct training, umpire exercises, build construction projects, or meet other pressing manpower requirements. Reserve units, in turn, had the personnel but often lacked training areas, equipment, and weapons for their training. As a result, reserve units of the 4th Marine Division frequently trained right along side their active duty counterparts, enhancing training for both.

## ***Creation of the Nucleus Headquarters***

The Marine Corps Reserve officially turned fifty in 1966 and the U.S. Postal Service marked the occasion with an anniversary stamp. In February 7th of that same year, the commandant issued an Initiating Directive officially activating the nucleus headquarters of the 4th Marine Division. The new headquarters was initially staffed with one or two officers and a few enlisted Marines.<sup>33</sup> At first, the 4th Marine Division's new nucleus headquarters concentrated on creating plans to improve the rapid mobilization and deployment of the Division when called upon to do so.

At the outset the new headquarters staff had almost nothing to work with. It possessed only a handful of officers, mostly reservists who had been recalled to active duty and a few motivated but inexperienced enlisted Marines. Its facility included one telephone, a barbershop, and a volleyball court.<sup>34</sup> The new headquarters was initially stationed in Area 25 aboard sprawling Camp Pendleton, California. When the 5th Marine Division was formed, the 4th's headquarters moved to the "Little Red Schoolhouse" (painted white) in the 17 area.<sup>35</sup> The base commander, Major General Robert F. Cushman, Jr., was assigned command of the new headquarters with Colonel H.L. Oppenheimer as his Deputy Commander, and Colonel R.D. Peterson as his Chief of Staff.<sup>36</sup> Colonel Oppenheimer had been called out of retirement for the new assignment while several of his staff officers were reservists on active duty.<sup>37</sup>

The new division staff had a *"primary mission to establish an effective core staff capable of directing, controlling and integrating the mobilization planning and logistics functions preceding the activation of the 4th Marine Division."*<sup>38</sup> In addition to the new nucleus headquarters, a Headquarters Company Cadre was also established to support mobilization. Enlisted Marines to man the new Reserve organizations came from the Files Section of the Reserve Liaison Training Unit, Marine Corps Base, Camp Pendleton and additional personnel from Headquarters, Marine Corps.<sup>39</sup>

General Cushman was an ideal officer to command the new 4th Division nucleus headquarters. During his long career in the Marine Corps, he had held several billets directly involved in mobilization planning and implementation. In 1940 and 1941, he had been assigned as the Operations Officer in the reserve training center at Quantico where he trained reservists mobilizing for World War II.<sup>40</sup> From 1962 through 1964, he had also been the Operations Officer (G-3) at Headquarters Marine Corps and was responsible for mobilization plans for the Marine Corps.<sup>41</sup> As the commander of both Camp Pendleton and the 4th Marine

Division, General Cushman was in an ideal position to provide developed training areas and other base facilities for the reservists. General Cushman and his new headquarters were specifically charged with making necessary preparations for mobilization of the 4th Division and its combat support forces.<sup>42</sup>

As personnel arrived for their new assignments, the new 4th Division headquarters' staff filled-out to include twenty-eight Marine officers, sixty-two enlisted Marines, two Navy officers, and one enlisted sailor.<sup>43</sup>

The Southern California base was a fitting site for the new nucleus headquarters. The 4th Division had originally been established at Camp Pendleton during the Second World War and returned there after the Japanese surrender to demobilize. In a symbolic connection between the World War II and the modern 4th Marine Division, in the summer of 1966, four hundred members of the 4th Marine Division Association traveled down to Camp Pendleton from their reunion in Los Angeles. During their visit, retired General Clifton B. Cates, commander of the division in World War II, presented the 4th Marine Division's World War II battle colors to Major General Cushman.<sup>44</sup>

While the nucleus division headquarters formulated mobilization plans, it initiated liaison with other Marine Corps commands, developed training programs, drafted standard-operating-procedures, division orders, and coordinated summer training. The day-to-day administration of 4th Division and other Reserve units was left under the control of the seven Marine Corps District Directors, 165 Inspector-Instructor staffs, and 222 individual Marine Corps Reserve units. In addition to their high profile annual training exercises, 4th Marine Division and other Reserve units continued their normal training out of 129 joint reserve centers, 47 Marine Corps Reserve Training Centers, 70 Naval Air Stations, one National Guard Base, and one Marine Corps Base.<sup>45</sup>

## ***Operation Golden Slipper***

In 1967, the 4th Marine Division Headquarters participated in a large-scale joint Navy/Marine Corps-Active Duty/Reserve amphibious training exercise called Operation Golden Slipper. With more than 3,000 Marine reservists, 2,500 active duty Marines, and 3,500 sailors participating, it was the largest Regular-Reserve Amphibious exercise ever held aboard Camp Pendleton.<sup>46</sup> The exercise was conducted during the period from July 30 to August 4. It included the Navy's Amphibious Command Group One and both active duty and reserve Marine Corps units in a Marine Expeditionary Brigade size problem which featured helicopter and surface assault landings.<sup>47</sup>

Units of the 4th Marine Division, 5th Marine Division, 3rd Marine Aircraft Wing, 4th Marine Aircraft Wing, and the 4th Marine Division Headquarters Nucleus all participated as combat elements of the 4th Marine Expeditionary Brigade (4th MEB). Individual Marine Class III Reservists also filled billets on the various MEB staffs. Aggressors were provided by one active duty rifle company from the 27th Marines and the Reserve 6th Rifle Company from Little Rock, Arkansas.<sup>48</sup> The Navy supported the exercise with Task Force 176.0, that included the amphibious command ship ***Estes***, the amphibious assault ship ***Iwo Jima***, attack transports ***Cavalier*** and ***Cabildo***, destroyers ***Maddox*** and ***Shelton***, and the tank landing ships ***Wexford County***, ***Jerome County***, and ***Summit County***.<sup>49</sup>

Golden Slipper was a particularly challenging exercise for the units of the 4th Division. While real-world planning allowed the Reserve division thirty days to mobilize and sixty days to deploy, the Camp Pendleton exercise allowed them only seven working days before landing ashore. For many of the participating

reservists, it was their first time afloat or aboard helicopters. Despite being in the same division, most of the reservists had never worked with each other, thus making coordination more difficult. The exercise was the first realistic test of the 4th Division's ability to mobilize and "fight" along side active duty counterparts and was a real test of the planning and leadership ability of the new nucleus headquarters staff.

The exercises began in earnest when assault elements of the 4th MEB embarked on their ships in San Diego and at Del Mar boat basin at Camp Pendleton. On August 1, the amphibious assault force conducted a rehearsal, landing at Silver Strand, Coronado, California before assaulting the beaches of Camp Pendleton the following day. One reinforced company made a diversionary landing on GREEN Beach while Battalion Landing Team (BLT) 1/28, from the active duty 5th Marine Division, landed on RED Beach amid aggressor machine-gun fire and explosions simulating naval shelling and enemy fire.

Reservists of BLT 1/23 traveled by helicopter from the deck of the *Iwo Jima* to Landing Zone Kathy, deep in "enemy" territory. Once ashore, the active duty and reserve Marines conducted aggressive patrolling and seized critical terrain features. The next day, BLT 1/23 conducted a helicopter-borne search and seizure mission against an "enemy" occupied village. Regimental Landing Team 23 (RLT 23) seized control of the mythical KILINDIA province. By the following day, the exercise climaxed as the landing force occupied all of their objectives.<sup>50</sup> The ambitious regular/reserve amphibious training exercise was observed by many prominent military and civilian dignitaries and received significant press coverage, including stories by the *Los Angeles Times*, *Leatherneck*, and *The Reserve Marine*.<sup>51</sup>

Golden Slipper was only the first of what would become a series of major training exercises that the 4th Division would engage in during the 1960s. From July 15 thru July 17, 1968, division units participated in another amphibious exercise called Bell Banger aboard Camp Pendleton. Some units of the Division also conducted their summer training at Twentynine Palms Marine Corps Base and Camp Lejeune, North Carolina.

## ***Continuing Challenges***

Operation Golden Slipper achieved its training objective but the exercise pointed out that a number of challenges remained to be met before the 4th Marine Division would become a truly effective force in readiness.

Among the most serious problems facing mobilization planners were logistic shortcomings and the need for increased regimental and division level training. The 4th Division's nucleus headquarters was stationed at Camp Pendleton, while all of the reserve units that formed the division itself were scattered across the United States. During a time of general recall, these Marines would have to be transported to Camp Pendleton, quartered, fed, adequately equipped and trained for assignment.

However, at the time the 4th Division nucleus headquarters was reactivated, the logistical task would have been difficult to perform because Camp Pendleton was also supporting a massive increase in formal schools necessary to train Marines and units on their way to Vietnam. Furthermore, the 5th Marine Division, with General Cushman in command, was also forming aboard the same California base. Finally, a general mobilization of the 4th Division during this time would have brought regimental and division staff members together, although few of them had any experience working together during normal Reserve training periods.

## ***Bell Banger***

By 1969, American involvement in ground combat in the Vietnam War began to decline. Richard Nixon had been elected president the previous year, partially on the promise of ending the war through a negotiated settlement. His Secretary of Defense, Melvin Laird, traveled to Vietnam shortly after the inauguration to personally observe the situation there. As a result of his visit, Secretary Laird offered an optimistic report and consoled the President that the United States could "*Vietnamize*" the war. American troops would "*train, equip, and inspire the South Vietnamese*" so that they could take an increasingly greater share of the responsibility for the war, allowing American troops to return home.<sup>52</sup> Under this "*Nixon Doctrine*," American troop strength in Vietnam moved steadily downward. On June 8, 1969, in a speech on Midway Island, Nixon announced that 25,000 American troops would be pulled out of Vietnam by the end of August.

Marines were included in the general reduction of American forces in Vietnam. Beginning in July 1968, the Marine Corps instituted the Expanded Early Release Program which allowed individual Marine Vietnam veterans discharges from active duty up to 20 months early.<sup>53</sup> Beginning in June 1969, the first group of 26,800 Marines, including the entire 3d Marine Division and several fixed-wing and helicopter squadrons were redeployed out of Vietnam.<sup>54</sup> As the Marine Corps commitment to ground combat in Indochina was transferred to South Vietnamese forces, the size of the active duty Marine Corps dropped as well. The 5th Marine Division was deactivated for the second time. From a wartime peak of 309,771 on active duty at the end of fiscal year 1969, the Marine Corps active duty strength dropped to 259,737 in 1970, to 212,369 in 1971, and to 198,238 in 1972.<sup>55</sup> By January 1, 1972, only 500 Marines were still in-country.<sup>56</sup> On August 11, 1972, the last U.S. combat troops left Vietnam.<sup>57</sup> As the demands of the war eased and active duty Marine Corps units returned to the United States, the Reserve and the 4th Division enjoyed mixed blessings. The de-escalation brought fewer wartime demands but along with it, an atmosphere of austerity and active duty force reductions. Once again, the Marine Corps was called upon to justify its existence and a unique mission during a post-war period. The Marine Corps also faced a number of internal and external problems that had to be aggressively addressed.

## ***Dealing with the Legacy of the Vietnam War***

With the end of the Vietnam conflict, the size of the American military was dramatically cut. The total active duty strength fell from 3.4 million in 1968 to only 2.1 million in 1975. By 1974 there were 46 percent fewer aviation squadrons, 47 percent fewer ships, and 16 percent fewer divisions than there had been a decade earlier.<sup>58</sup>

The Marine Corps faced a number of serious problems at the end of the Vietnam War. During the war, military pay was increased dramatically to make service more attractive. After the war, paying active duty Marines at the greater pay rates remained a huge expense. Between 1964 and 1975, personnel costs rose 106 percent.<sup>59</sup> Active duty "*reductions in force*" turned out to be of limited benefit to the Reserve. Some quality officers and enlisted Marines separating from active duty chose to retain their affiliation with the Marine Corps through the Reserve, but overall recruiting and retention became much more difficult when the draft was abolished.

During the war, the Marine Corps had been forced to rely on conscription to fill its ranks. Illegal drug use, disciplinary problems, criminal behavior, and racial friction grew into major problems within many

Marine Corps commands. These sorts of social problems, to one degree or another, also affected the Reserve. Disenchanted by the war in Vietnam, several colleges and universities disestablished their Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) units. A Reserve center in Oregon was destroyed by arson. Marine reservists in California refused to cut their hair to regulation length and their court-martial was overturned by a sympathetic federal judge.<sup>60</sup> The end of the Indochina conflict produced problems for the Marine Reserve far greater than the familiar personnel and equipment shortages of old.

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**1972 pictorial command survey. Overall view of the Naval Support Activity, New Orleans with the Mississippi River in the background. Future home of the Eighth Marine Corps District is under construction at center of photograph.**



**Led by MajGen. E.J. Miller the 4th Marine Division Colors march from Camp Pendleton, California to NSA New Orleans, LA April, 1977.**



*"Disbudak, Turkey-I" Major John T. Dyer, USMCR (RET), USMC Art Collection*  
*"Display Determination", first NATO amphibious exercise held in Turkey since 1973. 4th Marine Amphibious Brigade operation, with 6000 Marines from Camp Lejeune, NC and Norfolk, VA and Marine reservists.*



*Operation "Palm Tree-III". A camouflaged M48A3 tank of B Co., 4th Tank Bn participated in desert warfare training with over 2,400 Marine reservists of the 4th Marine Division.*



*"Over the Edge" Col. H. Avery Chenoweth, USMC (RET), USMC Art Collection.  
Instructor from 4th Recon Battalion, Hawaii with MWTC Staff Instructor trainees from 3/23 New Orleans, LA.*

## **Chapter 4**

# **Post Vietnam War Period: 1973-1976**

### **Post Vietnam War**

With the conclusion of the American commitment to the ground war in Vietnam in 1971, the Marine Corps, its Reserve, and the 4th Division, entered a period of transition, facing a number of serious problems and an uncertain future. As happens after any war, it was a time for introspection. People both inside and outside the Marine Corps assessed its battlefield performance and reconsidered its future role and mission in the nation's defense. This was especially true after the Vietnam War, since, despite years of tremendous efforts and great sacrifices of blood and resources, the United States ultimately failed to achieve its primary political and military objective in Southeast Asia. The Marine Corps, along with all of the armed services, had to both assimilate the lessons of the war and adapt itself to new peacetime realities.

The lengthy and unpopular war in Vietnam left the Marine Corps with a number of unwelcome legacies. The failure of a military solution in Vietnam made many Americans openly question the value of the military for achieving national goals. Isolationism, that had been such a predominant feature of American domestic politics before World War II, was embraced by a growing number of Americans weary of costly and futile overseas military commitments. A 1976 Brookings Institution study warned, "*there is growing public disenchantment with military ventures overseas, particularly those involving the use of ground troops.*"<sup>1</sup> As is so often the case in a democracy, public opinion ultimately manifested itself in public policy.

Even before the end of the war in Vietnam, the general concept of employing military forces changed significantly. Official policy of the new Nixon administration was outlined in 1969 as the Nixon Doctrine and the Strategy of Realistic Deterrence.<sup>2</sup> In a policy reminiscent of Eisenhower's "*New Look*," the Nixon Doctrine maintained the United States' continuing role in guarding the security of the Free World while down-playing the role of American ground troops. This new doctrine, coupled with massive post-war force reductions, made it highly improbable that the United States would be willing to commit ground forces to anything less serious than a full-scale Soviet invasion of a North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) ally in Western Europe.

The executive branch was not alone in restricting the future role of the U.S. military. In 1973, Congress passed the War Powers Act which attempted to limit the president's ability to commit ground troops to combat situations. In the immediate post-Vietnam War era, there was little apparent likelihood that Washington policy-makers would commit American ground military forces to the sort of expeditionary, small-scale, and limited interventions that had been the stock in trade of the Marine Corps throughout much of the 20th century. This assessment of future national security requirements and policy left the Marine Corps, an expeditionary force in readiness, in a precarious position.

### **Addressing the Marine Corps' Future**

Questions about the Marine Corps' future in the post-war era came from several different quarters. In light of the rapidly changing international situation and shifts in American foreign policy, the Brookings Institution conducted a study to discover if the Marine Corps was "*appropriately geared to meet the most likely*

threats to U.S. national interests."<sup>3</sup> Of particular interest to this study, was the question of how the lightly armed Marine Corps could deal with the "*sophisticated, heavily armored forces*" of the Soviet Union and its allies. Many Marine Corps leaders of the period openly wondered if they could find a role for the Marine Corps within NATO contingency plans.<sup>4</sup> By 1975, however, the Marine Corps was able to secure a limited NATO mission of defending Europe's northern flank, Norway, Denmark, and Iceland. Training exercises for this new mission were called Bold Guard and Northern Wedding.

The Brookings study also addressed what the future role of Marine Air would be and how the Marine Corps could address its critical recruiting problems in the post-draft period.<sup>5</sup> Central in the latter question was the future importance of the Reserve and the 4th Marine Division in providing the Marine Corps with the additional personnel and operational units to compensate for reductions of active duty forces while continuing to meet its future requirements. Reflecting the general sentiment of the era, the Senate Armed Services Committee ordered the Marine Corps to re-evaluate its mission and to clear out substandard personnel who were left over from the Vietnam War. To do this, the new Commandant, General Louis H. Wilson, convened a board, chaired by Major General Fred E. Haynes, to comprehensively study the Marine Corps' problems and to suggest possible solutions.<sup>6</sup>

The report issued by General Haynes's board acknowledged that the Marine Corps had, "*a manpower quality problem as generally identified*," by the Senate Armed Services Committee.<sup>7</sup> Specific personnel problems included unacceptably high rates of unauthorized absences and desertions, recruits who had not graduated high school, drug and alcohol abuse, racial conflict, and crime. In far too many cases, these problems ultimately led to young first-term Marines who failed to complete their enlistments. By 1975, the Marine Corps had the worst rates of imprisonment, unauthorized absence, and courts-martial in the armed forces.<sup>8</sup>

The report went on to say that the problems of the past had been identified and were in the process of being corrected and recommended that quality, rather than end strength, should be the promised goal of the Marine Corps. Discharging the "*dead wood*" was not the only reason the active duty side of the Marine Corps was shrinking. While post-World War II acts of Congress protected the existence of the Marine Corps and mandated it to maintain three active duty divisions and wings, the reality of austere post-war budgets forced Marine Corps planners to make some difficult choices. The Haynes Report noted, that while "*it has long been the opinion of this headquarters that a Corps of 212,000 Marines is necessary to maintain three [active duty] division/wing teams*," the reality of fiscal limitations dictated a 196,300 manning level.<sup>9</sup>

The post vietnam era forced the Marine Corps to clean out its "*dead wood*," and deal with low manning levels, while still meeting operational commitments abroad. In order to adapt and revise, the Marine Corps would have to increasingly rely on the Reserve and, especially, the units in the 4th Marine Division.

## ***Understrength***

Perhaps the most serious problem facing the Marine Corps in the immediate post-war years was getting and keeping the necessary numbers and quality of people for both active duty and reserve units. At the height of the Vietnam War, the Marine Corps had expanded to nearly 310,000 active duty Marines, its highest level in its history except during World War II. Actions taken during the war to meet critical manpower demands, however, did little to enhance the Marine Corps' image as an elite and selective military institution. As had happened during World War II, the Marine Corps was forced to accept tens-of-thousands of reluctant draftees into their ranks. President Johnson's social-engineering "*Project 100,000*" forced the Marine

Corps to accept enlisted men who, in a more selective environment, would not have been qualified to enter the Marine Corps because of low standardized test scores or physical limitations. The Marine Corps' seasoned staff non-commissioned officer corps was also seriously depleted during the Vietnam War era as many of these Marines were promoted to the warrant and commissioned officer ranks. Low retention rates during and in the years immediately after the war also meant that the Corps lost its skilled and experienced Marines, both officer and enlisted, in alarming numbers. Even as the war wound down, with lower manpower requirements and no combat rotations, recruiting and retention of good people remained very difficult for the Marine Corps.\*

## ***The All Volunteer Force (AVF)***

One of the most divisive and controversial issues during the Vietnam War was the draft. Since President Johnson did not order a general mobilization of the Reserves, the service branches relied on wide-scale conscription to fill their ranks.\*\* As American involvement in the war diminished and eventually ended, popular and political support for the draft waned. Shortly after taking office, President Nixon appointed former Secretary of Defense Thomas S. Gates chairman of a presidential commission with instructions to "*develop a comprehensive plan for eliminating conscription and moving toward an all volunteer armed force.*"<sup>10</sup> When the commission announced its findings in February 1970, it concluded that the draft could be eliminated without prohibitive costs or jeopardizing national security.

The new concept of an All Volunteer Force (AVF) would rely on making military life more attractive, through higher pay and better living standards, to encourage voluntary recruitment and retention. While the AVF solved some difficulties, it also created a number of new and serious manpower challenges for the Marine Corps.

Without the ability to rely on the draft for many of its new recruits, the Marine Corps and other services were authorized to provide substantial pay, education and other monetary incentives to build an all-volunteer force. This policy doubled the average military pay between 1968 and 1973.<sup>11</sup> Between 1964 and 1973, average pay for officers increased 81 percent while enlisted pay increased 125 percent.<sup>12</sup> This was welcome news for the individual service members and helped greatly with recruiting and retention, but it also made funding other aspects of the military budget that much more difficult. The Department of the Defense paid \$22 billion dollars more in 1974 for 400,000 fewer personnel than it had paid in 1964.<sup>13</sup> In fiscal year 1974, personnel costs accounted for more than half, 56 percent, of the entire Department of the Defense budget.<sup>14</sup>

More money also had to go into recruiting and advertising to compensate for the loss of draftees. Along with the other services, the Marine Corps also had to spend large amounts of its limited budget to improve the quality of life of its members to improve retention. Ironically, the American public expected a sizable "*peace dividend*" as the Vietnam War wound down. So despite the rising cost of pay and caring for Marines the defense budget shrank. From 1968 to 1974, overall military spending declined by 37 percent.<sup>15</sup> All this occurred at a time when military planners had to cope with high inflation, dramatically higher prices for petroleum products, and the need to acquire more sophisticated and expensive weapon systems.

Marine Corps leaders had to discover ways to maintain the Corps' size and combat effectiveness with fewer active duty Marines and less money. The way to do this was to rely more heavily on the Reserve and to make 4th Marine Division genuinely comparable to its active duty counterparts.

\*Post-war manpower levels were set at 196,300 active duty men and women and an organized Reserve of 35,000.

\*\*The post-World War II period was the only time in American history that a draft was used to maintain the military. Even in war, the draft had only been resorted to during the Civil War, the World Wars, and the Korean War.

## ***The Marine Corps Reserve Adapts to the AVF***

Before the Reserve and the 4th Division could help make up for the Marine Corps' active duty manpower shortages and budget problems, it had to deal with its own serious personnel problems. The draft ended in 1973, dramatically reducing the number of people willing to enlist.

Without an incentive to avoid the draft and service in Vietnam, far fewer young men were willing to join the Reserve. In addition, many Marine reservists left as soon as their military obligation was fulfilled. For the majority of Marine reservists during the Vietnam War era, the draft had been their most powerful incentive to enlist. A 1970 survey of 968 Marine reservists in the Sixth Marine Corps District revealed that 90 per cent of them reported that they joined the Marine Corps Reserve solely to avoid the draft.<sup>16</sup> The long lines of highly qualified young men who wanted to become Marine reservists during the Vietnam War disappeared abruptly with the end of the draft.

Reserve recruitment was all the more difficult since the generous new incentive packages being offered for active duty personnel to make the AVF attractive simply were not carried over to reservists in any meaningful way. These recruiting problems were only made worse by a 1973 increase in the authorized strength of reserve components.

In addressing the manpower problems with the AVF in the Reserve, the Department of Defense made an effort during the mid-1970s to initiate several programs to make reserve enlistment more attractive and to improve retention. Reserve drill pay was increased, payment of allowance for quarters for reservists with dependents was authorized during active duty periods, and direct procurement of non-commissioned and petty officers from skilled civilians was authorized.

In 1973, the Marine Corps initiated two experimental programs that allowed individuals to enlist for a total of six years obligated service in the Reserve but allowed them to transfer to a Class III Ready Reserve status after three or four years.<sup>17</sup> Despite these changes, end strength numbers fell dramatically during the early 1970s. As early as 1973, Secretary of the Navy Chafee stated before the Senate Armed Services Committee, *"I am especially concerned about our ability to enlist and retain the quantity and quality of people we need in the Naval and Marine Corps Reserve"*; The Secretary cited the need for upgraded recruiting and a new incentive package *"to attract able people to the reserve forces."*<sup>18</sup> The most troublesome area remained the inability to find qualified individuals with *"hard skills"* to fill particular billets.

In 1975, when the Marine Corps was authorized to have 36,703 paid drilling reservists, it had only 32,391, with severe (MOS) shortages in the combat arms. Shortages were especially critical in the lower enlisted ranks.<sup>19</sup> Inactive Reserve shortfalls were equally pronounced. Between 1974 and 1978, the number of Marines in the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) fell from 89,700 to 39,600.<sup>20</sup> Department of Defense manpower problems were such a serious concern that Congress created the Defense Manpower Commission in 1974 to investigate the problem and suggest possible solutions. Reserve recruiting problems were so severe that the Department of Defense's Project Volunteer Committee gave serious consideration to proposing a *"Reserve draft."*<sup>21</sup> Retention and recruiting remained problematic in the Reserve as it lacked many of the effective monetary incentives, such as advanced training and educational benefits, available in the active duty Marine Corps. Manpower problems, however, were not the only ones that faced the Reserve and the 4th Marine Division in the immediate post-Vietnam Era.

## ***Reserve Post-War Readiness***

During the prolonged Indochina conflict, while all attention was focused on supporting the immediate needs of active duty Marines engaged in combat in Vietnam, Reserve issues such as readiness, modernization of weapons and equipment, amphibious shipping, facilities construction and maintenance all suffered from unavoidable neglect.

While fighting continued in Vietnam, only limited progress was made to bring the 4th Marine Division up to a truly combat-ready status. The Marine Corps Reserve also had to deal with a troubling legacy that, even at the height of the fighting in Southeast Asia, it had never been mobilized or sent. The reserves' absence from the battlefield raised doubts in the minds of many about the Reserves' readiness and value to the national defense. Although President Johnson may have had a number of sound political reasons for not mobilizing the reserves, many people concluded that the reserves were not called up because they were not ready to fight.

In the 1970s, several critics concluded that the nation's reserve forces were in serious trouble. Professor John B. Keeley of the University of Virginia noted, "*the condition of our reserve forces, in their totality, can only be judged as disastrous.*"<sup>22</sup> Martin Binkin, of the Brookings Institution, agreed stating that the nation's reserve forces were "*short of people, short of equipment, untrained and unready.*"<sup>23</sup> While these problems were most evident in the Army Reserve and National Guard, the Marine Reserve also had its share of post-war problems, or at least a perception that had to be addressed. The austere post-war period, however, proved to be a difficult time to play catch-up.

## ***Reserve Reform and Recommitment: The Total Force***

At the same time the reserves were attempting to deal with the problems and challenges that faced all the American military services at the end of the Vietnam War, the Executive Branch initiated a comprehensive reorganization which fundamentally changed the relationship between active duty and reserve components. Under the Nixon Doctrine, the United States would no longer automatically intervene to counter Soviet expansionism in proxy wars of national liberation in the Third World. Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird embarked on a program of scaling down American conventional forces. From a capacity to fight two-and-one-half major global conflicts, American forces had to fall back to a more realistic assumption of one-and-one-half conflicts. Military units no longer needed on active duty were either deactivated or transferred to the reserves. The new policy was designed to bring the reserve forces into the mainstream of national security planning as never before. The reserves were intended to materially augment the shrinking active duty force.

In 1970, the Secretary Laird formally announced a renewed emphasis on integrating the shrinking active duty forces with revitalized reserve components of all of the military services under an overall "*Total Force*" policy. This policy not only addressed the realities of the day, it also appealed to America's long tradition of maintaining a small regular military that could be augmented by trained and equipped "*citizen-soldiers*" in time of need. Secretary Laird was counting on "*members of the National Guard and Reserve, instead of draftees,*" to be the "*initial and primary source for augmentation of the active forces in any future emergency requiring a rapid and substantial expansion of the active forces.*"<sup>24</sup>

The "Total Force" idea was to reorganize the reserves, while providing them with new missions and higher priorities in military operational planning. Secretary Laird envisioned the Total Force as *"the most advantageous mix [of active duty and reserve units] to support national strategy and meet the threat."* The total force concept would be *"applied in all aspects of planning, programming, manning, equipping and employing the Guard and Reserve."*

The ultimate goal of the Total Force program was to prepare the reserves *"to be the initial and primary source for augmentation of the active forces in any future emergency requiring a rapid and substantial expansion of the active forces."*<sup>25</sup> Each service developed mobilization planning to meet predetermined maximum total force requirements with its active duty and reserve forces. Reflecting the new emphasis on the reserves under the Total Force policy, and at a time when overall Department of Defense spending was being cut, annual appropriations for the reserves increased from \$2.6 billion in 1970 to \$4.4 billion by 1974.<sup>26</sup>

For the Army, the Total Force program meant dramatic changes in the role of its Reserve and National Guard. To compensate for the loss of active duty soldiers, five Army divisions had one of their active brigades, about 5,000 each, replaced by reserve "round-out" brigades. In theory, the Army would be able to field more combat divisions with a given number of active duty soldiers. The reserve round-out brigades, in turn, would benefit from better training and higher priority in resource allocation.<sup>27</sup> By 1989, the Army had six round-out divisions and three others that relied on one or more reserve round-out battalions.<sup>28</sup> Units in the Army Reserve and National Guard that were not part of the round-out program also received increased attention. They were assured their levels of readiness and training were adequate so as to mobilize and reinforce the regular Army in time of war or national emergency. Under the Total Force concept, the Army's reliance on its Reserve and National Guard units was so great, that by 1983, they comprised approximately one-half of the Army's combat units and about 70 percent of its combat service support units.<sup>29</sup>

For the Marine Corps, the new Total Force concept changed little but did prompt the Marine Corps' leadership to recommit itself to insuring that the 4th Division was brought up to the same standards and capabilities as the active duty divisions. In addition to increased readiness, the Total Force Concept held the promise of maintaining a large conventional force at a substantially reduced cost. A series of formal studies were initiated within the Marine Corps, within the Department of Defense, and with private consulting groups to determine how best to apply this program.

An obvious solution to the manpower shortage and budget cuts was to place a greater reliance on the far more cost-effective Ready Reserve. Defense policy makers counted on placing a *"greater reliance on our National Guard and Reserve"* in order to *"preclude any need to return to a massive draft."*<sup>30</sup> The goal was to have a truly combat-ready National Guard and Reserves that could be realistically incorporated into strategic planning and quickly augment active units.

As an indicator of the renewed commitment to the National Guard and Reserve, the Nixon administration called for a \$600 million budget increase for them in fiscal year 1973.<sup>31</sup> Under the concept of a Total Force, all the services, along with their reserve components, would be integrated into strategic planning at all levels. Reserve forces were particularly important in this time of force reductions and budgets cuts. Elliot L. Richardson, Laird's successor as Secretary of Defense, noted in his annual report to Congress, *"a well equipped, manned and trained National Guard and Reserve, deployable on short notice, is potentially the most economical part of our Defense establishment."* He went on to say that, *"it is also an essential part of the total force concept, and I intend to seek ways to improve and strengthen the quality and readiness of the National Guard and Reserve."*<sup>32</sup> Without a functioning selective service, the Ready Reserve, including the 4th Marine Division, represented the only way to rapidly mobilize additional forces at the outbreak of hostilities.

In 1973, the full integration of the active duty forces with the National Guard and Reserve Force was formalized under the concept of the Total Force. This policy was initiated by Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger and was intended to bring the reserve community to the same standard as active duty force in force structuring, mobilization planning, and operational evaluation.<sup>33</sup> Reserve forces in all of the services received more recognition and funding. The reserves also received a windfall of modern equipment made available from the shrinking active duty forces. This equipment included fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters. Units in the 4th Marine Division received M-16 rifles, M48A3 tanks, LVTP-7 amphibious tractors, and M561 Gama Goats.<sup>34</sup>

Major General M.P. Ryan, Director of the Marine Corps Reserve, worried that mobilization remained a difficult problem. While Marine Corps doctrine called for the 4th Division/Wing Team to be activated within thirty days, this was likely overly optimistic. A Brookings Institution study in 1976 concluded that deployment of the wing would require two months and the division between two and five months.<sup>35</sup>

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## ***Chapter 5***

# ***Transformation Into The Total Force, 1976-1990***

While the United States was not committed to combat operations immediately following the end of the Vietnam conflict, it did face volatile and significant political and military threats throughout Africa, Asia, Central America and Europe. Even overlooking the fall of South East Asia to communist forces, the Cold War in Europe and its spread to Third World countries multiplied the number of possible contingencies to which Marine expeditionary forces may be required to respond. With these multiple global threats, a draw-down of active duty forces and a shrinking defense budget, the role of the Marine Corps Reserve would take on greater prominence. In the post-World War II era, the 4th Marine Division had been viewed primarily as a source of pre-trained combat replacements. Now, units of the 4th Marine Division would begin training to fight as part of a task-organized Total Force, integrating Reserve units with Active units for contingency planning.<sup>1</sup>

### ***The Reorganization of the 4th Marine Division***

By 1975, the 4th Marine Division had grown to an approximate strength of 23,000. It was the largest and most complex Division in the Marine Corps. It was larger than any of the other Marine Divisions. The 4th had a fourth artillery battalion, two Air Naval Ground Liaison Companies (ANGLICO), two tank battalions, two engineer battalions and more Force troops than any Active duty division. The units of the 4th Marine Division were spread across the United States. Local reserve centers could be found in 156 cities and in 45 of the 50 states. Individual units of the Division numbered in excess of 200.<sup>2</sup>

While remaining ready for any contingency, combat skills training began a subtle shift away from the small unit tactics used in Indochina to preparing for the more armor-intensive threat found in Europe and in the desert environs of Africa and the Middle East. At the same time, hard-learned lessons from combat in World War II and Korea, along with the mobilization problems of 1950, would be incorporated into planning for the new Total Force.<sup>3</sup>

By 1977, planning doctrine for the Total Force dictated that the 4th Marine Division units were better deployed and trained at a size no larger than the brigade level as opposed to deploying the entire Division or the 4th Marine Aircraft Wing. With this new focus on unit employment in the Total Force, the Division's force structure was revised to facilitate this transformation. Reserve units were activated, deactivated and reassigned. This structural re-alignment enabled the Marine Corps to rapidly establish air-ground units, Marine Air Ground Task Forces (MAGTF) and to provide a Reserve Marine Amphibious Brigade (MAB).

One of the major re-alignments was the simplification of the Reserve command structure. The original command relationships at the 1966 re-activation of the Division were complex. In 1962, the Organized Marine Corps Reserve (OMCR) was structured to mirror that of a Marine Expeditionary Force, composed of the 4th Marine Division, the 4th Marine Aircraft Wing, and requisite combat and combat service support units necessary to support a Division/Wing team in sustained combat. Until the re-organization of the mid 1970's, the 4th Marine Division was structured to facilitate mobilization and deployment on short notice as part of the Division/Wing team.

Under the original command relationships, responsibility and direction over the operation of the Division was divided three ways between Division headquarters, Headquarters, Marine Corps, and the twelve regional Marine Corps Districts. Headquarters Marine Corps issued training plans spanning three to four year cycles, while local reserve commanding officers were tasked to develop their own training programs to reflect their mission.<sup>4</sup> The Directors of the twelve regional Marine Corps Districts, normally active duty Colonels, were responsible for all Marine Corps functions in their region which were not tasked to major operational commands. This included supervision of the local reserve units and the Inspector-Instructor staffs in addition to other primary responsibilities such as recruiting, officer procurement and ceremonies.

The original command structure of the 4th Marine Division tasked the Director, Marine Corps Reserve with developing plans and programs to prepare reserve units for mobilization while the district directors were tasked with supervising reserve units and individual Reservists in their respective geographical areas. Inspector-Instructor staffs (I&I) were, in turn, assigned to assist reserve commanding officers at the local reserve center in the operation, training, administration and logistical support of their units.

This operational chain of command posed some obvious command challenges. District directors had several important primary duties such in addition to supervising local reserve units. Focus on their vital recruiting mission impacted the ability of a district director to monitor the training and administration of local reserve units. Also, because the districts were organized to be regional in scope, the district director had little ability to oversee the quality of training in a subordinate unit if it were located outside his district. For example, a district director could find himself responsible for overseeing the conduct of a reserve infantry battalion in the First Marine District but was unable to oversee the training of a subordinate infantry company or platoon from that battalion if it were located in the Sixth Marine District.<sup>5</sup>

Inspector-Instructors often found themselves responsible to a district director yet also answerable to the Division's commanding general. The appointment of commanding officers of reserve units was also a source of frustration. District directors recommended commanders to the Commandant of the Marine Corps. The Commanding General of the 4th Marine Division, to whom the commanding officer of the reserve unit would ultimately answer, merely forwarded the recommendations to Headquarters Marine Corps.<sup>6</sup>

On July 15, 1970, Brigadier General Leo J. Dulacki assumed command of the 4th Marine Division. He was the first commanding general whose singular duty was to actually command the Division. Two days later, Dulacki was promoted to Major General. His appointment was viewed by many as a significant step in the re-organization that had been ongoing since the activation of the Division. From this point forward, the emphasis in command alignment would be to bring all training and appointing authority under the Commanding General of the 4th Marine Division.<sup>7</sup> Brigadier General P. X. Kelley, the Commanding General, 4th Marine Division from 1974-1975, recommended to Headquarters Marine Corps that the Division's commanding general make the Division's command assignments instead of simply forwarding on the recommendations of district directors. This recommendation was also supported by Major General Ryan, Director of the Marine Corps Reserve. The Commandant approved this recommendation. Thus, in 1975, the 4th Marine Division became responsible for its own training and command appointments. This refinement of command relationships continued under Major General Edward J. Miller who succeeded Brigadier General Kelley as the Division's new commanding general.

In July, 1975, Major General Miller recommended to the Commandant that it was "essential" for the Commanding General to assume operational and administrative control of all 4th Marine Division units and their assigned Inspector/Instructor staffs. This and other organizational recommendations were accepted and phased in during the early part of 1976. On 2 March 1977, the Commandant of the Marine Corps

directed that the final transfer of the command of the Organized Marine Corps Reserve ground assets from district to 4th Marine Division control would be accomplished by 1 October 1977. This shift in power phased out the district directors' responsibility for reserve training and permitted the district directors to focus on the other responsibilities of their command.<sup>8</sup>

On April 20, 1977, the headquarters of the 4th Marine Division, under the command of Major General Miller, was relocated from Camp Pendleton to New Orleans, Louisiana. This move allowed the Division's headquarters to be more centrally located in the continental United States, as 65% of the Division's units were located East of the Mississippi River. The movement of Division headquarters to New Orleans was also seen as a way of solidifying the partnership between the Division and the other half of the Marine Reserve's Air-Ground Team, the 4th Marine Aircraft Wing which was already headquartered there.

The 4th Marine Division Colors were marched 1,820 miles from Camp Pendleton to New Orleans. The Division's Colors arrived on 3 August 1977. The entire advance was accomplished on foot with the Colors being transferred to local reserve units along the way. Representative of that effort was Sgt. Twila Toule of the 4th Tank Battalion who marched the Colors five miles across desert sand. At the same time that the Division Colors began their trek, the battle standard of the new 4th Marine Amphibious Force was marched from the birthplace of the Marine Corps, Tun Tavern, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. The battle standard arrived at the same time in New Orleans, and was welcomed by that city's first all military parade since World War II. General Louis Wilson, Commandant of the Marine Corps, described the dual march as "*symbolic of our determination as a nation to be organized, trained, equipped and ready to defend against the full range of unspecified and highly visible threats that confront us in today's world of advanced sophisticated technology.*"<sup>9</sup>

Several other symbolic changes reflected the growing prominence of the Division as unit in transformation. Just prior to the Division's relocation to New Orleans, the title "*New Breed*" and a new logo were bestowed on the 4th Marine Division. In April, 1977, ***The Reserve Marine***, was absorbed by the ***Continental Marine*** which is still published today. Over the years, the ***Continental Marine*** has been selected several times as the best appropriated fund newspaper in the Marine Corps.<sup>10</sup>

## ***People and Problems***

Immediately following the end of the Vietnam conflict, the 4th Marine Division reflected many of the problems of the American society from which it drew its members. It further suffered, to some extent, from the same malaise that afflicted the active duty forces, including a break down in respect for military authority, racial polarization, and widespread substance abuse. During this difficult time, the 4th Marine Division not only survived these challenges but also was able to assume its global mission as a member of the Total Force. By effectively dealing with its problems following the Vietnam conflict, the 4th Marine Division not only survived intact but actually thrived.

Many of the company grade officers joining the Division in the early 1970's got a shock as they joined the Division's reserve units. A joining officer, many of whom saw combat action in Vietnam, could be expected to encounter unkempt Reservists wearing short hair wigs to cover non-regulation long hair during drill week-ends.<sup>11</sup> However, many of the Reservists were far better educated than the new officers. Many of these Reservists had no genuine desire to extend their initial enlistment, having joined the Reserves to avoid the draft. Many Reservists questioned the need to train as ordered or even to make drills or annual training duty. Race relations were tense. Drug and alcohol abuse was also common.

In addition to these significant command challenges, many commanding officers found it difficult to motivate the Reservists who did perform drill. In many areas, especially urban centers, unemployment and societal problems provided leadership challenges unknown to a regular unit. Some commanders discovered that the meals provided during a drill week-end and the drill pay were the only earned food or income a Marine had all month.

The dramatic interest in human relations and programs developed by the Commandant to combat this threat to the combat readiness of the Marine Corps was also introduced to 4th Marine Division units. Command attention was drawn to identifying and addressing the causes of racial friction and not just treating the symptoms. Officers and staff non-commissioned officers were directed to immediately begin a meaningful dialogue with their Marines about race relations and perceptions. Numerous studies, commissions and recommendations followed.<sup>12</sup>

In July, 1972 the Marine Corps Human Relations Institute was established at Marine Corps Recruit Depot, San Diego, California. The purpose of this Institute was to train instructors to conduct seminars about race relations and human diversity. Instructors traveled throughout the Marine Corps conducting Human Relations Training and evaluating existing programs. Every Marine, whether in boot camp or at the general officer level, received a mandated course of instruction. Besides opening a constructive dialogue, this training focused a commander's attention on race relations in his unit. While it cannot be said that these efforts resulted in overturning years of perceived or actual injustice and bias, the new focus served well to remind leaders that good leadership begins with fairness and impartiality in decisions affecting enlistment, assignment, discipline and promotions.<sup>13</sup>

Widespread drug and alcohol problems were initially met with education and rehabilitation. Marines and sailors were isolated, detoxified, and received inpatient treatment where necessary. Many Marines, who could have been punished for illegal drug use, were afforded exemption, a diversion process that allowed for rehabilitative treatment and, in some cases, a return to duty.

General Louis H. Wilson became Commandant of the Marine Corps in July, 1975. His arrival marked the beginning of the "*Great Personnel Campaign*."<sup>14</sup> This effort was aimed at reducing the serious social ills afflicting the Corps by insisting on improved recruit quality standards. The percentage of high school graduates was raised and recruitment of Marines from the lowest mental group was ended. Expedient administrative discharges rather than courts-martial for malcontents were ordered. For 4th Marine Division reservists, this meant mandatory processing for immediate administrative separation for those who maintained an unsatisfactory drill attendance. Finally, Marines were admonished to adhere to traditionally high standards of behavior and commitment. Those who did not were purged from the rolls. General Wilson, in his 1978 State of the Corps report, stressed that the goal of recruiting quality high school graduates applied equally to both Reserve and Active duty recruiting missions.<sup>15</sup>

These efforts dramatically reduced a myriad of command problems which affected the 4th Marine Division's morale and combat effectiveness during the 1970s. By 1981, the most serious residual personnel problem was the still wide-spread use of illegal drugs throughout the Marine Corps. In 1981, The Commandant, General Robert Barrow announced "*a war on drugs*."<sup>16</sup> More aggressive detection methods, such as unscheduled and random drug tests of all ranks, including officers, commenced. While rehabilitation and therapy was still offered, efforts at retaining identified abusers in a duty status diminished. This anti-drug campaign produced immediate results because it identified substance abusers. Along with the introduction of random drug testing through urinalysis, a concurrent assault on the alcohol abuser within the Corps began. Historians have noted that the early focus on identifying and treating the drug abuser enabled the

Marine Corps to also quickly identify alcohol abuse as a significant problem. This two pronged assault allowed Marine Corps commanders to look at the root causes behind incidents such as serious automobile accidents and domestic violence.<sup>17</sup>

By 1985, the Active and Reserve components of the Marine Corps reached a plateau of excellence in recruiting and retaining quality officers and enlisted. The wealth of experience and expertise in the 4th Marine Division was impressive. Combat experience remained high among the career Reservists. To assist with readiness and mobilization, the Marine Corps developed programs and data bases such as Reserve Qualification Summaries to capitalize on the skills and expertise gained by Reservists in the private sector. In addition to the drilling Reservists assigned to the Selected Marine Corps Reserve (SMCR) units, Marine Corps Mobilization Stations (MCMS), and Mobilization Training Units (MTU) and other detachments which specialized in specific or technical mobilization support were staffed by Individual Mobilization Augmentees (IMA). While not under 4th Marine Division control, these units often assisted local reserve units, or were attached as special staff in large scale division exercises.

Another essential component of reserve readiness was the Full Time Support (FTS) program recently redesignated as the Active Reserve (AR) program. This program brought Reservists on extended periods of active duty, some for a few years. These Reservists often filled administrative and logistic billets at various headquarters within the Division. The intent of this program is to make more personnel available to perform the day to day requirements of a reserve unit, thus allowing the drilling Reservists to concentrate on training and readiness. Prior to 1980, the majority of FTS Marines came from those Marines being released from active duty. By Fiscal Year 1984, however, there were over 800 FTS Marines recruited and joined from the Reserve ranks.<sup>18</sup>

## ***Women Marines in the 4th Marine Division***

Prior to 1958, most women Reservists were located in Women Reserve Platoons. These tended to be disbursing and administration units. The platoons were normally attached to a ground unit and commanded by the reserve unit's male commanding officer. These Women Reserve Platoons were deactivated in 1958 due to fiscal limitations, and a desire to increase male enlisted strength. The deactivation allowed for 227 women Reservists to remain in a drill pay status. This tiny number represented one-half of one percent of the authorized strength of the Organized Marine Corps Reserve. At first these billets were highly sought. However, by 1967, the number of women in a drill status dwindled to only two officers and 74 enlisted.<sup>19</sup>

By 1974, several administrative changes occurred that did much to remove the perceived separate status of women in the Marine Corps. For example, prior to 1974, a special Commandant's anniversary message was promulgated for the founding of the Women Marines on February 13, 1943. After 1974, however, only one message commemorating the November 10th Marine Corps Birthday was released signifying unity. The separatism fostered by the official use of the title "*Woman*" before the use of the word Reserves, as in Woman Reservist (WR), or Women Marine (WM) was discouraged.<sup>20</sup>

Between 1958 and 1967 there was no specific Reserve program for women Marines. In 1971, a women Marine "*Special Enlistment Program*" was established in the Marine Corps Reserve with an initial quota of 88 billets. The women selected to fill these billets were to be recruited by the ground and aviation units of the Organized Marine Corps Reserve. From that time, the assignment of women in the Reserves paralleled the assignments of those in the Active components.<sup>21</sup>

In 1967, Public Law 90-130 removed any percentage caps on the number of women Marines who could join the Marine Corps and its reserve forces. Previous federal law had limited the number of women Marines to a maximum of two percent of the enlisted Marine strength. By May 1976, 30 officer and 400 enlisted billets belonged to women in the Fourth Marine Division/Wing Team.<sup>17</sup> In 1973, Women Marines began filling billets in the Division headquarters. 1973 was also the year that Major Jeanne Boatwright Humphrey became the first female commanding officer of an Organized Marine Corps Reserve unit, Truck Company, 4th Service Battalion, 4th Marine Division located in Erie, Pennsylvania. This change of command was significant. Prior to Major Humphrey's command of this almost exclusively male Marine unit, female Marine officers had been relegated to commanding predominantly all female units.<sup>22</sup>

In June, 1980, the Commandant refined Marine Corps policy concerning the assignment of women Marines to ground and combat support units. The policy change provided that women Marines could now be recruited and assigned to any 4th Marine Division unit that had a billet requirement and an MOS open by federal law for women, in which the female reservist could be effectively employed and trained. In November 1993, Congress rescinded the statutory restrictions of Title 10, and thus "*opened exciting new career opportunities for female personnel.*" For the Marine Corps Reserve this meant that all occupational fields, except those involving assignment to direct combat billets, were open.<sup>23</sup>

## ***Deployment and the MORDT***

The 4th Marine Division of World War II took five months to move by sea to its first combat objective. Deployment as part of the Total Force would be measured in days. Modern warfare emphasized rapid mobilization and speed of deployment as never before. The key indicator for successful mobilization was the reserve unit's ability to assemble, mount out and deploy when the recall came. In order to test mobilization readiness, a Mobilization Operational Readiness Deployment Test (MORDT) was developed. The MORDT was first used in 1976 to inspect 4th Marine Division units in emergency recall procedures, administration, logistics and embarkation readiness. MORDTs were tailored for Reserve readiness and commenced unexpectedly. Because of their unpredictability, they required that units constantly maintain a high level of deployment readiness. A MORDT did not assess a unit's combat readiness. Other inspections like the Marine Corps Combat Readiness Evaluation System (MCCRES) tested for combat efficiency.<sup>24</sup> The second phase of a MORDT assessed the ability of the unit to "mount out". This movement might take the form of a motor march to an in-state training site, a flight to a distant military base, or even the joining of several reserve units for a weekend exercise.

1977 was a representative year in which there were twelve unit MORDTs conducted. One of the more publicized MORDTs was Operation "*Iron Hand*" which took place during March 9-13, 1977. Reservists from all the armed forces were test mobilized, including three thousand Marine reservists who came from 12 states and the District of Columbia. Units were transported to Camp Shelby, Mississippi, by the Air Force's Military Airlift Command, and 4th Marine Aircraft Wing aircraft. The operations plan for the exercise was formulated by the reservists of the 8th Staff Group from Houston, Texas. The success of this operation was attested to by the Commandant, General Louis Wilson, who said in a message to all participants that "*this operation was a significant demonstration of our ability to rapidly and professionally assemble and deploy Marine Air/Ground task force elements ...observers from the highest levels of our government were able to witness first hand the successful execution of what is meant by Total Force and interservice cooperation.*"<sup>25</sup>

On January 5, 1979, six hundred 4th Division Marines began a MORDT at their drill centers after only 72 hours notice. They then flew by Military Airlift Command to Camp Lejuene, trained with their active duty counterparts and returned to their reserve centers by the end of the drill week-end on January 7, 1979. Among the units participating were Long Lines Company, 6th Communications Battalion, from Brooklyn, New York, Bravo Company, 4th Combat Engineer Company, from Roanoke Virginia, and Alpha Company, 4th Combat Engineer Battalion, from Charleston, West Virginia.<sup>26</sup>

The validity of the MORDT in ensuring mobilization readiness was described by Brigadier General Frederick R. Lopez, Commanding General, 4th Marine Division, in a November 1996 oral history interview: *"The units that were mobilized, [for the Persian Gulf Conflict], did well. Because we do MORDT's every two years formally, something we practice regularly, we did not have a problem getting people to the [Station of Initial Assignment] and then "in country."*<sup>27</sup>

Lengthy sea movement to an area of conflict was now a thing of the past. The dictates of modern warfare required air delivery by the Military Airlift Command with the unit being equipped and supplied in theater with pre-positioned supplies. Small units were challenged to develop training schedules that would accomplish this type of training at local reserve centers. For example, Bravo Company, 8th Tank Battalion in Syracuse, New York utilized Canadian training facilities for its small arms live fire exercises and would then be flown to Fort Knox, Kentucky where it would acquire its tanks. Similarly in 1980, Detachment 4, Truck Company, 6th Motor Battalion from New Haven Connecticut spent a weekend drill learning to load vehicles on a C141 Starlifter, at Westover Air Force Base, while working closely with reservists from the Military Airlift Command who were stationed at Dover Air Force Base, Delaware.<sup>28</sup>

## **Equipment**

Significant change in equipping the Marine Reserve became necessary for it to become a true partner in the Total Force. The message became clear for both Regular and Reserve Marines; train with the same equipment as you would fight. The Marine Corps has a mobilization potential second to none among the armed services. Trained units and pre-trained individuals can be quickly assimilated from the Reserve into a total war effort. Provisions have been made to augment or reinforce Active commands with a great range of capabilities, from individual combat or combat service support units to a complete Reserve Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF). In a maximum effort, the Reserve will provide almost one-third of the manpower, a broad range of combat assets, 100% of civil affairs, 67% of force reconnaissance units, 40 % of the tanks and 33% of the artillery.

Over the years there has been a changing character in the relationship of the Active/Reserve force. Once viewed as a source of pre-trained individuals, the SMCR (4th Marine Division) trains today as a highly effective combat organization. Units are tied to active commands for contingency planning. In concert with the Active forces, Reserve units will receive major new ground equipment and weapons systems being introduced into the Marine Corps inventory.<sup>29</sup>

Prior to the early 1980's, equipment priorities dictated that the other Marine divisions receive new weaponry first and that the Reserves would be equipped with newer weaponry later. For example, the Reserve was not fully equipped with M-16 service rifles until the early 1970's. M-60 tanks did not reach the tank battalions until 1979. An obvious draw-back to this situation was that mobilized reserves, who had trained on older equipment, would need to spend considerable time at the Station of Initial Assignment (SIA)

drawing new equipment and training on it before deployment. Such a delay might seriously impact the Division's Total Force effectiveness.

During the 1980's the Division began receiving state of the art equipment on the same time line as the Regular forces. In some instances, the Division received equipment ahead of active forces, as with the issuance the Beretta 9mm service pistol. Total Force missions, and its resultant equipment modernization, allowed the Reserve to receive major new ground equipment as it was being introduced into the Marine Corps inventory.

Among changes in the arsenal of the Division was the replacement of the 105mm Howitzer batteries with the new 155mm Battery and the introduction of the Light Armored Vehicles(LAV). New infantry weapons included the squad automatic weapon (SAW), the shoulder launched multipurpose assault weapon (SMAW), a lightweight mortar, new helmets and body armor.<sup>30</sup>

## ***Training and Readiness***

Following the Vietnam conflict, several studies questioned what the mission of the Marine Corps would be. However, old enemies from the Cold War continued to pose a significant threat to national security. The Soviet military threat was evidenced by the deployment of its growing "*blue water*" navy around the world including the Pacific and North Atlantic and its massive military involvement in Afghanistan. The Marine Corps, as an expeditionary force, would play a vital part in the defense of Europe and other parts of the world which required a rapid response.

In his 1981 Fiscal Year Posture Statement, the then Commandant, General Robert Barrow stated "*without question, with the threat to NATO, Europe remains our conventional force's most demanding challenge.*"<sup>31</sup> Regular employment of the 4th Marine Division in a North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) mission began taking shape. The Marine Corps and its Reserve was assigned responsibilities including the defense of the North Atlantic against possible Warsaw Pact incursions over the Arctic. 4th Marine Division training began to focus for these missions.

In February, 1978, Operation Drumbeat II was conducted at Fort Drum, in northern New York. This operation was designed to test how effectively a joint service force of Marine Reservists, along with New York Air and Army National Guardsmen could mount an air supported mechanized thrust into Northern Europe if assigned such a mission by NATO.

Tactical control of the operation rested with the staff of 1st Battalion, 25th Marines from Boston, Massachusetts, who were commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Francis P. Reidy. The New York Army National Guard provided armored personnel carriers. Units from Bravo Company, 8th Tank Battalion from Syracuse, New York were extensively employed as the armor element of the exercise. Captain Richard Van Horne, commander of a tank platoon, found this training to be beneficial as it permitted armor and infantry commanders to work together. "*It is important that the tank and infantry commanders are co-located in order to coordinate our movements and get the job done.*"<sup>32</sup>

Realistic training for this mission had to include cold weather training, mountain warfare skills, joint operations, and brigade-level operations. With a defense of the North Atlantic, Norway's countryside, with its numerous mountains, fjords, and bitter cold became a familiar training area for Marines. Bridgeport, California, the home of the Marine Mountain Warfare training Center (MWTC), also hosted much reserve

training. Annual Training Duty (ATD) for some units from the 4th Marine Division emphasized mountain training in the summer and cold weather skills in the winter. Situated in the California High Sierra mountains, a unit would often march out to the training site in snow and return in 90 degree weather. Rappelling, rock climbing, and river crossing skills were taught. Cold weather survival and ski training also were highlighted. The training taught an infantry company that an outnumbered unit could still gain the advantage against a superior mechanized infantry or heavy armor force which had difficulty negotiating mountainous rock and tall timber. This training helped those Marines assigned missions in NATO operations in Norway and within the Arctic circle.<sup>33</sup>

Training in Alaska, Norway, Denmark, and Canada during the 1970s through the 1990's included such operations as "*Jack Frost*," "*Northern Wedding*," "*Bold Guard*," and "*Alloy Express*." "*Operation Jack Frost*" in 1979 at Fort Wainwright, Alaska, was typical of what was to be expected in Norway. One hundred and fifty one Marines, from four rifle companies within 3rd Battalion, 25th Marines, were transported by Military Airlift Command (MAC) to Alaska. There, they received cold weather training, and then participated in a week long joint service operation with more than 17,000 soldiers, sailors and airmen.<sup>34</sup>

From March 11-23, 1979, Marines from across New York and New England participated in Exercise "*Cold Winter*," a NATO operation held in northern Norway. More than 160 Leathernecks, from Alpha Company, 1st Battalion, 25th Marines from Albany, New York spent two weeks becoming accustomed to temperatures that often dropped below zero and barely rose to 30 degrees in the afternoon. Other 1st Battalion, 25th Marine units included Bravo Company, from Hartford, Connecticut, Charlie Company from Chicopee, Massachusetts, Delta Company, from Topsham, Maine and Headquarters and Service Company from Worcester, Massachusetts as well as a smaller contingent from Headquarters Battery, 3rd Battalion, 14th Marines in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. Part of the two week training was spent in a field skills test with active duty Marines from the 2nd Marine Division, Canadian and Norwegian soldiers, and Marines from the British and Dutch Marine Corps. American presence in the operation was explained by Marine Reserve Major David Corson. "*Our presence assures the Norwegians that we stand behind them and our commitments to NATO.*"<sup>35</sup>

From September 1-15, 1979, Fox Company, 2nd Battalion, 23rd Marines, participated in Operation "*Bar Frost*." This exercise attested to the emphasis on a NATO role for the 4th Marine Division in Northern Europe. Captain Ned Ellsworth, Executive Officer of Fox Company, put the training in perspective: "*I had heard of NATO, as long as I could remember, but it was just a collection of letters... now I know it as a real thing, a deterrent force.*"<sup>36</sup>

From its reactivation in 1962, throughout the Vietnam conflict and, with the exception of "*Golden Slipper 1967*," 4th Marine Division training usually centered around battalion-sized exercises. However, it became apparent that by embracing new NATO missions, units larger than battalions, such as brigades, would have to be employed. Like individual Marines, staffs required constant training, especially training requiring the integration of supporting arms and maneuver warfare. In order to do this, a large training areas which would permit maneuver and live fire exercises was needed.

General Wilson, while Commanding General, Fleet Marine Forces Pacific, 1973-1975, first thought of the possibilities that Marine Corps Base, 29 Palms California offered. Wilson said "*that when I was selected to be the Commandant, I then determined that I was going to take the 29 Palms Base and enlarge its mission to include all the tactical units of the Marine Corps.*" True to his word, upon becoming Commandant, he redesignated the huge desert base as the Marine Corps Air Ground Combat Center (MCAGCC), Twentynine Palms.<sup>37</sup>

The 932 square miles of high desert at Twentynine Palms provided a harsh and realistic training environment ideal for live fire and maneuver warfare. Marines also learned how to survive under extreme field conditions where temperatures approached 120 degrees. It was in this environment that all the weapons in the Marine inventory could be employed including rifle, howitzers, tanks, and aircraft. Senior officers at the base's Tactical Exercise Control Center (TECC) were able to control and exercise participating units and staffs which would make up a deployed brigade. During the late 1970's General Wilson left no doubt that these exercises were not only extremely significant, but were to be conducted before the eyes of the entire Marine Corps, and many throughout the Department of Defense. Twentynine Palms was to be a permanent *"Combined arms college for the whole Marine Corps."*<sup>38</sup> Within two years, General Wilson could comment that *"both Regular and Reserve units participate in these exercises which take advantage of live firing and the full spectrum of combined arms in an open, unrestricted environment. That side by side training of Regular and Reserve Marines supports the total force concept and provides a realistic means of preparation for all contingencies."*<sup>39</sup>

*"Palm Tree III"* in August, 1976 saw 4th Marine Division assets employed in a live fire exercise at a Marine Amphibious Unit (MAU) level. The Commandant, General Wilson, favored these new mobility exercises, in order to make the Reserve *"a member of our Marine Team."* By 1981, the 4th Marine Division training cycle included regularly scheduled Combined Arms Exercises (CAX) which rotated Active and Reserve units through the Combat Center each year. The 1981 training cycle was unique in that it involved two consecutive 4th Marine Division Combined Arms Exercises. Staff Sergeant Charles Owe, a photojournalist, described the initial exercise as *"the irresistible force that is the Marine Corps Reserve clashing head on with the immovable force that is the Mojave Desert."*<sup>40</sup>

The first unit to train that Summer in 1981 was the 41st Marine Amphibious Unit (MAU), commanded by Colonel John Studt, the Commanding Officer of the 25th Marines. The infantry element came from 1st Battalion, 25th Marines, while the artillery support was supplied by the four batteries of the 14th Marines. At the conclusion of the first two weeks the 42nd MAU arrived, commanded by Colonel Luigi Ragosta. The infantry element were the Marines from 2nd Battalion, 25th Marines. The operation culminated in a *"3 day war,"* including live fire and the use of combined arms.<sup>41</sup> Beginning in 1985, six active duty and two reserve battalion sized Combined Arms Exercises were conducted each year at the Combat Center.

The Marine Corps fundamental mission has always centered around amphibious warfare. In so doing, Marine forces have historically been task organized depending on the requirements of the particular mission. The 4th Division of the 1980's was able to contribute to that historic mission. Since the end of the Vietnam conflict, the Division successfully purged its rolls of malcontents and substance abusers. It participated in realistic training at Twentynine Palms, Bridgeport and Norway. It was outfitted with state of the art weapons and equipment. Most importantly, the Division was manned by reservists skilled and motivated to take on the challenges of Total Force commitments. In 1984 alone, 25,000 4th Marine Division members trained in exercises around the world from Puerto Rico to Korea.

## ***The 2nd Marine Amphibious Brigade***

In December, 1982, the Division redesignated, relocated, or deactivated a total of 68 division units. Of considerable importance was the revitalization, and reorganization of the 2nd Marine Amphibious Brigade (MAB). The brigade headquarters was to be permanently co-located with the Division in New Orleans. In a test of its ability to task organize and support a brigade, the MAB was directed to conduct a MAB *"command post exercise (CPX)"* in 1983 and then a full MAB exercise in 1984.<sup>42</sup>

August 1984 saw the largest Marine Reserve exercise and amphibious landing since the Korean War. Units from the 4th Marine Division, some 7,000 strong, made up the 2d Marine Amphibious Brigade which was commanded by Brigadier General Constantine Sengalis. Marine Corps Base Camp Lejeune, Marine Corps Air Station Cherry Point, North Carolina, and the Naval Operating Base Norfolk, Virginia hosted reservists from 125 units and hailing from 32 states and the District of Columbia.<sup>43</sup> This exercise marked the first time a full strength amphibious brigade was completely assembled from reserve units. The brigade's ground element was drawn from the 24th Marines from Kansas City, Missouri who were commanded by Colonel James R. Ruffini. This regiment of 3,300 Marines was supported by 28 amphibious assault vehicles, 16 tanks and 22 artillery pieces. The 24th Marines' 1st Battalion was landed by amphibious tractor. The 2d Battalion was helicoptered in and the 3rd Battalion was the brigade reserve. Preparation for this exercise evolved over the twelve preceding months. Participating units used their drill weekends to prepare and rehearse. This included all administrative procedures needed for mobilization and the embarkation of equipment to be moved to the East Coast. The scenario mirrored a possible Marine response to a threat in Northern Europe and a simulated brigade movement in Norway's Jutland peninsula. Besides conducting an amphibious landing, the brigade secured a beachhead for the landing of follow-on friendly forces. Marines also conducted river crossings, helicopter air assaults, and extractions while battalion, regiment and brigade staffs tested command and control and fire support coordination in the fast moving, fluid environment of maneuver warfare.<sup>44</sup>

The training exercise, "*Phalanx Sound 2*" offered a unique historic reunion. The infantry of the 24th Marine Regiment was supported by the artillery of the 14th Marine Regiment, a relationship reminiscent of the bonds forged during the Pacific battles of Roi-Namur, Saipan, and Iwo Jima. The participating 6th Engineer Battalion also fought in the Pacific on Okinawa as did the participating 4th Assault Amphibian Vehicle Battalion which had served as the 4th Amtrac Battalion in 1943 at Roi-Namur.<sup>45</sup>

During the mid-1980's, the 4th Division continued participation in training with active duty counterparts, as first begun in the early 1970's. Reserve infantry battalions participated in NATO exercises "*Alloy Express*," "*Northern Wedding*," "*Bold Guard*" and "*Teamwork 84*." The year 1984 saw the augmentation by the 2nd Battalion, 23rd Marines, headquartered in Encino, California, to the 6th Marine Amphibious Brigade.<sup>46</sup>

Exercise "*Solar Flare*," in the Summer of 1987, saw another realistic test of the Total Force concept. This training evolution grew out of the 1984 "*Phalanx Sound II*" brigade landing which saw a 4th Marine Division brigade employed for the first time since World War II. Planning for "*Solar Flare*" began in 1986 with a directive by then Commandant, General P.X. Kelley. General Kelley directed the Commanding General of II Marine Amphibious Force (MAF) to conduct a force level exercise that integrated active duty and reserve Marines and equipment. The training plan called for the active duty 4th Marine Amphibious Brigade and the reserve Second Marine Amphibious Brigade, drawn from the 4th Marine Division, to face off against each other in a series of unstructured engagements typical of maneuver warfare.<sup>47</sup>

During July, 1987, the 2nd Marine Amphibious Brigade under the command of Brigadier General Omrod, deployed a force of 7,500 Marines from 118 units around the country. Facing the brigade were units of 2d Marine Division that constituted the 4th Marine Amphibious Brigade. A Reserve infantry battalion, 3rd Battalion, 23rd Marines, was attached to Regimental Landing Team 2 (RLT). The Reserve battalion, commanded by LtCol. W.R. Wittington, was composed of rifle companies from Houston and Austin Texas, and Shreveport and Lafayette, Louisiana. Likewise, an active duty infantry battalion, 2nd Battalion, 8th Marines was assigned to the reserve Regimental Landing Team 23.

The battalion from 23rd Marines was able to train with the active force on a daily basis and was selected to be the lead element in a highly successful counterattack on the final day of the exercise.<sup>48</sup> At the conclusion of Solar Flare, it was evident to observers that 4th Marine Division forces, when given comparable equipment and training, were capable of fully integrating into active units. Major General Comfort, the Commanding General of II MAF which was the senior headquarters for the 2d MAB, believed that the 2d Marine Amphibious Brigade's performance validated the contingency plans for II MAF in Europe and the Caribbean.<sup>49</sup>

The decade of the 1980's proved to be a water shed for the 4th Marine Division. Prudent decisions on future policy, made in the early 1960's, were now producing results. The division had been reconstituted as a credible fighting force. The 4th Marine Division saw its units deployed with the Marine Corps to combat training exercises as part of task organized brigades and amphibious units as opposed to utilization as a combat replacement pool. In 1988, General A.M. Gray, Commandant of the Marine Corps, in an address to Congress on the status of combat readiness stated: "*While we are fully prepared for the most challenging conflict, your Marine Corps must also stand ready for the most likely conflict, that in the Third World. We are not only your most deployable force, but the most employable across a broad spectrum of conflict.*"<sup>50</sup>

The **Perestroika** movement in 1987 signaled the lessening of Cold War tension, the approaching collapse of the Soviet nation and the demise of the Warsaw Pact. With a perceived lessening of global threats and tension, many again questioned the modern roles and missions of the Marine Corps. While the Soviet threat had indeed subsided, many knew that the current threat came from small groups of terrorists and guerrilla movements which operated in urban and jungle environs alike, including Beirut, Lebanon, Central and South America, and Africa. This new type of warfare became known as Low Intensity Conflict (LIC). Low Intensity Conflict, however, proved to be a form of conflict well known to Marines whose predecessors fought in Haiti, the Dominican Republic and the Philippines. It was a return to warfare that had been the Marine Corps' strength for years. This was an area in which the Marine Corps had traditionally excelled.

To those who confused the missions of the Marines and Army, the Marine Corps saw it's mission clearly. Brigadier General Edwin Simmons, the Director of the Marine Corps History and Museums Division, summed up the distinction between the Army and Marine Corps roles as follows "*the Army and the Marine Corps seem to be converging ... the nation does not need, nor can it afford two land armies. For that matter, it neither needs, nor can it afford, two Marine Corps.*"<sup>51</sup>

By 1990, the 4th Marine Division had come far from the assessment of the Reserves as conjured up in a 1976 Congressional report which reported that the Reserves suffered from "*benign neglect...handicapped by serious shortages...it is not unexpected that some Reservists have a difficult time in maintaining a high level of dedication.*"<sup>52</sup> The 4th Marine Division of 1990 had modern equipment, more than a decade of meaningful training, including battalion, brigade and force level experience, and an infusion of quality recruits. As 1990 began, Marine commanders were aware of the readiness of the 4th Marine Division, yet few could foresee that, within 9 months, units of the Division would be activated for combat for the first time since 1945.

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***Cpl T. Carson, 8th Tank Battalion, aims an M-16A1 rifle equipped with the multiple integrated laser engagement system (MILES) during field exercises at Ft. Pickett, VA.***



***Marines from Battery H, 3/14, loads a round into an M-101 105mm howitzer during training exercises at Ft McCoy, WI.***



***Two M-60 main battle tanks of the 8th Tank Battalion move along a dirt road during field exercises at Ft. Pickett, VA.***



**"Ammo Humper", LtCol. Donna C. Neary, USMCR, USMC Art Collection**  
**Artist covered desert exercises with Reserve Marines of the 2nd Bn., 23rd Marines from Port Hueneme at MCB Twentynine Palms, California.**



**"U.S. Marine Reservist", LtCol. Donna C. Neary, USMCR, USMC Art Collection**  
**Reservist in cold weather garb, spends a healthy portion of his two weeks annual training duty in Norwegian snow during NATO exercise "Teamwork-84".**



***Marines from the Scout Sniper Platoon, 23rd Marines, 4th Marine Division, practice their skiing during cold weather exercises in Bieber, Canada.***



***Marine Sniper from the Scout Sniper Platoon, 23rd Marines steadies his sniper rifle during cold weather exercises in Bieber, Canada.***



***Marine Reservists wearing winter camouflage prepare to board a CH-53E Super Stallion helicopter during a cold weather training exercise.***



*Reservists from Company A, 1/23, receive classes in amphibious warfare and safety procedures before being transported in amphibious personnel carriers. After landing, the reservists would move out to take set objectives during Operation "Cutlass Slash" at Camp Lejeune, NC. 1,800 Reserves from 45 cities were involved.*



*Members of H&S Co., 6th Eng. Supt. Bn., participate in conditioning march during training at the Marine Corps' Mountain Warfare Training Center in Pickle Meadows, CA.*



*Marines from the Combat Engineers Battalion sweep road with mine detectors (ANTR-153) as part of a combat readiness evaluation in the Pakalula Training Area, HI.*



***Troops from the 2nd Battalion, 25th Marines, wait to board a C-130D Hercules aircraft for transportation to Ft. Drum, NY, during exercise "Sentry Castle - 81".***



***Marine Reservists from Company B, 1/24 participating in an assault on Combat Town during Operation "Pioneer Surf". An operation designed to "clear" an enemy held village.***



***Combat control team members at Hickam Air Force Base, Hawaii being instructed by Marines of the 4th Force Reconnaissance Group, on the use of inflatable small boat (ISB).***



***"Captain Cook, USMC", LtCol. Donna C. Neary, USMCR, USMC Art Collection  
Desert Operations at Twentynine Palms, California. Inspector - Instructor, Det., H&S Company, 2nd Bn., 23rd Marines from  
Port Hueneme.***



*Aerial view of mainbase at the Marine Corps Air Ground Combat Center, Twentynine Palms, California.*




*A CH-46 Sea Knight helicopter lifts Reconnaissance team off the ground during special patrol insertion/extraction (SPIE) rig training.*



*Members of gun crew #5, Battery B, 1/14 load a round into an M-155mm howitzer.*



***Camp Wilson and the Expeditionary Airfield (EAF) at the Marine Corps Air Ground Combat Center, Twentynine Palms, California.***



***Delta Corridor at the Marine Corps Air Ground Combat Center, Twentynine Palms, California.***



*M-1A1 Abrams main battle tank enters the water from the open ramp of a utility landing craft LCU-1658. Tank is equipped with a fording kit that is being evaluated by the Marine Corps at the Naval Amphibious Base, Little Creek, VA.*



*A bow view of an air cushion landing craft LCAC-12 underway near the Naval Amphibious Base, Little Creek, VA. The landing craft is carrying an M-1A1 Abrams main battle tank.*



*Marine undergoing intense training at Marine Corps Recruit Depot, Parris Island, SC.*



*Marines stand at attention on the drill field during graduation ceremonies at MCRD, Parris Island, SC.*



*Naval Reserve corpsmen from the 4th Medical Bn treat a simulated casualty during training exercises.*



*Woman Marine recruit fires an M-16A1 rifle from the prone position during basic training at Marine Corps Recruit Depot, SC.*



*Woman Marine recruit pulls fellow Marine through the rigorous obstacle course during basic training.*



*Marine Drill Instructors stand at attention during a pass in review on the parade deck.*



*LVTP-7 generates a smoke screen as it approaches Onslow Beach, NC during Operation "Solid Shield-87".*



*Convoy of Hummers equipped with TOW's travel through Norwegian countryside during Operation "Cold Winter-87".*



*Marines of Company C, 1/23 prepare to board CH-46 Sea Knight during Operation "Solar Flare".*



*M-60 main battle tank is driven ashore from LCU during NATO exercise Operation "Northern Wedding-82".*



*Reservists fire a tube launched, optically tracked, wire command link, guided missile (TOW) during winter exercise.*



*Color Guard from the 4th Marine Division Headquarters in New Orleans, LA present colors during the wreath dedication ceremony at Major Daniel Carmick's tombstone at the Archdiocesan Cemetery. Major Carmick was a Marine officer who served during the War of 1812.*

# **Chapter 6**

## **Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm**

### **Background**

During Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, units of the 4th Marine Division, like many of the active duty units to which they were assigned, distinguished themselves on the battlefield. However, the contribution of these Marines and other reservists went far beyond any battlefield honor. The Marines of the 4th Marine Division mobilized quickly and proved themselves in combat for the first time since World War II. Reserve Marines of the Division were activated and served throughout the world, enabling the Active Marine Corps to form three complete Marine Expeditionary Forces and one Marine Expeditionary Brigade, to fulfill defense commitments in Europe, Latin America, the Far East and to continue to support operations in the United States. Over seventy-five percent of the 4th Marine Division, or 15,616 of the Division's 20,630 Marines, was mobilized to augment and support the Marine Corps' wartime effort.<sup>1</sup>

### **Invasion of Kuwait**

On August 2, 1990, Saddam Hussein, President of Iraq, shocked the world by sending an invading army into the tiny, oil rich nation of Kuwait. Within hours, the Iraqi dictator controlled twenty percent of the world's oil reserves, and was positioning forces to threaten the neighboring nation of Saudi Arabia, which held another twenty five percent of the oil reserves. In a response to this threat to the United States' vital interests, President George Bush, on August 7th, ordered a major deployment of United States armed forces to the Persian Gulf region.

On that same day, I Marine Expeditionary Force, San Diego, 1st Marine Expeditionary Brigade, Hawaii, 4th Marine Expeditionary Brigade, Camp Lejeune, and the 7th Marine Expeditionary Brigade at 29 Palms were all alerted to be ready to deploy to Southwest Asia. Soon thereafter, the 7th Fleet Amphibious Ready Group Alpha, with the 13th Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable) embarked and made ready to sail from the Western Pacific to the North Arabian Sea. Once again, U.S. Marines prepared to go into harm's way.<sup>2</sup>

The first Active Marine forces deployed to Saudi Arabia were units of the 7th Marine Expeditionary Brigade, stationed at the Marine Corps Air Ground Combat Center, 29 Palms California. The 7th MEB arrived at Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, on 14 August and was tasked with defending Saudi Arabia from Iraqi aggression. The Military Airlift Command (MAC) flew 259 missions to transport the 7th MEB to Saudi Arabia. Concurrently the ships of the Maritime Pre-Positioning Squadron 2 steamed from Diego Garcia, in the Indian Ocean, with supplies to Al Jubayl Saudi Arabia.<sup>3</sup>

During the first weeks of the deployment of U.S. Forces to the Gulf, the 2nd Marine Division at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, also began planning to form units to rotate into Southwest Asia to maintain the "line in the sand" against possible Iraqi incursions. Attention was given to bringing the Division to full Table Of Organization (T/O) strength. Although augmentation of these active duty units with individual reservists had been the answer in the past, the Commandant directed that the Marine Corps would meet its commitments for the first sixty days without calling for the Reserve. This demonstrated the readiness of the Marine

Corps to deploy, employ, and sustain a Marine Expeditionary Force for at least sixty days, and was in the tradition of the Marine Corps to call Marines from all over the world to fill out a fighting force on short notice.<sup>4</sup>

On October 10, 1990, the first Reserve Marines activated were from Combat Service Support Detachment 40 who reported to Marine Corps Air Station, Kaneohe Bay, Hawaii. Their mission was to maintain and refurbish equipment left behind by the 1st MEB as it deployed to Saudi Arabia to meet up with its pre-positioned equipment aboard Maritime Propositioning Ship 3.<sup>5</sup>

On November 8, 1990, President Bush announced the impending reinforcement of the U.S. Central Command by 200,000 troops, among which were a large number of Reserve units and individual members. The reinforcement of I MEF committed nearly all of the east coast Marine units including II MEF, 2nd Marine Division, 2nd Marine Aircraft Wing, and 2nd Force Service Support Group. There were also smaller units from III MEF deployed in the Western Pacific. All told, this augmentation created in I MEF the largest Marine force assembled since the Vietnam War. I MEF constituted nearly seventy five percent of the Fleet Marine Force. Operational plans also called for a reinforcement of 25,000 Marines, who were to be joined at a rate of 1,000 Marines a day.<sup>6</sup>

## ***The Presidential Call-Up***

The Commandant implemented retention policies to freeze the discharge or release of active duty Marines. At that same time, he ordered the activation of eighty units of the Selected Marine Corps Reserve, or about 54.7 percent of the 4th Marine Division and 4th Marine Aircraft Wing personnel. On November 6, 1990, the first 800 reservists from 21 units were activated. The Secretary of Defense, Dick Cheney, on 14 November, authorized the Marine Corps to call up 14,000 reservists. The majority of units had over ninety-nine percent of its members reporting under the Presidential call-up. Some units had over one hundred percent report when members in the process of separation reported for activation.<sup>7</sup>

The initial increments of mobilized Reserve units began arriving at Camp Lejeune, November 26, 1990 and were processed for integration with active duty commands. Eventually, the 2nd Marine Division would deploy with three Reserve battalions, 3rd Battalion, 23rd Marines, 1st Battalion, 25th Marines, and the 8th Tank Battalion. Kilo and Mike Battery of the 4th Battalion, 14th Marines were added to the 2d Marine Division's artillery regiment, the 10th Marines.

Alpha, Bravo, Charlie, Delta and Weapons Companies of the 4th Light Armored Vehicle Battalion were attached to the 2nd Light Armored Infantry Battalion (LAI). Fox Company, 2nd Battalion, 25th Marines also joined the 2nd Light Armored Infantry Battalion to act as scouts for the reserve infantry companies. Bravo, Charlie and Delta Companies of the 4th Combat Engineer Battalion were all attached to the 2nd Combat Engineer Battalion.

The 4th Tank Battalion's Bravo and Charlie Companies were attached to the 2d Tank Battalion, enabling it to ultimately field five tank companies all equipped with the M1A1 Abrams main battle tank. The 2d Assault Amphibian Vehicle Battalion was reinforced by Bravo Company of the 4th Assault Amphibian Vehicle Battalion. Delta Company of the 4th Reconnaissance Battalion was assigned to the 2d Reconnaissance Battalion. Finally, 2d Marine Division headquarters was augmented by one Truck Company and one Military Police Company, 4th Marine Division, and the 4th Civil Affairs Group.<sup>8</sup>

Reorganization of the 2d Division continued in Saudi Arabia. Tank companies were attached to the infantry regiments to give them added punch. Bravo and Charlie Company of the 4th Tank Battalion were assigned to the 8th Marines. The 8th Tank Battalion, under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Michael Cavallaro, was attached to 6th Marines. 8th Tank Battalion's Alpha Company was assigned to the 2nd Battalion, 2nd Marines while Charlie Company was assigned to the 1st Battalion, 6th Marines. The tank battalion's Bravo Company and Headquarters and Service Company were assigned as the reserve for the 6th Marines.<sup>9</sup>

I MEF planners decided that both 8th Communication Battalion and 9th Communication Battalion would be headquartered in Saudi Arabia. In order to accomplish this task, 8th Communication Battalion required significant augmentation from 4th Marine Division. A sizable portion of the 6th Communication Battalion from Fort Schuyler, Bronx, Brooklyn, and Huntington, New York were activated, a total of 425 officers and enlisted. The main body of the battalion landed at Al Jubayl on December 25th, 1991. Some reservist communicators were assigned to support division and wing assets. The bulk of 6th Communication Battalion supported the I MEF command element and constituted twenty-five percent of its troop strength.<sup>10</sup>

## ***24th Marine Regiment***

The largest 4th Marine Division unit activated was the 24th Marine Regiment from Kansas City, Missouri under the command of Colonel George E. Germann, USMC. The regimental Executive Officer was LtCol Stephen Engelhardt, USMCR (later promoted to Brigadier General). The 24th Marines consisted of a headquarters company and three 3 infantry battalions numbering 2,692 Marines. The 1st Battalion was commanded by Lieutenant Colonel A.B. Davis, the 2nd Battalion by Lieutenant Colonel Francis A. Johnson, and the 3rd Battalion by Lieutenant Colonel Ronald G. Guwilliams.

Activation orders for 24th Marines arrived on November 13, 1990. During the first week of December, 1990, the command element of 24th Marines went to its Station of Initial Assignment (SIA) at Camp Pendleton. The remaining companies of the regiment flew to Camp Lejeune, North Carolina. Weapons firing and chemical warfare training were emphasized at Camp Lejeune. The regiment, minus the 1st Battalion, then flew into Al Jubayl, Saudi Arabia 1 January, 1991. By January 1991, the 24th Marines had assumed the rear area security mission for I MEF. The 1st Battalion, 24th Marines deployed to Okinawa as part of the unit deployment program. This permitted an active duty battalion to deploy to South West Asia. The 1st Battalion's deployment also helped preserve American commitments in the Western Pacific.<sup>11</sup>

Lieutenant General Walter Boomer, Commanding General of I Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF), assigned the 24th Marine Regiment the mission to defend the sprawling Al Jubayl Vital Area and other key points from conventional and terrorist attacks. Al Jubayl was the port of entry for the prepositioned supplies that were linked with the 7th MEB in August of 1990.

The Al Jubayl command post, known as the "*Police Station*," became I MEF Rear under the command of Major General John Hopkins. Conventional doctrine held that rear area security was the responsibility of the logistics element, specifically, the 1st Force Service Support Group (FSSG). General Boomer determined that the specialists of the FSSG were needed more in the North for combat service support for the coming offensive. To replace the loss of the FSSG security force and to protect I MEF Rear, 24th Marines was assigned to the mission. In response, Colonel Germann deployed his regiment in platoon and company defensive positions along a 200 mile line from Dhahran to Al Mishab, shifting them as requirements changed.<sup>12</sup>

## ***5th Marine Expeditionary Brigade***

The 5th Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB), commanded by Major General Peter J. Rowe had, with the exception of the 24th Marines, the largest number of Marine Reservists. The 5th MEB was initially requested as the I MEF reserve. It was subsequently used in a strategic amphibious feint. On November 15, 1990, the first of 890 reservists began arriving at Oceanside, California. Units included reconnaissance Marines, tankers, anti-tank Marines, light armored infantrymen, anti-aircraft gunners, intelligence specialists, combat engineers and a helicopter squadron. The incoming reservists were assigned to their active duty commands within forty eight hours and then attended a four day Southwest Asia training program run by the School of Infantry.

General Rowe was impressed by the highly motivated reservists assigned to the brigade. General Rowe favorably compared them to the British territorial soldiers activated for the Boer War described by the British author, Rudyard Kipling, who wrote that "*when they heard the bugle call, their regiment did not have to search to find them.*" The only major operational difficulty noted by the commanding general was the understandable lack of familiarization with the 5th MEB's standard operating procedures.<sup>13</sup>

The ground element of the 5th MEB, was the 5th Regimental Landing Team, commanded by Colonel Randolph A. Gangle. In November, 1990, during a series of training exercises at Twentynine Palms, Colonel Gangle immediately integrated his reserve and active duty units. Embarking on ships off the West Coast, the 5th MEB continued an intense series of war games at sea and tactical exercises ashore in the Philippines, Oman, and the United Arab Emirates. By the time the brigade reached its war station in the northern Persian Gulf, it was in such a high state of readiness that Colonel Gangle stated he could not tell the difference between his Regular and Reserve Marines.<sup>14</sup>

## ***Ground Offensive***

The beginning of ground offensive operations for Operation Desert Storm commenced on February 24, 1991. Coalition forces, including Marine forces deployed in Southwest Asia, were ordered to neutralize the Iraqi National Command Authority, eject Iraqi forces from Kuwait, and assist in the restoration of the legitimate government of Kuwait. Republican Guard forces and the Iraqi ballistic missile, nuclear, biological and chemical warfare capabilities were also targeted for destruction. These latter tasks, of course, were already part of the ongoing air war, Operation Desert Shield.

The Marine Central Command was directed to conduct a supporting attack to penetrate Iraqi defenses, destroy Iraqi forces in its zone of action, and secure key objectives to prevent reinforcement of Iraqi forces facing the Joint Forces Command-North/Northern Area Command. Once this was achieved, I MEF was to establish blocking positions to halt the northern retreat of Iraqi forces from southeastern Kuwait and Kuwait City and to assist passage of Coalition Forces into Kuwait City. The MEF was prepared to assist in securing and defending Kuwait City as well as the U.S. Embassy. Deception operations, the collection and control of enemy prisoners of war, and the protection and direction of displaced civilians/refugees were additional tasks of the force. Finally, I MEF forces were prepared to conduct operations in urban areas. This MarCent plan had three stages: penetration, exploitation, and consolidation.<sup>15</sup>

At 0400 hours on February 24, 1991, I MEF and coalition forces began the ground assault on Iraqi defenses. The 2nd Marine Division and 1st Marine Division, with its four Task Forces, named "*Ripper*," "*Bear*,"

"Taro," and "Grizzly," located just south of the Kuwait border along the Persian Gulf were the striking power of I MEF. This force stormed into Iraqi defenses and convinced the defenders that it was the main effort of attack. Meanwhile, heavily armored allied forces to the west flanked and then assaulted Iraqi defenses from the rear. Simultaneously, Marine units of the 4th MEB and 5th MEB, afloat in the Persian Gulf, pinned down large numbers of Iraqi troops who were expecting an amphibious assault. The Iraqi Army was defeated in 100 hours by U.S. and allied forces.

Operation Desert Storm ended on February 28, 1991 when a cease fire was ordered by President George Bush. During Operation Desert Storm, I MEF had a peak strength of 92,990 Marines, making it the largest Marine Corps operation in history, larger than any operation in World War II, Korea or Vietnam. A total of 23 Marines were killed in action or later died of battle wounds as a result of the conflict.<sup>16</sup>

## **4th Tank Battalion**

Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney told this widely publicized story about Bravo Company, 4th Tank Battalion which, for many, epitomized the combat efficiency of the modern Marine Reserve:

*"Consider one of my favorite stories about the Marines of Company B of the 4th Tank Battalion. They're combat reservists from Yakima Washington, not active duty personnel. They were activated last December and went into battle with their Abrams tanks when ground operations began in Kuwait on the 24th of February. Before dawn, moving north inside Kuwait, Company B discovered a large formation of Iraqi tanks. They saw some of the top line T-72 tanks heading straight towards them through a large group of dug in Iraqi armor. All told, the Marine company with thirteen tanks faced 35 oncoming Iraqi tanks outnumbered 3 to 1. But when the encounter was over, the Marine reservists had destroyed or stopped 34 of the 35 enemy tanks. In fact, in a total of four engagements in four days, Company B stopped 59 Iraqi tanks, 30 of them top-line T-72. What made this all the more impressive is that Company B had never used those Abrams tanks before they arrived in the desert. That was their first exposure to the new equipment. And they trained on it, acquired the capability to operate it, and then performed superbly in combat."*

In the 100 hour conflict, Bravo Company breached two minefields, seized an battalion sized fortified position, crushed two regimental counterattacks, and destroyed 119 enemy vehicles, 90 of which were armored.<sup>17</sup>

## **3rd Battalion, 23rd Marines**

3rd Battalion 23rd Marines (3/23), was commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Ray C. Dawson, an attorney from Baton Rouge, Louisiana. On 25 November 1990, 3/23 was one of two reserve infantry battalions called to active duty. By the beginning of December, 1990 the Battalion arrived at Camp Lejeune for deployment training, and was assigned to the 8th Marines, 2nd Marine Division. On Christmas day, the 3rd Battalion left for Saudi Arabia. After arriving in Al Jubayl, it continued desert training until February 16, when it moved up to its final assembly area prior to G- Day. The mission of the Battalion prior to G-Day, was to defend in sector, provide security forward of the Saudi defensive berm and screen to the northeast to allow an artillery battalion to establish firing positions forward of friendly lines to fire in support of offensive operations on G-Day. These missions were intended to be part of the overall 2d Marine Division plan to conceal and deceive the actual point of the breach.<sup>18</sup>

On Day G-2, February 22, 1991, 3/23 commenced combat operations as bulldozer's cut three holes in the Saudi berm to allow 3/23 and the artillery unit forward to execute their mission. At 1010, the Battalion commenced operations. It engaged enemy infantry with both air and artillery strikes. Later in the day, under conditions of extreme darkness caused by smoke from burning oil wells, the Battalion moved back through the berm to the Saudi side. The Battalion returned on February 23rd, and continued to report on enemy troop movement and activities. It also engaged enemy troops and brought in 168 prisoners. Most importantly, the Battalion kept the enemy at a distance, and ignorant of the 2d Marine Division's intentions.<sup>19</sup>

The conduct of the route reconnaissance proved to be an example of the different configurations that an infantry battalion could take. Four task organized cavalry teams from 3/23 were formed around heavy anti armor weapons mounted on HMMWVs. The teams included engineers, scout snipers, and artillery reconnaissance experts. These teams were named "*Task Force Alberts*," after Captain Lloyd Alberts from New Orleans, Louisiana. Task Force Alberts crossed the berm at 1400 on February 22, 1991. This movement was followed by a motorized infantry company, the battalion command element and the 81mm mortar platoon. These two elements would assume blocking positions that allowed the artillery units to displace forward.<sup>20</sup>

3/23 participated in several combat operations prior to G-Day. When Task Force Alberts approached Iraqi defenses, it employed its own organic weapons and, using artillery and air support, destroyed several Iraqi armored vehicles and killed or wounded an estimated 52 Iraqi soldiers. On G+1, 3/23 was assigned the mission of flank security for 2nd Marine Division and for closing any gap between it and the western flank of the 1st Marine Division.

In moving forward to its objective on G+2, February 26, 1991, 3/23 began taking sporadic, harassing small arms fire from an agricultural area. One company was dispatched to clear this area of snipers. As 3/23 continued north, it came upon a large number of abandoned Iraqi mechanized vehicles, which they destroyed with their organic weapons. At dawn on G+3, the battalion discovered they were in a large bunker complex. The agricultural area contained a vast number of Iraqi bunkers, and it might still contain Iraqi soldiers. Further, it was evident that not all the abandoned vehicles had been destroyed the night before. Sweeping the area with two companies, 3/23 used an Arabic psychological operations tape in an attempt to get the enemy to surrender. A tank platoon from 4th Tank Battalion joined in the clearing operations. The tank platoon's involvement ended when a secondary explosion in an Iraqi tank killed one Marine crewman and wounded another.<sup>21</sup>

In its final task of the day, 3/23 was ordered to move northeast, closer to the 1st Battalion, 8th Marines. At the northern edge of a farm complex, it received sniper and rocket fire. Reacting quickly, Marines destroyed an Iraqi ammunition truck, and killed several Iraqi soldiers. At 2300 that evening, the battalion was ordered by 8th Marines to conduct a house to house clearing operation in the suburbs of Kuwait City. Due to the fast paced success of the coalition forces, the urban mission was delayed and the 8th Marines continued to consolidate in place. These combat actions by 3/23 constituted some of the last 2nd Marine Division engagements against Iraqi forces in the conflict.<sup>22</sup>

During the four days of conflict, the 2nd Marine Division captured 13,676 Iraqi soldiers, captured or destroyed more than 500 tanks, 172 field and antiaircraft artillery pieces, and 300 armored personnel carriers.<sup>23</sup>

## ***1st Battalion, 25th Marines***

1st Battalion, 25th Marines was activated in the November, 1990 mobilization and was originally assigned to the 2nd Marine Division. It received its pre-deployment training at Camp Lejeune. Arriving in Saudi Arabia in January 1991, 1/25 was reassigned to the 1st Marine Division, where it joined Task Force Grizzly. 1/25 assumed the important mission of being a special prisoner handling unit. Intelligence forecasts predicted that an offensive operation would produce a large numbers of enemy prisoners. This enemy horde could seriously impair mechanized forces. Each division therefore established special prisoner of war units.<sup>24</sup>

An example of the utility of this mission was on G-1 Day, when 1st Battalion, 5th Marines and 3d Tank Battalion from 1st Marine Division were breaching a minefield and became inundated with surrendering Iraqi soldiers. 1/5 dismounted an infantry company to deal with the prisoners whose numbers quickly swelled to nearly 1,300. Within two hours of the engagement, elements of 1/25 arrived to secure the prisoners. This allowed 1/5 to proceed with the advance without delay.<sup>25</sup>

## ***8th Tank Battalion***

A platoon of tanks from Charlie Company, 8th Tank Battalion was ordered to support Charlie Company, 1st Battalion, 6th Marines on February 25, 1991. The tank platoon was commanded by Chief Warrant Officer-2 Charles D. Paxton, from the Columbia, South Carolina area. The platoon encountered several Iraqi tanks and armored personnel carriers soon after crossing the line of departure. The platoon quickly destroyed seven tanks and four of the APCs, all the while continuing with the momentum of the attack. When smoke and fog reduced visibility to only 200 meters, enemy targets had to be engaged at close range. Nevertheless, Chief Warrant Officer Paxton continued to press his platoon forward, destroying another six tanks and two ZSU 23-4 antiaircraft guns before consolidating his unit's defense for the night.<sup>26</sup>

## ***6th Motor Transport Battalion***

The arrival of United States and Coalition Forces created a tremendous demand for motor transport support. A great part of the commercial vehicle fleet of Saudi Arabia, constituting over 1,100 vehicles, including privately owned 4x4 drive vehicles, were pressed into service along with hiring of local drivers. This effort became known to many as "*Saudi Motors*." Early in January 1991, the 6th Motor Transport Battalion, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Larry D. Walters, arrived in Al Jubayl. This unit's arrival allowed Brigadier General Brabham, the Commanding General of the 1st Force Service Support Group, to return 8th Motor Transport Battalion to the Direct Support Center. Oversight for the Saudi Motors was given over to Lieutenant Colonel Walters' 6th Motor Transport Battalion.<sup>27</sup>

To counter any reluctance by local drivers before the commencement of the ground assault, Lieutenant Colonel Walters assigned Marines as assistant drivers. This reassured the foreign drivers and gave the newly arrived Reservists an opportunity to familiarize themselves with Saudi Arabia. As hostilities approached, it became apparent that many of the civilian drivers would have to be replaced. Reservists answered the call.<sup>28</sup>

These volunteer drivers were given the standard four hour United Parcel Service training course given to commercial drivers in the United States. This course was brought to the desert by the battalion's executive officer, Lieutenant Colonel James Collery, a United Parcel Service employee. As the pool of dependable and trained Marine drivers increased, Lieutenant Colonel Walters replaced the least reliable civilian drivers. Despite these problems, Saudi Motors averaged 250 trips a day, moved 50,000 short tons of cargo, and succeeded in stocking the supply point at Kibrit.<sup>29</sup>

Kibrit was the major supply point from which the original I MEF assault of one division would be supplied. Shortly before the battle began, it was decided that two divisions would assault on line. This necessitated a change in the supply point from Kibrit to a new point called Al Jahrah. 8th Motors was tasked with immediately moving those stores already assembled at Kibrit to Al Jahrah. 6th Motors was ordered to bring up the extra eight days of supplies since the new supply point was further away from the port of Al Mishab, which had received the bulk of I MEF supplies.

Lieutenant Colonel Walters, by using his drivers, the remaining foreign drivers, and 100 volunteers, including General Brabham's personal driver, established a circuit course between Al Jubayl and Forward Ammunition Supply Point (FASP) 5 near Al Jahrah. Walter's plan called for establishing transfer points at Al Mishab and Al Jahrah where full trailers were exchanged for empty ones. 6th Motors deployed three teams of drivers to work the Al Jubayl to Al Mishab, Al Mishab to Al Jahrah, and the Al Jahrah to FASP-5 loops. At each location the driver dropped off a full truck, picked up an empty truck and returned to his point of origin, ready to start another run. Thus 6th Motors became known to many, in tribute to World War II's famous "*Red Ball Express*" as the "*Baghdad Express*."<sup>30</sup> This impressive transportation effort ensured that Al Jahrah was stocked and able to support the combat support operations of both Marine divisions on G-Day.

6th Motors also assisted 5th MEB in positioning itself as the MEF reserve. 5th MEB came ashore with only 16 trucks of a provisional truck company. More trucks were needed to keep 5th MEB mobile during offensive operations. To solve this vehicle shortage, the Marines and trucks of "*Saudi Motors*" were ordered to support 5th MEB. 6th Motor's responded with its civilian vehicles, circus wagons, and civilian drivers. "*Saudi Motors*" also successfully kept 5th MEB supplied during the offensive.<sup>31</sup>

## **14th Marines**

The 14th Marines was the artillery regiment for the 4th Marine Division. The regiment had firing batteries activated and deployed to support the Marine Divisions of I MEF; Battery K and M of the 4th Battalion were attached to 5th Battalion, 10th Marines, 2d Marine Division. This attachment brought 5/10 up to four batteries of 155mm howitzers. Battery D and F from 2d Battalion were also attached to 10th Marines.<sup>32</sup>

Battery H, 3rd Battalion, 14th Marines from Richmond, Virginia was attached to 1st Battalion, 11th Marines. On G Plus 1, 25 February 1991, 1st Marine Division became concerned about a possible Iraqi counterattack. Iraqi movement had been masked most of the day by the burning oil fields of Al Burqan. The smoke and flames also hindered the Division Task Force in responding to such an attack.<sup>33</sup> Task Force Papa Bear and the Division Command Post immediately came under attack and defeated a three brigade Iraqi attack. With infantry and armor assets engaged, the 11th Marines started the long process of moving its artillery battalions through the second obstacle belt and into position to support Division operations. This deployment brought the artillery units into a very fluid battlefield situation. In late morning, 1/11 came under attack from Iraqi automatic weapons fire. Sergeant Shawn Toney of Battery H spotted two enemy

multiple rocket launchers preparing to fire on Marine positions. He thought they were tanks but his gun chief, Sergeant Thomas Stark IV, looked closer and determined they were rocket launchers. After quickly swinging their guns onto the vehicles and taking direct aim from point blank range, the artillerymen of Battery H put both rocket launchers out of action with a combination of automatic weapons fire and direct fire from their M198 155mm howitzers.<sup>34</sup>

In addition to deploying tactical units (artillery batteries), 14th Marines also mobilized and deployed task-organized, functionally oriented sub-units known as "*14th Marines Headquarters Detachments*." There were a total of six "*Dets*" that augmented Active Duty organizations for Desert Shield/Storm. The immediate demand was for trained Q-36 Counter Battery/Counter Mortar operators. The 10th Marines requested and received augmentees from Headquarters Battery, 14th Marines to fill personnel vacancies in the 10th Marines Radar sections. This detachment, known as "*Det 1*," was comprised of enlisted Marines, both SMCR and I&I, detached to Headquarters Battery, 10th Marines.

The 10th Marine Regiment's requirement for MOS qualified and experienced enlisted Marines continued. Two additional "*Dets*" were mobilized and attached to 10th Marines. These "*Dets*" consisted of artillery surveyors, meteorological personnel, combat engineers, and motor vehicle operators.

"*Det 4*" was different. It consisted of field grade officers and enlisted personnel (4 officers/20 enlisted) plus equipment. This detachment was requested by Headquarters, I MEF to form the nucleus of the I MEF Fire Support Coordination Center (FSCC). At the time, Marine Corps doctrine did not envision a multi-division MEF. Although the MEF Headquarters had a Fire Support Information Center (FISC) on the Table of Organization, it was incapable of coordinating the fire support resources of a multi-division MEF. A non-doctrinal "*quick-fix*" solution was required. Therefore, 14th Marines was asked to deploy the 4th Marine Division FSCC to form the nucleus of the I MEF FSCC.

"*Det 4*" deployed to Camp Pendleton on December 6, 1990. LtCol Duncan Burgess was the Officer in Charge. For several weeks prior to that time, the 14th Marines officers slated for the MEF FSCC busied themselves with developing a doctrinal framework for operating a MEF FSCC. No MEF level fire support coordination doctrine existed within the Marine Corps. Additionally, no Table of Organization (T/O) or Table of Equipment (T/E) for a MEF FSCC existed. The officers of "*Det 4*" extemporized doctrine procedures, T/O and T/E by borrowing heavily from U.S. Army Corps-level fire support coordination doctrine and rapidly adapting it to U.S. Marine Corps organization and practices.

Upon arrival at Camp Pendleton, "*Det 4*" was augmented with active duty aviators and continued to develop and refine its FSCC doctrine and procedures. By Christmas, 1990, the advance party of the nucleus I MEF FSCC was integrated into the I MEF Headquarters at Al Jubayl, Saudi Arabia. The detachment from 14th Marines quickly stood up the rudimentary functions of a MEF FSCC, while those I MEF Fire Support Coordination Center personnel already at Al Jubayl were freed to organize the I MEF Targeting Cell, a component of the FSCC. Other individual Marines arrived over the next several weeks to augment the I MEF FSCC at the required manning levels and prior to the commencement of ground combat operations.

## ***Aftermath***

Operation Desert Storm clearly demonstrated the value of years of Reserve planning and training. The proficiency of the Reserve Marines in the Gulf War justified the expenditures needed to equip and train them. They showed the capability to support various operational scenarios on short notice. The quality and

motivation level of the Reservists served as a testimonial to the Marine Corps' superior recruiting standards. Improved mobilization readiness could be directly attributed to the use of MORDT screening. Likewise, the successful deployment and employment of 4th Marine Division Marines, in support of I MEF, could be credited to more than a decade of concurrent training with active duty units at regiment, brigade and force levels. The quick mobilization of thousands of reservists also helped the Marine Corps identify the need to improve Reserve administration in the areas of pay and family readiness. Without reservation, the 4th Marine Division proved itself a capable partner in the Total Force and is prepared for the challenge of the 21st century.

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27. Major Steven Zimmeck USMC (Ret), *U.S. Marines in the Persian Gulf, 1990-1991, A war of Logistics : Combat Service Supporting Desert Shield and Desert storm, Draft, History and Museums Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, Washington, DC: 1997, p. 5-3, 5-4.*
28. Zimmeck, p. 4-24
29. *Ibid.* p. 4-24.
30. *Ibid.* p. 5-12, 5-13.
31. Brown, p. 210.
32. Mroczkowski, pp. 4,7.
33. Cureton, p. 90.
34. Cureton, pp. 90, 100.



***M-60A1 main battle tank fires a zeroing round from its main gun as the battalion conducts live-fire training exercises during Operation "Desert Shield".***



***M1A1 Abrams main battle tank passes by an abandoned Iraqi position during the ground phase of Operation "Desert Storm".***



***An Iraqi T-55 main battle tank burns after an attack during Operation "Desert Storm".***



*Destroyed Iraqi T-55 main battle tank lies abandoned beside a road at the edge of an oil field.*



*Oil wells fires rage outside Kuwait City in the aftermath of Operation "Desert Storm". The wells were set on fire by Iraqi forces before they were ousted from the region by coalition forces.*



**"AMTRAC Driver", LtCol. Eith A. McConnell, USMCR, USMC Art Collection**  
Task Force "Ripper" Amtrac driver attempts to stay warm on top of his "track" during the morning of February 28 in Kuwait, Operation "Desert Storm".



*M-60A1 main battle tank equipped with reactive armor, mine-clearing rollers and plow stand by at the head of a column of AAVP-7A1 assault amphibian vehicles as I MEF prepares to enter Kuwait at the start of the ground phase of Operation "Desert Storm".*



*An Iraqi T-72 main battle tank, destroyed by a coalition air strike, lies near Ali Al Salem Air Base.*



**On 10 December 1990, elements of the 2nd MARDIV, 2nd MAW, and 2nd FSSG commanded by LtGen. Carl E. Mundy Jr. Commanding General of II MEF, formed on W.P.T. Hill Field. More than 24,000 Marines and Sailors, active duty and mobilized reserves, stood in formation for the largest review in memory at Camp Lejeune, NC. After an address and review by General Alfred M. Gray Jr., Commandant of the Marine Corps, LtGen. Mundy ordered the assembled commanders to "deploy their Marines to SWA". Formation stands 50 ranks across, 50 deep. One third troops are Reserve and 7% women.**





*"Never since the darkest days of World War II have so many Marines mustered on the historic parade deck of Camp Lejuene".  
General Alfred M. Gray, Commandant of the Marine Corps.*



*General Alfred M. Gray, Commandant of the Marine Corps and Admiral Powell Carter, Jr., Commander in Chief of the Atlantic Fleet, reviews troops.*



*Lance Corporal Keith Dorsett, a Marine reservist, spends his off duty time playing his saxophone during Operation "Desert Storm."*



*Enemy position destroyed by bombing run from FA-18 fighters and explosion scatters debris.*



*Marine armed with M-16A1 rifle joins his company in forming a defensive line after being transported by helicopter to an LZ.*



*Marine reservists from the 4th Marine Division man a perimeter observation post.*

# **Chapter 7**

## **4th Marine Division into 21st Century**

### **4th Division Headquarters Operations**

While much attention has been focused on their combat service in Southwest Asia, the 4th Marine Division also helped the Marine Corps carry out national defense commitments at home and throughout the world. In so doing, the 4th Marine Division has proven itself an integral part of the Total Force team.

During the 1990s, the 4th Division command element evolved from a headquarters that could take an entire division to war to one that had two staffs, a nucleus staff and a division battle staff. The Active Duty Marines form the nucleus staff; they perform the daily administrative operations of the headquarters. Their mission is to ensure that subordinate units are prepared for activation and integration with Active Marine units.<sup>1</sup>

By 1995, there was a marked emphasis on integration of 4th Marine Division into the operational scenarios of the three active divisions. A total of nineteen operational tempo relief missions were conducted by division units, including exercises **Cobra Gold**, **Ulchi Focus Lens**, **Forest Light**, **Fiery Vigil**, and **Indigo Desert**. The close coordination and cooperation between Active and Reserve units permitted a "seamless integration" of forces.

The efforts of 1st Battalion, 24th Marines in 1991 are an excellent example of operational tempo relief and seamless integration. Upon its activation in 1990, the battalion comprised nearly one thousand Marines from Michigan and Ohio, and was commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Andrew Davis. On 9 December 1990, the battalion deployed to the 3rd Marine Division in Okinawa. They replaced an Active duty battalion of the 9th Marines that had been sent to the Persian Gulf. While in Okinawa, 1/24 underwent thirteen weeks of special operations training, and became the first Reserve battalion to become "*Special Operations Capable*." (2d Battalion, 23rd Marines also became MEU (SOC) qualified and deployed to Okinawa). In February 1991, 1/24 participated in cold weather training with Japanese Self Defense Forces in Operation Forest Light. During the first quarter of 1991, LCpl Han Lin of Company "A" was named Marine of the Quarter for the entire 3rd Marine Division.

With Desert Storm over, 1/24 was designated the ground combat element of Marine Air Ground Task Force 4-90 for an April 1991 deployment to the Republic of the Philippines. At the time of their deployment, Major General H.C. Stackpole, Commanding General III MEF, wrote to the Commandant of the Marine Corps about the professionalism of the reserve battalion. He closed his letter by stating: "*The highest accolade I can bestow upon them is that here in the West Pacific, I can't discern any difference between Regular and Reserve. They are total Marines in every respect.*"

On 12 June 1991, Mount Pinatubo, an active volcano, began erupting in a seismic fury that would destroy the huge American military complexes at Clark AFB and Subic Bay. On Saturday 15 June, 1/24 was alerted to begin relief duties in Operation Fiery Vigil. From 15 June - 2 July 1991, 1/24 was engaged in a massive relief operation in Subic Bay and the Alangapo area. Among the projects carried out by the battalion were excavating and repairing the fresh water supply of the entire Subic area, feeding over 1,500 U.S. Military personnel, protecting the Naval magazine, armed security at base housing and the Navy Exchange, and rescuing Philippine nationals in isolated villages in the local area.

Prior to Desert Storm, armed conflict could be said to "*follow the clock*." There were periods of war fighting, followed by recovery and rest periods. High intensity conflict, the marriage of smart munitions and rapidly evolving command and control functions created the 24 hour battlefield. The battle staffs of Marine Air Ground Task Forces (MAGTF) require staff augmentation to continue the operational tempo of the conflict on an around the clock, day after day, pace. The Division battle staff, while mirroring the nucleus staff uses the drill weekend to train to Division standards in their respective billets. Upon activation, the battle staff will be assigned to replenish staffs of deployed MAGTFs, on a one for one basis.<sup>2</sup> This is in line with a need for staff augmentation to ensure successful 24 hour staff functioning in high intensity conflict.

General Wilkerson, in a recent oral history interview, stated that one of the key lessons learned from Desert Shield/Desert Storm was that none of the staffs, reserve or active, in their peacetime configuration, could maintain 24 hour war fighting capability. Augmentation going to the operating forces should be from units with which the force is familiar. Thus, commanders and staffs train in peacetime with the forces they will augment in time of war.<sup>3</sup>

While Southwest Asian operations were ongoing, the 4th Marine Division command element was responsible for coordinating the deployment of the IV MEF Command Element and a specially created amphibious task force nucleus staff sent to Honduras for Operation AHUAS Tara-91. The operation was a Joint Chiefs of Staff, (JCS) sponsored exercise that had not previously utilized reserve forces. During this exercise, the IV MEF staff served in the triple role of staffing the joint Task Force South, Marine Forces South, and the IV MEF. The operation was declared a resounding success by both the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs and the Commander, U.S. Forces, Southern Command.<sup>4</sup>

The 4th Marine Division also provided valuable support to Joint Task Force-6, conducting counter-narcotics operations in the vicinity of Fort Huachuca and Ajo, Arizona by providing imagery intelligence. This resulted in beneficial training with the U.S. Customs Service and the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA). Combat Engineer support was provided to the U.S. Customs Service and the Border Patrol along the southwest border of the United States. Units constructed and maintained border-crossing checkpoints.<sup>5</sup>

In order to maximize combat proficiency for division units, the Division Command Element deployed to the Marine Corps Air Ground Combat Center (MCAGCC), Twentynine Palms, California in June, 1991. The Division staff provided administrative, operational and training support to 4th Marine Division Marines receiving training there. This training required detailed staff planning, coordination, communication, and supervision of over 4,000 Marines.<sup>6</sup>

During the winter of 1991, the Division trained and prepared the Ground Combat Element (GCE) and Combat Service Support Element (CSSE) for participation with 2d MEB in Exercise "*Battle Griffin 91*" conducted in Norway. Altogether, 4,300 Reserve Marines participated in this major NATO joint combined exercise. This, too, was a first, as this operation had never employed Reserve forces as major participants.

In 1991, 4th Marine Division headquarters planned and supervised sixteen annual training periods which took place outside CONUS. These exercises featured subordinate Reserve units with assigned missions in Marine Corps Exercise "*Team Spirit*" in Korea. 4th Division Marines also supported III MEF in Okinawa. Division units also conducted Turbo Intermodal Surge 91, a nationwide logistics exercise designed to improve the Department of Defense ability to conduct containerization operations in coordination with civilian industry. A total of 240 Division units participated in some forty six CONUS operations and either supported or augmented twenty-six exercises.<sup>7</sup>

The mission of the 4th Marine Division is clearly stated as a matter of federal law. This mission is to provide trained and qualified units and individuals for services in wartime, national emergency, or such times as the President may direct. By priority, the roles of employment are (1) the augmentation of Active Marine expeditionary forces; (2) the reinforcement of Active Marine expeditionary forces; and (3) the implementation of a nucleus for regeneration or reconstituting Marine Expeditionary Forces. Major General James Livingston, Commanding General, Marine Forces Reserve, stated that the Marine Corps should *"protect the existing Reserve Force structure and expand the Reserve, where necessary, to better augment and reinforce the Active component in war time or in crisis."*<sup>8</sup>

## ***Creation of Marine Forces Reserve (MARFORRES)***

On June 6, 1992 Marine Forces Reserve (MARFORRES) was created and became one of the three Forces in the Marine Corps, along with Marine Forces Atlantic, and Marine Forces Pacific. MARFORRES is the largest command in the Marine Corps with the 4th Division, 4th Force Service Support Group, and 4th Marine Aircraft Wing as subordinate units. The Marine Corps Reserve Support Command (MCRSC) became a separate command to reflect an expanded nationwide mission, while maintaining its traditional focus on providing administrative support and training for the Individual Ready Reserves (IRR), the Fleet Marine Corps Reserve and the Standby Reserve. MCRSC is the largest administrative command in the Marine Corps with the responsibility for over 64,000 service records.<sup>9</sup>

The mission of MARFORRES is to provide service to the community, augment and reinforce Active Marine Forces in time of war, national emergency or contingency operations, and provide personnel and operational tempo relief for the active forces in peacetime. With the establishment of Marine Forces Reserve, the intended deployment of 4th Marine Division is in direct support of Marine Forces Atlantic and Marine Forces Pacific. The modern concept of operations for employment of the Division is based on the premise that the Division's assets are best utilized in the augmentation of task organized units from the active duty components. This concept modifies original plans which assumed that the entire Division would go to war as had occurred in World War II.

The proficiency of 4th Marine Division units continues to be on par with the active component. For example, during October 1996, Brigadier General Frederick R. Lopez, Commanding General of the 4th Marine Division, hosted the first annual Total Force Tank Gunnery Competition at Fort Knox, Kentucky. *"Top Gun"* tank teams from the active duty 1st and 2d Tank Battalion and Reserve Marines from the 4th and 8th Tank Battalions participated. Prior to the official competition, each tank crew was involved in a shoot-out with other tank crews within their respective battalions for the honor of representing their unit in the national competition. Consequently, each tank crew was the best its battalion had to offer. On the ultra-modern Yano Tank Range, the Reservists from 4th Tank Battalion in Boise, Idaho bested all to win the competition.<sup>10</sup>

When asked what he thought about the differences between the Reserve Marines and Active duty Marines in this inaugural competitive shoot, the guest of honor, LtGen. Paul K. Van Riper, Commanding General, Marine Corps Combat Development Command, Quantico, Va., answered emphatically, *"Quite frankly, I don't see any difference between the reserve battalions and the active duty battalions. A Marine is a Marine regardless of their active or reserve status."*

Building on the success of Reserve integration into the task-organized units of the Fleet Marine Forces, Generals Libutti (1994-1996), Harvey (1993-1995), and Lopez (1995-1996) continued to integrate reserve and regular units and command elements into various CAX and regimental MAGTF exercises at Twentynine Palms. These exercises showed that reserve units had no equipment compatibility problems and could quickly absorb the CAX mission objectives. General Libutti spoke for many general officers when he unequivocally stated that the Marine Corps today could not fight without the Reserves. He went on to note that the 4th Marine Division Marines were *"on the same page as the active forces."*<sup>11</sup>

Major General James Livingston, Commanding General, Marine Forces Reserve, stated that Marine Reservists who served in Cuba for refugee support during 1994 and 1995 were *"an excellent example of seamless integration. Reserve Marines underwent a very short period of training provided by Regular Marines, and they used that training to competently and professionally meet the requirements."* Reservists were also called upon to serve during Operation *"Uphold Democracy"* in Haiti. Seven Marines fluent in the native language deployed with the Regular forces to serve as linguists.<sup>12</sup>

In April, 1996, 4th Marine Division units, including 4th Assault Amphibian Vehicle Battalion and 3rd Battalion, 23rd Marines, participated in Exercise Turbo Intermodal Surge '96. The Division's Marines loaded equipment and vehicles which were transported to Fort Lewis, Washington. The combat cargo was then loaded into containers and sea lifted to MCB, Twentynine Palms, California. Conducted in anticipation of the summer's Combined Arms Exercises, the training emphasized the logistical and embarkation skills required for rapid deployment.<sup>13</sup>

In the Winter of 1996, 4th Marine Division units participated in *"Battle Griffin '96."* The GCE Headquarters was Headquarters, 25th Marines, commanded by Colonel Rick Barry, USMC. Some 4,300 Marines, 90% of whom were Reservists, deployed to Norway to execute their mission as part of the Norway Air-Landed Marine Air-Ground Task Force (NAL MAGTF). Marines arrived in Norway, retrieved equipment and weapons stored in a system of caves and conducted cold weather training. Battle Griffin '96 proved to be an excellent example of how Reserve units constituted a significant part of II Marine Expeditionary Force, especially in the II MEF's Augmentation Command Element (MACE).<sup>14</sup>

As the 20th Century comes to a close, there is no doubt that Marines of the 4th Marine Division played a significant role in large scale conflicts such as Operation Desert Storm and in smaller specialized operations as occurred in the Caribbean. As Major General Libutti stated: *"Without a doubt, the system today of using existing units is smarter, wiser, makes more sense and is productive in terms of association with units that you are dealing with over the years trained under the notion that reserve units would be plugged into active forces"*<sup>15</sup>

## ***Community Outreach***

General Victor Krulak, the father of the current Commandant, once said that *"the reason there is a Marine Corps is that the public wants one."*<sup>16</sup> An important mission for the 4th Marine Division remains the need to continually tell the *"Marine Corps story"* to citizens around the country. In so doing, Marines, especially reservists, can better inform the American public about the mission of the Marine Corps and how it impacts their lives. Community outreach is a vehicle to ensure that every American knows and understands that reserve Marines are *"twice the citizen"* who not only work in the community but who also provide for this Nation's defense.

This mission is more important than ever, because fewer and fewer citizens, including America's elected leaders, have ever served in the military. Not only does telling the "*Marine Corps story*" help ordinary citizens understand the dedication it takes to be a Marine, especially a reservist, but community outreach assists in recruiting and employer support of drilling reservists. The Reservists of 4th Marine Division are ideally suited to carry out this mission because over 200 reserve centers are located in parts of America far removed from major Marine installations on the East and West Coast.<sup>17</sup>

On the eve of the new century, the Marine Reservist must be able to fight and win battles abroad as well as in their own backyard. Drug and alcohol abuse, illiteracy, economic deprivation, and street violence is the island that the reservist must storm to ensure replenishment and national acceptance. Drug demand reduction efforts provide an effective anti-substance abuse program aimed at America's young people. Dedicated and motivated uniformed Marine Reservists instruct in classrooms around the country about drug abuse and the importance of making healthy life choices. Eight hundred thousand students, parents, educators, law enforcement, and community leaders nationwide can be reached through this program. In addition to making a difference, students and parents can see first hand how the Marine Corps can transform many into productive citizens. Similarly, Marines who lead the Junior Reserve Officer Training Corps impart discipline through positive leadership and example. Many teach literacy to students and help them learn the importance of academic achievement. Those reservists who lead "*Young Marines*" serve as positive role models and teach alternatives to crime and violence through leadership. In coordination with the Marine Corps Leagues, this program attempts to instill a sense of pride, discipline and dedication in its young members through sports, physical fitness, community involvement, and academic activities. The Young Marine program has been officially recognized by the Drug Enforcement Administration as a leader in the fight to reduce our nations drug, alcohol and crime problems.<sup>18</sup>

Marines of the 4th Marine Division and Marine Forces Reserve were honored during 1996 by the Secretary of Defense for their drug demand reduction lectures given in junior and senior high schools in addition to leadership of Junior ROTC and the Young Marines units, and the raising of millions of toys for underprivileged youth in the Toys for Tots program.<sup>19</sup>

## ***Reserve/Inspector-Instructor Team***

A unique characteristic of the Marine Corps Reserve is the role of the Inspector-Instructor in each unit. The Inspector-Instructor, commonly referred to as "the I&I", is a Regular officer. His small staff consists predominately of Regular NCO's and SNCO's. The I&I concept represents a significant and unique investment by the Active Marine Corps in its Reserve component. It distinguishes the Marine Corps Reserve from all other Reserve components. The I&I concept, implemented in the late 1940's, is a critical factor in the mobilization readiness and demonstrated combat performance of the Marine Corps Reserve. Its validity was proven during the Korean War in 1950 and the Persian Gulf War in 1990-91.

The relationship between the Reserve unit's Commanding Officer and Inspector-Instructor is fundamental to the accomplishment of the unit's pre-mobilization mission. This relationship has its closest and most consistent application at the local Company-level Reserve unit. The Commanding Officer is a Reserve officer, like all Commanding Officers, is responsible for what happens or fails to happen in his unit. However, the Commanding Officer is also a "citizen Marine". He cannot be continuously present at the Reserve Center during normal duty hours. It is the roll of the I&I, assisted by his Staff, to provide the day-to-day administrative support to the Reserve unit. This continuous support enables the Reserve Marines to focus maximum effort toward training, unencumbered with the burden of daily administrative routine.

The role of the I&I is also to supervise, instruct and assist the Reserve leaders at all levels in achieving Marine Corps standards of readiness and operational excellence. The I&Is provide a continuous and renewable infusion of current knowledge and procedure from the Active operating forces. The I&I Staff is the established institutional conduit of expertise, "*lessons-learned*" and current operational practice from the Active Marine Corps into its Reserve.

As a result of the I&I/Reserve relationship, the Marine Corps Reserve is a virtual "*mirror image*" of the Active Marine Corps at all levels. Marine Corps Reserve tactical units are organized, trained and equipped as "*mirror images*" of Active units. More importantly, the individual Marine Reservist thinks, talks and is habituated in a similar manner as his Active Duty counterpart. This explains the unique, impressive ability of the Marine Corps to rapidly assimilate its Reserve component and achieve success in combat. The performance of the Marine Corps Reserve in the Korean War (1950) and the Persian Gulf War (1990-91) demonstrated that the Marine Corps had a uniquely successful Reserve program due, in large part, to the role of the Inspector-Instructor.

In addition to directly supporting the Reserve unit, the I&I Staff performs other important duties related to public affairs, Community Outreach and recruiting.<sup>20</sup> Color Guard details, funeral details, public speaking engagements, casualty calls and static displays consume a significant portion of the small I&I Staff's time and effort.<sup>21</sup> These functions, seemingly unrelated to training and supporting the local Reserve unit, are a vital part of being part of the larger Marine Corps and are consistent with the duties traditionally performed by I&Is since the late 1940's.

Since the reactivation of the 4th Marine Division in 1966, there has been discussion and conjecture about the role of the Inspector-Instructor Staff after mobilization. The issue was never resolved and resurfaced during the mobilization process for the Persian Gulf War in 1990-91. In an interview conducted in 1996, Brigadier General F. Lopez, Commanding General, 4th Marine Division, stated that the most serious drawback to mobilization for Desert Shield/Desert Storm was that the Division "*left some of its best people behind,*" when the I&I Staffs were not allowed to assimilate into the activated units.<sup>22</sup> Current Division policy has been modified and plans now direct that the I&I Staffs be integrated into a single Table of Organization (T/O). Currently, nearly 5,000 Active Duty Marines and sailors support MARFORRES as a whole. Approximately 2,000 are assigned to the 4th Marine Division, representing over 10% of its total manpower.<sup>23</sup>

Major General T. Wilkerson, Commanding General, MARFORRES, during the T/O integration process, stated that the purpose of the integration was to foster a single unit identity. In the future, when a unit is activated, all Marines and sailors, both Active and Reserve, will deploy together. Concurrent with the 4th Marine Division and MARFORRES T/O integration initiative, HQMC directed that the "*R*", denoting "*Reserve*", be deleted from all Marine commands, except "*Marine Forces Reserve*". This highly symbolic directive indicates that, in the Total Force Marine Corps, one Marine unit, whether Active or Reserve is indistinguishable from another.<sup>24</sup>

## ***Readiness Support Program***

The Peacetime/Wartime Support Team (PWST) concept, implemented in 1996, is the product of several converging trends. The PWSTs, composed of drilling SMCR personnel, are an attempt to correct numerous Reserve family support deficiencies that arose during the Gulf War mobilization. They are also the primary vehicles at the local Home Training Centers (HTC) to implement the Community Outreach program. Finally, as a result of the integration of the I&I staffs and the SMCR units, it is now a certainty that the I&I staffs will

mobilize and deploy with the unit. The PWSTs are the mechanism by which the HTC is manned and maintained after mobilization. One of the best lessons learned from Operation Desert Storm was the need to review and improve family readiness support. During mobilization of a spouse or, after his/her deployment, Marine families are left behind and many times, alone. The Commandant has ordered that these families be provided for. Failure to adequately provide for a dependent left behind adversely affects combat readiness.<sup>25</sup>

The spouse and family of a mobilized Marine Reservist has the same concerns as the dependents of Active Duty Marines... pay and allowances, dependent identification cards, and medical care to mention a few. The major difference is that these dependents are often completely unfamiliar with the intricacies of being a full-time military dependent. At the stroke of a pen, they went from being married to a civilian wage earner and part-time Marine to being dependents of a full-time Active Duty Marine who is now deployed away from home. Additionally, the Marine Corps has a responsibility to those dependents who may choose to relocate with family for the duration of the war. Often, the Reserve HTC is the closest Marine Corps facility.

PWSTs are also tasked with site maintenance. Should the Inspector-Instructor and his or her staff be deployed with the Reserve unit, the PWST would literally be handed the keys to the training center. This team, in addition to its station keeping duties, would continue with family assistance and the community outreach effort. Besides maintaining the premises until the unit returns, the PWST would care for those Marines not deployed and their families.<sup>26</sup>

## **R-NET**

Recently, the 4th Marine Division joined with a Reserve-wide area network of computers known as the Marine "*Reserve Internet*" (R-NET), linking local reserve center computers with higher headquarters at Division and Marine Forces Reserve levels. While maintaining and emphasizing the use of the chain of command, commanding officers and Inspector-Instructor staffs now have a communications ability which is viewed as a force multiplier of unprecedented proportions. The Commanding General can now communicate to all subordinate sites without relying upon routine message traffic. This is perceived as an asset for mobilization.<sup>27</sup>

In 1996 and 1997, by utilizing electronic mail and other communication means, General Lopez and his staff were able to conduct a division wide Command Post Exercise (CPX) over a drill weekend with all subordinate units at their respective Reserve centers. The CPX was accomplished using desktop computers linked, in real-time, across three time zones, to the Division's four organic regiments and six organic separate battalions at their HTCs. All of this was accomplished at greatly reduced cost when compared to a conventional CPX.<sup>28</sup>

## **Conclusion**

As the Marine Corps embarks into the 21st Century, the 4th Marine Division has proven itself to be an equal partner with the active duty Marine force with which it serves. The organization and structure of the modern 4th Marine Division allows for rapid mobilization and deployment to Major Regional Contingencies (MRCs) such as the Korean conflict, Gulf War, or Lesser Regional Contingencies (LRCs) such as peacekeeping and humanitarian relief missions like those conducted in Haiti, Bosnia, and Cuba. Through dedication, chal-

lenging and realistic training, and a commitment to excellence, the Division continues to fulfill its mission as a source of highly trained, readily deployable units and individuals for augmentation or reinforcement of the Active Component.


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# Appendix A

## 4th Marine Division



### Headquarters 4th MARDIV New Orleans, LA

1. 4th LAR Bn., CamPen, CA
2. 4th Tank Bn., San Diego, CA
3. 4th Recon Bn., San Antonio, TX
4. 4th AAV Bn., Tampa, FL
5. 4th CBT Eng Bn., Baltimore, MD
6. 8th Tank Bn., Rochester, NY

### 14th Marines

7. 1/14 Alameda, CA
8. 2/14 Fort Worth, TX
9. 3/14 Philadelphia, PA
10. 4/14 Bessemer, AL
11. 5/14 Long Beach, CA

### 23rd Marines

12. 1/23 Houston, TX
13. 2/23 Encino, CA
14. 3/23 New Orleans, LA

### 24rd Marines

15. 1/24 Detroit, MI
16. 2/24 Chicago, IL
17. 3/24 St Louis, MO

### 25th Marines

18. 1/25 Camp Edwards, MA
19. 2/25 Garden City, NY
20. 3/25 Cleveland, OH

# **Appendix B**

## **Chronology**

### **16 August 1943**

*Activated at Camp Pendleton, California, as the 4th Marine Division.*

### **13 January 1944**

*Departed CONUS for combat operation against the Empire of Japan.*

### **31 January 1944**

*Began the invasion of Roi-Namur.*

### **15 June 1944**

*Began the invasion of Saipan.*

### **24 July 1944**

*Began the invasion of Tinian.*

### **19 February 1945**

*Began the invasion of Iwo-Jima.*

### **20 November 1945**

*4th Marine Division deactivated.*

### **1 July 1962**

*The 4th Marine Division is reactivated at Camp Pendleton to serve as the force structure for the Marine Corps Reserve ground units.*

### **7 February 1966**

*The nucleus headquarters of the 4th Marine Division is established at Camp Pendleton. Major General Robert F.Cushman is assigned command of the new headquarters.*

### **30 July 1967**

*4th Division units, 3000 Marines, participate in Operation Golden Slipper, a large Navy-Marine Corps, Active and Reserve amphibious training exercise. This is the beginning of large scale, joint service training.*

### **1970**

*Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird announces the Total Force Policy, integrating the shrinking active duty forces with a revitalized reserve.*

### **15 July 1970**

*Brigadier General Leo Dulacki becomes the first Commanding General whose primary duty is commanding the Division.*

### **1973**

*The draft ends. The All Volunteer Force begins.*

### **1974-1975**

*Brigadier General P.X. Kelley , Commanding General 4th Marine Division, begins the reorganization of the Division to bring appointing and command authority under Division control rather than Marine Corps District.*

### **1975**

*Under General Louis H. Wilson, Commandant of the Marine Corps, the "Great Personnel Campaign" began. Unsatisfactory participants are discharged and the active and reserve forces begin recruiting to a higher standard.*

**2 March 1977**

The Commandant of the Marine Corps directs that the final transfer of command of the Organized Marine Corps Reserve will be accomplished no later than 1 October 1977.

**20 April 1977**

The Headquarters of the 4th Division, Major General E.J. Miller, Commanding General, is relocated from Camp Pendleton, California to New Orleans, Louisiana.

**1978**

The deployment to Europe of 4th Marine Division forces to participate in NATO exercises is enlarged and becomes a permanent part of the training cycle.

**1982**

General P.X. Kelley, Commandant of the Marine Corps, states that 4th Division units will train with same equipment they will use in battle. Efforts are intensified to ensure reserve units are issued weapons and equipment on the same time line as the active Marine Corps.

**August 1984**

Operation Phalanx Sound is the largest reserve Amphibious operation since 1950. Over 4000 4th Division Marines participate as part of the 2nd MAB.

**August 1987**

Operation Solar Flare is the first time a reserve brigade, 2nd MAB, goes force on force against an active brigade, 4th MAB.

**August 1990 - May 1991**

Operation Desert Shield and Desert Storm. 4th Marine Division units from across the United States are mobilized and deployed to support Active Duty Marine units in Southwest Asia, Europe, North America, and the Western Pacific.

**6 June 1992**

Marine Forces Reserve is activated at New Orleans, Louisiana. The largest command in the Marine Corps, its mission is to provide service in the community, augment and reinforce active Marine forces in time of war/national emergency and to provide personnel and operational tempo relief for active forces in peace time.

**July 1994**

Division Battle Staff provides MAGTF Headquarters nucleus for Operation Pinnacle Advance.

**1996**

A Command Post Exercise is held over a 5 drill weekend that utilizes the Reserve Wide Computer net that links all 4th Marine Division training sites together simultaneously. This first time occurrence will be utilized to train staffs to interact with higher and subordinate staff on a regular basis.

**October 1996**

Division developed philosophy and plan for full integration of SMCR and Inspector-Instructor staff into single tactical units.

**1996**

Inspector-Instructor staffs are integrated into a single Table of Organization in the Division. Peacetime/wartime support teams are established and become the station keepers at time of activation and provide family assistance to the extended Marine Corps family.

# **Appendix C**

## **Commanding Officers and Inspector-Instructors 1966 - 1996**

### **DIVISION COMMANDING GENERALS**

MAJGEN R.E. CUSHMAN 1 JAN 66 - 28 FEB 67  
MAJGEN L.J. FIELDS 1 MAR 67 - 14 JUN 68  
MAJGEN W.B. KYLE 15 JUN 68 - 17 JUL 68  
MAJGEN D.J. ROBERTSON 18 JUL 68 - 31 DEC 70  
MAJGEN L.J. DULACKI 1 JAN 71 - 4 MAR 73  
MAJGEN J.N. MCLAUGHLIN 5 MAR 73 - 9 AUG 74  
BGEN P.X. KELLEY 10 AUG 74 - 30 JUN 75  
MAJGEN E.J. MILLER 1 JUL 75 - 16 JUN 78  
MAJGEN M.A. MOORE 17 JUN 78 - 5 JUN 80  
MAJGEN E.J. MEGARR 6 JUN 80 - 8 JUL 82  
MAJGEN R.E. MOSS 9 JUL 82 - 11 JUN 84  
MAJGEN J.J. SALETTES 12 JUN 84 - 4 SEP 84  
MAJGEN D.B. BARKER 5 SEP 84 - 24 JUN 87  
MAJGEN H.E. DAVISON 25 JUN 87 - 26 JUN 88  
BGEN W.E. BOOMER 27 JUN 88 - 31 DEC 88  
MAJGEN W.E. BOOMER 1 JAN 89 - 25 JUL 90  
MAJGEN M.T. COOPER 26 JUL 90 - 15 JUL 91  
MAJGEN J.E. LIVINGSTON 16 JUL 91 - 5 JUN 92  
MAJGEN J.T. COYNE 6 JUN 92 - 1 JUL 93  
MAJGEN A.C. HARVEY 1 JUL 93 - 1 JUL 95  
BGEN F.R. LOPEZ 1 JUL 95 - PRESENT

### **DIVISION SERGEANTS MAJOR**

SGTMAJ H.C. McALISTER FEB 66 - MAR 68  
SGTMAJ J.H. MYRICK MAR 68 - MAY 69  
SGTMAJ A.B. KOUMA MAY 69 - SEPT 70  
SGTMAJ R.A. FRAUENPRIES SEPT 70 - MAY 75  
SGTMAJ P.P. GIATEN MAY 75 - FEB 77  
SGTMAJ W.J. STEELE FEB 77 - MAY 80  
SGTMAJ H.P. MORTELLO MAY 80 - FEB 81  
SGTMAJ R.A. LISS MAR 81 - JUN 84  
SGTMAJ C.D. MORTIS JUN 84 - JUN 86  
SGTMAJ C.J. FERG JUN 86 - NOV 88  
SGTMAJ R.L. COBB NOV 88 - JUL 90  
SGTMAJ D.L. WILDENHAUS JUL 90 - JUN 92  
SGTMAJ J.E. BETTIS JUL 92 - MAY 93  
SGTMAJ E.S. HAMPTON JUN 93 - JUN 96  
SGTMAJ P.M. GANTE JUN 96 - PRESENT

**14TH MARINE REGIMENT**

COL V.J. ROBINSON 1968-1971  
COL R.B. BAITY 1971-1974  
COL P.H.H. HARRINGTON 1974-1975  
COL K.D. BJORKLUND 1975-1978  
COL C.E. HOGAN 1978-1981  
COL F.L. CAPIN 1981-1984  
LTCOL J.J. DAVID 1984-1984  
COL T.W. ROGERS 1984-1987  
COL A.H. RESSMEYER 1987-1990  
COL D.F. ROBERTS 1990-1990  
COL J.M. CANARIO 1990-1992  
COL L.W. SMITH III 1992-1993  
COL L.A. STUART 1993-1995  
COL P.A. GIDO 1995-PRESENT

**23RD MARINE REGIMENT**

COL D.R. KENNEDY 1969-1969  
COL E.O. SWANEY 1969-1972  
LTCOL V.L. DE BOEVE 1972-1975  
COL E.J.A. CASTAGNA 1975-1976  
COL R.A. STEPHENS 1976-1979  
COL R.D. WHITE 1979-1981  
COL J.E. STANTON 1981-1984  
COL J.T. GARCIA 1984-1988  
COL B.J. FAGAN 1988-1990  
COL J.J. CLARK 1990-1992  
COL H.W. PETERSON 1992-1994  
COL J.A. GILLIS 1994-1996  
COL L.G. HERNANDEZ 1996-PRESENT

**24TH MARINE REGIMENT**

LTCOL A.N. WYRICK 1969-1970  
COL A.F. MACKIN 1970-1972  
COL D.J. HYTREK 1973-1975  
COL W.M. YEAGER 1975-1977  
COL A.W. LAMB 1977-1979  
COL J.R. TICKLE 1979-1982  
COL J.R. RUFFINI 1982-1985

COL J.L. THROCKMORTON 1985-1987  
COL S.R. BERKHEISER 1987-1990  
COL G.E. GERMANN 1990-1991  
LTCOL J.M. GAESKI 1991-1991  
COL J.L. CREED 1991-1993  
COL F.W. HICKS 1993-1996  
COL C.O. MYERS 1996-PRESENT

**25TH MARINE REGIMENT**

COL E. J. GRANSTEIN -1967  
COL E. J. GRANSTEIN 1967-1970  
COL N. A. CANZONA 1970-1972  
COL J. C. STUDT 1972-1972  
COL N. A. CANZONA 1970-1973  
COL J. R. LILLEY II 1973-1976  
COL W. F. BURT 1976-1980  
COL JOHN C. STUDT 1981-1981  
COL R. C. HYATT 1980-1984  
COL R. C. RAINES 1983-1985  
LTCOL G. S. CONVERSE 1985-1985  
COL M. A. SEXTON 1985-1988  
COL R. C. RAINES 1986-1986  
COL B. C. STEED 1987-1990  
COL A. C. HARVEY 1987-1987  
LTCOL R. R. BURKE 1989-1991  
COL J. J. PRESTON 1991-1991  
COL W. P. ARMES 1991-1993  
COL D. V. O'DELL 1993-1993  
COL K. A. CONRY 1993-1995  
COL R.M. BARRY 1995-PRESENT

## **Battalion Commanding Officers 4th Marine Division**

### **1ST BATTALION, 23RD MARINE REGIMENT**

LTCOL H.W. HARDY 1965-1967  
LTCOL T.E. LUCAS 1968-1970  
LTCOL G.F. TWYMAN 1970-1972  
LTCOL M.H. HARRINGTON 1972-1974  
LTCOL T.N. HINES 1974-1976  
LTCOL C.S. VAUGHN 1976-1977  
LTCOL R.R. JESPERSEN 1978-1979  
LTCOL D. MORRIS 1979-1981  
LTCOL BOONE III 1981-1983  
LTCOL J.B. ZIMMERMAN 1983-1985  
LTCOL W.R. STACEY 1985-1987  
LTCOL D.V. O'DELL 1987-1989  
LTCOL J.G. CHASE 1989-1990  
LTCOL T.G. PEELER 1990-1992  
LTCOL J.L. MITCHELL 1993-1995  
LTCOL J.L. WILLIAMS 1995-PRESENT

### **2ND BATTALION, 23RD MARINE REGIMENT**

LTCOL P.E. GODFREY 1965-1967  
LTCOL W.R. LOCKLEAR 1967-1969  
LTCOL A.B. HUGHES 1969-1971  
LTCOL G.G. YARBOROUGH 1971-1971  
LTCOL H.M. STEWART 1971-1973  
LTCOL R.C. REED 1973-1976  
LTCOL V.P. ANDALORO 1976-1977  
LTCOL T.W. ALDRICH 1977-1979  
LTCOL J.H. POPE 1979-1981  
LTCOL D.R. SAXON 1981-1983  
MAJ F.R. LOPEZ 1983-1984  
LTCOL F.R. LOPEZ 1985-1986  
MAJ G.J. OHLS 1986-1988  
MAJ D.M. STONE 1989-1990  
LTCOL D.M. STONE 1991-1991  
LTCOL C.T. BODDINGTON 1991-1994

LTCOL R.J. WOMACK 1994-1996  
MAJ H.N. SMITH 1996-PRESENT

### **3RD BATTALION, 23RD MARINE REGIMENT**

LTCOL H.O. SWANEY JR 1965-1967  
LTCOL H.A. LOONEY 1967-1969  
LTCOL H.R. MORRIS 1970-1971  
LTCOL W.S. CHAPMAN 1972-1973  
LTCOL R.M. FOWLER 1973-1974  
LTCOL H.R. MCPIKE 1975-1976  
LTCOL W.J. BIENVENU 1976-1977  
LTCOL B.M. WAGNER 1977-1979  
MAJ J.M. PYLE 1979-1979  
LTCOL J.M. PYLE 1980-1981  
LTCOL A.C. HARVEY 1981-1983  
LTCOL J.D. WATSON 1983-1984  
LTCOL T.W. MCANINCH 1985-1986  
LTCOL W.R. WHITTINGTON 1986-1989  
LTCOL R.C. DAWSON 1989-1991  
LTCOL J.B. PETERSON 1991-1993  
LTCOL K.M. KOBELL 1993-1995  
LTCOL J.L. PHILLIPS 1995-PRESENT

### **1ST BATTALION 24TH MARINE REGIMENT**

LTCOL M.B. STANLEY 1961-1963  
LTCOL H.N. THOMPSON 1963-1966  
LTCOL A.E. COFER 1966-1968  
LTCOL J.H. BEMIS 1968-1970  
LTCOL N.J. SMITH 1970-1972  
LTCOL F.L. MARANGON 1972-1975  
LTCOL R.H. WAKEFIELD 1975-1977  
LTCOL R.L. YARMY 1977-1980  
LTCOL R.S. KULCZYCKI 1980-1982  
LTCOL K.D. MARSHALL 1982-1984  
LTCOL C.W. BROWN 1984-1986  
LTCOL H.V.B. KLINE III 1986-1988

LTCOL A.B. DAVIS 1988-1991  
LTCOL R.B. RACLAU 1991-1993  
LTCOL M.K. HUGHES 1993-1995  
LTCOL D.H. MCELREATH 1995-PRESENT

**2ND BATTALION, 24TH MARINE REGIMENT**

LTCOL J.M. FRISBIE 1966-1966  
LTCOL J.C. GORDY JR 1966-1968  
LTCOL J.F. OBRIEN 1968-1969  
LTCOL C. SANGALIS 1969-1972  
LTCOL N.B. PATBERG 1972-1974  
LTCOL C.B. ERICKSON 1974-1975  
LTCOL L.P. MAGILLIGAN 1976-1978  
LTCOL M.J. WATERS 1978-1979  
LTCOL M.G. LIPSCOMB 1979-1981  
LTCOL G.F. BRAUN 1982-1983  
LTCOL B.E. HILL 1983-1984  
LTCOL D.D. PIERCE 1984-1986  
LTCOL S.M. ENGELHARDT 1986-1988  
LTCOL J.S. VINTAR 1988-1990  
LTCOL F.A. JOHNSON III 1990-1993  
LTCOL J. FORNEY 1994-1996  
LTCOL D.K. HAGOOD 1996-PRESENT

**3RD BATTALION, 24TH MARINE REGIMENT**

LTCOL J.E. JACKSON 1965-1965  
LTCOL P.J. BOOGHERTS 1966-1966  
LTCOL W.B. HAYNES 1967-1967  
MAJ J.D. KEAST 1967-1968  
LTCOL J.D. KEAST 1969-1971  
MAJ E.K. KIEFNER 1971-1972  
LTCOL E.K. KIEFNER 1973-1974  
LTCOL J.W. VOWELL 1974-1976  
LTCOL H.C. ROBERSON 1977-1977  
LTCOL J.P. CARMAN 1978-1979  
LTCOL D.S. BILLIK 1979-1981  
LTCOL J.D. REECE 1981-1983  
LTCOL S.F. LAMPO 1983-1985  
LTCOL G.W. JOHNSON 1985-1986

LTCOL J.W. GORDON JR 1986-1988  
LTCOL R.J. WADLE 1988-1990  
LTCOL W.G. GRIEVE 1990-1990  
LTCOL R.G. GUILLIAMS 1990-1992  
LTCOL R.L. HUDON 1992-1994  
LTCOL W.F. CALLOPY 1994-1996  
LTCOL B.R. GRATHWOHL 1996-PRESENT

**1ST BATTALION, 25TH MARINE REGIMENT**

LTCOL P.W. GLOVER 1965-1967  
LTCOL H.N. FEIST 1967-1969  
LTCOL R.R. BAGLEY 1969-1971  
LTCOL G.S. AMES 1971-1973  
LTCOL R.H. SHORTSLEEVE 1973-1975  
LTCOL J.J. SALETTES 1975-1977  
LTCOL F.P. REIDY 1977-1979  
LTCOL R.N. HOEHN 1979-1981  
LTCOL E.H. COYLE 1981-1984  
LTCOL J.E. FLANAGAN 1984-1986  
LTCOL E.F. MURPHY 1986-1989  
LTCOL S.M. MC CARTNEY 1989-1991  
LTCOL C.W. WOOD 1991-1993  
LTCOL J.J. MOORE 1993-1995  
LTCOL K.T. MURPHY 1995-PRESENT

**2ND BATTALION, 25TH MARINE REGIMENT**

LTCOL J.S. KNAR 1965-1967  
LTCOL L.P. FLYNN 1968-1969  
LTCOL R.H. CAREY 1970-1972  
LTCOL J.L. FOWLER 1972-1974  
LTCOL M.J. KELLY 1974-1974  
LTCOL S.L. OLIVIERI 1974-1976  
LTCOL L. RAGOSTA 1976-1978  
LTCOL M.J. KELLY 1978-1979  
LTCOL P.J. GARVEY 1980-1980  
LTCOL W.H. COOK JR 1980-1982  
LTCOL J.J. CASSIDY JR 1982-1985  
LTCOL K.P. BROOKS 1985-1987  
LTCOL S.A. GLAZER 1987-1989

LTCOL C.R. BLAICH 1989-1991  
LTCOL R.J. STACY 1991-1993  
LTCOL J.J. CARROLL 1993-1995  
LTCOL T.L. MIJA 1995-1996  
LTCOL M.L. KLINE 1996-PRESENT

### **3RD BATTALION, 25TH MARINE REGIMENT**

LTCOL T.E. MC QUAY 1965-1967  
LTCOL R.H. ICKE 1967-1969  
LTCOL G.A. DICKERSON 1969-1971  
LTCOL A.J. DOWD JR 1971-1974  
LTCOL W.H. BEYER 1974-1976  
MAJ J.J. GANNON 1976-1976  
LTCOL J.J. GANNON 1977-1978  
MAJ M. GLASGOW 1978-1980  
LTCOL A.R. MILLETT 1980-1981  
LTCOL F.P. WILBOURNE III 1982-1983  
LTCOL J.S. HERAK 1983-1984  
LTCOL D.M. MC CARTHY 1984-1986  
LTCOL L.E. DECHANT 1986-1988  
LTCOL S.E. CONLEY 1988-1990  
LTCOL J.E. CODREA 1991-1991  
LTCOL R.F. MC CULLOUGH 1992-1993  
LTCOL J.M. SEVOLD 1993-1995  
LTCOL D.M. WELCH 1995-PRESENT

### **1ST BATTALION, 14TH MARINE REGIMENT**

LTCOL J.J. JUDY 1965-1966  
LTCOL C.D. BINGHAM 1966-1969  
LTCOL R.E. MADORY 1969-1971  
LTCOL G.F. CIAMPA 1971-1973  
LTCOL H.R. DELKESKAMP 1973-1976  
LTCOL G.W. HINKLE 1976-1978  
LTCOL W.M. SCHRAMM 1978-1980  
LTCOL J.S. ELEKES 1980-1982  
LTCOL W.H. ALLEY 1982-1985  
LTCOL J.A. GRAHAM 1985-1985  
LTCOL R.B. WRIGHT 1986-1986  
LTCOL G.R. KLEMMER 1986-1988

LTCOL G.A. MARACCHINI 1988-1990  
LTCOL R.J. STUDEBAKER 1990-1992  
LTCOL K.P. HART 1992-1994  
LTCOL T.J. KAMINSKI 1994-PRESENT

### **2ND BATTALION, 14TH MARINE REGIMENT**

LTCOL R.T. PATTERSON 1965-1965  
MAJ H.L. LAND JR 1965-1968  
LTCOL C.G. SMITH JR 1968-1969  
LTCOL H.L. LAND JR 1969-1970  
LTCOL C.S. JACKSON 1970-1972  
LTCOL H.F. BARNES 1972-1975  
LTCOL H.R. CURTIS 1975-1976  
LTCOL W.M. BISHOP 1977-1979  
LTCOL C.E. ZACHARY 1979-1981  
LTCOL W.R. RICE 1982-1983  
LTCOL C.R. VROOMAN 1983-1985  
LTCOL T.E. CHANDLER 1985-1987  
LTCOL B.J. ENGLISH 1987-1989  
LTCOL L.B. COPELAND 1989-1991  
LTCOL H.T. WILLIAMS 1991-1992  
LTCOL P.D. VETETO 1992-1994  
LTCOL K.T. POOLE 1994-1996  
LTCOL M.A. WORKMAN 1996-PRESENT

### **3RD BATTALION, 14TH MARINE REGIMENT**

LTCOL J.L. WORRILOW 1961-1965  
LTCOL E. BRYDON 1966-1968  
LTCOL J.A. MALLOY JR 1968-1970  
LTCOL J.P. DALY III 1970-1972  
LTCOL D.S. MANVEL 1972-1974  
LTCOL E.F. JANNEY JR 1975-1976  
LTCOL F.P. ORLANDO 1977-1978  
LTCOL M.R. GARDNER 1978-1981  
LTCOL R.G. QUINN 1981-1983  
LTCOL D.F. CAREY JR 1983-1985  
LTCOL R.E. LYMAN 1985-1987  
LTCOL P.J. SHIMONIS 1987-1989  
LTCOL J.D. GORIAN 1989-1991

LTCOL G.A. PATTERSON 1991-1993  
LTCOL J.H. MEARS 1993-1995  
LTCOL H.R. PHILLIPS 1995-PRESENT

#### **4TH BATTALION, 14TH MARINE REGIMENT**

MAJ F.O. BURGE 1965-1965  
LTCOL F.O. BURGE 1966-1967  
LTCOL T.A. SIMPSON 1967-1969  
LTCOL J.T. FORD JR 1969-1972  
LTCOL G.H. TOTTON 1972-1973  
LTCOL R.S. HANLEY 1973-1975  
LTCOL R.M. CONDREY 1975-1977  
LTCOL J.G. COOPER 1977-1979  
LTCOL W.M. KEAL 1979-1981  
LTCOL J.W. WILSON 1981-1983  
LTCOL J.L. BROWN 1983-1985  
LTCOL J.B. WILKES 1985-1986  
LTCOL J.W. HILL 1987-1988  
LTCOL J.E. SAWYER 1988-1990  
LTCOL J.T. RAGSDAL 1990-1991  
LTCOL T.O. WILSON 1991-1993  
LTCOL H.T. WILLIAMS 1993-1994  
LTCOL T.V. COLELLA 1994-1996  
LTCOL J.T. GILBERT 1996-PRESENT

#### **3RD FIELD ARTILLERY GROUP**

*(Redesignated 5/14 in 1979)*

COL J.W. BURKARD 1967-1969  
LTCOL L.M. HOWARD 1970-1972  
COL J.H. GOSE 1972-1974  
COL J.L. TIAGO, JR 1974-1976  
COL H.R. MORRIS 1976-1978  
COL G.R. KILLAM 1978-1978

#### **5TH BATTALION, 14TH MARINE REGIMENT**

LTCOL G.R. KILLAM 1979-1980  
LTCOL R.D. MAHONEY 1980-1982  
LTCOL R.E. STOVER 1982-1984  
LTCOL R.B. WRIGHT 1984-1985  
LTCOL J.A. GRAHAM 1986-1987

LTCOL D.C. YORCK 1987-1989  
LTCOL R.A. ANDRES 1989-1990  
LTCOL R.A. SHAGEN 1990-1993  
LTCOL P.W. BLOOM 1993-1995  
LTCOL R.E. FOULK 1995-PRESENT

#### **4TH ASSAULT AMPHIBIAN VEHICLE BATTALION**

LTCOL W.W. DUTTON 1965-1968  
LTCOL W.H. BERRY III 1968-1970  
LTCOL E.T. KOCH 1970-1973  
LTCOL R.A. STIGLITZ 1973-1974  
LTCOL W.A. HAYWARD 1974-1977  
LTCOL W.J. LOHMAN 1977-1979  
LTCOL C. FAKNELL 1979-1981  
LTCOL W.V. BUNKER 1981-1983  
LTCOL J. EVERETT 1983-1985  
LTCOL R.W. JOHNSON 1985-1987  
LTCOL R.O. RUMBLE 1987-1989  
LTCOL R.L. URBAN 1989-1991  
LTCOL J.M. LANAHAH 1991-1993  
LTCOL R.E. WARD 1993-1995  
LTCOL J.W. SAPUTO 1995-PRESENT

#### **4TH COMBAT ENGINEER BATTALION**

LTCOL N.A. CANZONA 1965-1966  
LTCOL M. SHAW 1966-1971  
LTCOL C.M. SCHMIEG 1971-1971  
MAJ J.C. BEAZELL 1971-1972  
LTCOL W.R. BOSLEY 1972-1975  
LTCOL R.B.D. CRAWFORD 1975-1976  
MAJ H.R. SULLIVAN 1976-1977  
LTCOL R.E. NIPPARD 1977-1979  
LTCOL A.F. SCHUSTER 1979-1981  
LTCOL H.R. SULLIVAN 1981-1983  
LTCOL W.M. KERR 1983-1985  
LTCOL M.C. HICKEY JR 1985-1987  
LTCOL M.W. HENIG 1987-1989  
COL W.E. SANDERS 1989-1991  
COL G.W. ENDERS 1991-1993

LTCOL T.M. COOK 1993-1995  
LTCOL R.B. TURPIN 1995-PRESENT

#### **6TH COMMUNICATION BATTALION**

LTCOL J.J. CAMPBELL 1965-1967  
LTCOL A.L. GALDI 1967-1969  
LTCOL C.F. DONOHUE 1969-1971  
LTCOL V.B. LASALA 1971-1972  
LTCOL R.P. WEINBERG 1972-1973  
LTCOL S.A. FRITZ 1973-1976  
LTCOL D.J. MILOSCIA 1976-1978  
LTCOL R.W. PAINTER 1978-1979  
LTCOL T.L. PRISTAVEL 1979-1982  
LTCOL L.E. CHERICO 1982-1984  
LTCOL E.H. KROPP 1984-1986  
LTCOL K.M. DOYLE 1986-1988  
LTCOL J.R. JELINSKI, JR 1988-1990  
LTCOL J.J. NEWMAN 1990-1992  
LTCOL R.B. ST CLAIR 1992-1994  
LTCOL RAUSA 1994-1996  
LTCOL NEUBEAUR 1996-PRESENT

#### **4TH LIGHT ARMORED RECONNAISSANCE BATTALION**

LTCOL T.G. ANDERSON 1987-1990  
LTCOL T.E. CUNNINGHAM 1990-1992  
LTCOL M.J. CONRAD 1992-1994  
LTCOL R.W. GITTINGS 1994-1996  
LTCOL M.M. WALKER 1996-PRESENT

#### **4TH TANK BATTALION**

LTCOL R.W. QUINT 1965-1966  
LTCOL F.M. BATES 1966-1969  
LTCOL R.E. KING 1969-1972  
LTCOL J.J. KRASOVICH 1973-1973  
LTCOL R.D. BECKER 1974-1975  
LTCOL E.N. PIPER 1977-1978  
LTCOL R.C. DETWEILER 1980-1980  
LTCOL M.F. EDDY 1980-1983  
LTCOL M.I. NEIL 1983-1984  
LTCOL J.M. KAHENY 1985-1986

LTCOL C.O. LANE 1986-1988  
LTCOL J. R. PIERCE 1988-1991  
LTCOL T. L. GHARST 1991-1993  
LTCOL F. M. THOMASON 1993-1995  
LTCOL D.D. STANLEY 1995-PRESENT

#### **8TH TANK BATTALION**

LTCOL J.E. KAISH 1967-1969  
LTCOL H.J. BOGAN 1970-1972  
LTCOL J.W. ANSLOW 1972-1974  
LTCOL G. GANNON JR. 1975-1976  
LTCOL J.P. CASEY 1977-1978  
LTCOL W.E. WEAN 1978-1979  
LTCOL J.R. VOGEL 1980-1983  
LTCOL P.W. O'BRIEN 1983-1985  
LTCOL R.F. VAN HORNE 1985-1986  
LTCOL G.B. FELTNER 1986-1989  
LTCOL M.D. CAVALLARO 1989-1991  
LTCOL D.A. MORGA 1991-1993  
LTCOL C.C. HILSDORF 1993-1995  
LTCOL M.R. PANNELL 1995-PRESENT

#### **4TH RECONNAISSANCE BATTALION**

LTCOL L.C. MARTIN 1965-1966  
LTCOL O.L. GRISHAM 1967-1969  
LTCOL J.G. STEELE, JR 1969-1971  
LTCOL W.H. STROMAN 1971-1972  
LTCOL R.W. HARWOOD 1972-1975  
LTCOL T.R. HORTON 1975-1977  
LTCOL R.G. BEAN 1977-1979  
LTCOL G.S. KENDRICK 1979-1981  
LTCOL J.H. McCUISTION 1981-1983  
LTCOL A.S. REYNA 1983-1985  
LTCOL J.D. COATS JR 1985-1987  
LTCOL J.J. PRESTON 1987-1989  
LTCOL W.L. STARNES 1989-1991  
LTCOL D.C. FARINA 1991-1993  
LTCOL C.L. HUBBARD III 1993-1995  
LTCOL J.C. ANDRUS 1995-PRESENT

## **Inspector-Instructor List 4th Marine Division**

### **HEADQUARTERS, 23RD MARINE REGIMENT**

CAPT C.W. FARNI 1963-1965  
MAJ C.E. TEAGUE 1965-1967  
MAJ F.A. KARKER 1967-1969  
LTCOL J.F. SCHEFERMAN 1988-1992  
MAJ M.J. WARREN 1992-1992  
MAJ T. DUMS 1992-1993  
LTCOL M.P. NOLAN 1993-1996  
MAJ O.R. RICHEY 1996-PRESENT

### **1ST BATTALION, 23RD MARINE REGIMENT**

LTCOL MOORE 1967-1969  
LTCOL L. CHARRON 1969-1971  
LTCOL FRY 1971-1973  
COL RAPP 1973-1974  
LTCOL D. CARTWRIGHT 1974-1979  
LTCOL CLOSE 1979-1981  
LTCOL J. HENDRICKS 1981-1984  
LTCOL H. LANGDON 1984-1988  
LTCOL NEALEY 1988-1992  
LTCOL T. MINOR 1992-1994  
LTCOL R. LARSEN 1994-1996  
LTCOL R. WEINERS 1996-PRESENT

### **2ND BATTALION, 23RD MARINE REGIMENT**

LTCOL A.I. LEIDY 1965-1966  
LTCOL V.T. BLAZ 1966-1969  
LTCOL R.T. SMITH 1969-1972  
LTCOL G.X. MCKENNA 1972-1976  
LTCOL P.E. SHAW 1976-1978  
LTCOL F.J. LENNARTZ 1978-1983  
LTCOL T.G. NULTY 1983-1986  
LTCOL T.H. HALL 1986-1987  
LTCOL H.W. PETERSON 1987-1989  
LTCOL B.L. FAUNCE 1989-1993  
LTCOL D.R. SCHATTLE 1993-1995  
LTCOL W.W. SIMMONS 1995-PRESENT

### **3RD BATTALION, 23RD MARINE REGIMENT**

LTCOL J.H. FLOOD 1965-1966  
LTCOL J.B. RYCKMAN 1966-1968  
LTCOL T.L. SULLIVAN 1968-1970  
LTCOL P.D. REISSNER, JR 1970-1973  
LTCOL G.A. KNUDSON 1973-1975  
LTCOL R.B. ALEXANDER 1975-1977  
CAPT A.J. BROADSTONE 1977-1977  
LTCOL R.A. ROSS 1977-1981  
LTCOL J.M. STRICKLAND 1981-1984  
LTCOL W.C. BLAHA 1984-1987  
LTCOL T.H. TIMBERLAKE, JR 1987-1990  
LTCOL R.L. HAYES III 1990-1993  
LTCOL R.W. KOKKO 1993-1995  
LTCOL S.C. CARPENTER 1995-PRESENT

### **HEADQUARTERS, 24TH MARINE REGIMENT**

LTCOL R.K. YOUNG 1980-1981  
LTCOL K.W. MOORE 1982-1984  
LTCOL D.M. KRUSE 1984-1987  
LTCOL D.M. KRUSE 1984-1987  
LTCOL J.C. BRADDY 1987-1990  
LTCOL W.M. MEADE 1993-1996  
LTCOL R.J. KNAPP 1996-PRESENT

### **1ST BATTALION, 24TH MARINE REGIMENT**

LTCOL F.R. WYCOFF 1960-1964  
LTCOL W.H. DRAPER 1964-1967  
LTCOL E.Z. GRABOWSKI 1967-1969  
MAJ W.R. IRWIN 1969-1972  
LTCOL J.B. KNOTTS 1972-1975  
CAPT N.C. YOUNGSTROM 1975-1975  
LTCOL T.L. YOUNGMAN 1975-1978  
LTCOL R.D. HUGHES 1978-1982  
LTCOL J.H. DAVIS 1982-1985  
LTCOL R.M. WENZELL 1985-1988  
LTCOL C.R. THOMAS 1988-1992

LTCOL R.M. SCOTT 1992-1995

LTCOL M.T. EDWARDS 1995-PRESENT

**2ND BATTALION, 24TH MARINE REGIMENT**

LTCOL R.H. DURNING 1965-1966

LTCOL T.C. SMITH 1967-1968

LTCOL W.M. WILLS 1969-1970

LTCOL C. SANGALIS 1970-1972

MAJ D.E. MILONE 1973-1973

LTCOL R.D. KELLY 1973-1974

LTCOL R.R. THRASHER 1974-1977

LTCOL W.R. HUF 1977-1980

LTCOL B.D. MOORE 1981-1983

LTCOL C.D. CROSS 1983-1985

CAPT G.L. HALL 1985-1985

LTCOL M.R. WELLS 1985-1986

LTCOL T.L. PAUL 1986-1988

LTCOL E.J. HAGAN III 1988-1991

LTCOL R.D. ROGERS 1992-1993

LTCOL J.M. LOWE 1993-1995

LTCOL T.A. GRAY 1995-PRESENT

**3RD BATTALION, 24TH MARINE REGIMENT**

LTCOL H.J. JOHNSON 1965-1965

LTCOL M.E. GEORGE 1965-1967

LTCOL H.J. CONLIN 1967-1968

LTCOL B.W. PETERKA 1969-1972

LTCOL A.A. LAPORTE 1972-1975

LTCOL B.H. LANDIS JR 1975-1978

LTCOL R.J. GRUENBERG 1978-1981

LTCOL J.S. ZDANOWSKI 1981-1984

LTCOL R.J. MORGAN 1984-1987

LTCOL L.F. PARSONS 1987-1991

LTCOL D.A. KING 1991-1993

LTCOL R.L. HUMPHREY 1993-1995

LTCOL E.E. HICKSON 1995-PRESENT

**HEADQUARTERS, 25TH MARINE REGIMENT**

LTCOL F.M. KAUFFMAN 1974-1977

LTCOL J.L. KERSHNER 1977-1980

MAJ W.E. DEESE 1980-1984

LTCOL G.S. CONVERSE 1984-1987

LTCOL R.A. BEAUDOIN 1987-1990

LTCOL A.J. KARLE 1990-1994

LTCOL J.A. BASS 1994-PRESENT

**1ST BATTALION, 25TH MARINE REGIMENT**

LTCOL W.K. ROCKY 1965-1966

LTCOL E.F. FITZGERALD 1966-1969

LTCOL J.C. GOODIN 1969-1972

LTCOL F.P. KNIGHT 1972-1975

LTCOL W.F. HURLEY 1975-1981

LTCOL W.E. HEALEY 1981-1984

LTCOL R. NEGRON, JR. 1984-1987

LTCOL R.R. BURKE 1987-1989

LTCOL M.E. SCHAFFER 1989-1980

MAJ H.M. HOPPER 1990-1991

CAPT M.R. BANNING 1991-1991

LTCOL M. MONTEZ 1991-1993

LTCOL J.E. ROGERS III 1993-1995

LTCOL V.R. LEONE, JR. 1995-PRESENT

**2ND BATTALION, 25 MARINE REGIMENT**

LTCOL C.M. MOSHER 1965-1967

MAJ W.H. NULTY 1967-1970

LTCOL R.A. BECERRA, JR. 1970-1973

LTCOL R.F. ARMSTRONG 1973-1976

LTCOL P.V. BARRA 1976-1979

LTCOL W.R. ABELE, JR. 1979-1982

LTCOL P.V. BARRA 1982-1985

LTCOL G.M. MALONE 1985-1988

LTCOL J.M. WIRE 1988-1991

LTCOL R.M. CARROLL 1991-1993

LTCOL J.S. SWIFT 1993-1995

LTCOL W.T. DECAMP III 1995-PRESENT

**3RD BATTALION, 25 MARINE REGIMENT**

LTCOL J.R. HEPPERT 1965-1967

LTCOL J.R.A. REHFUS 1967-1970

LTCOL W.D. THOMPSON 1970-1973

LTCOL N.H. SMITH 1973-1975

LTCOL R. V. HUNT 1975-1977

LTCOL O. D. HOWE III 1977-1980  
LTCOL T. M. TRESCHUK 1980-1984  
LTCOL M. J. BARNES 1984-1987  
LTCOL E. D. BRINDLE 1987-1990  
LTCOL T. A. BAILY 1990-1992  
LTCOL K. L. STEVENS 1992-1994  
LTCOL D. M. WINN 1994-1996  
LTCOL C. T. PATRANCE 1996-PRESENT

#### **HEADQUARTERS, 14TH MARINE REGIMENT**

LTCOL J.R. DUCKWORTH 1966-1967  
LTCOL D.T. BOND 1967-1968  
COL J.F. SPANGLER 1968-1969  
MAJ B.G. PEARSON 1970-1973  
LTCOL C.P. ROWLANDS 1973-1974  
LTCOL K.F. JOHNSON JR 1974-1976  
LTCOL M.H. WATERBURY III 1977-1979  
LTCOL G.B. ERWIN 1979-1981  
MAJ C. PARDO 1982-1983  
MAJ C.R. RASOR 1983-1986  
CAPT W.L. SMITH III 1986-1986  
LTCOL W.D. MAXON 1987-1989  
LTCOL U.S. GRANT 1989-1991  
LTCOL J. MOISUK JR 1992-1995  
LTCOL W.C. SCHMICK JR 1995-PRESENT

#### **1ST BATTALION, 14TH MARINE REGIMENT**

LTCOL R.E. KNAPP JR 1965-1966  
LTCOL C.D. BINGHAM 1966-1969  
LTCOL R.E. MADORY 1969-1970  
LTCOL E.A. CONDON JR 1971-1973  
LTCOL R.W. BOLVES 1974-1976  
LTCOL T.R. MCELROY 1976-1978  
MAJ A.D. NASTRI 1978-1979  
LTCOL J.S. ELEKES 1980-1982  
LTCOL J.F. PERRY 1982-1984  
LTCOL R.A. PRYOR 1984-1985  
LTCOL J.E. CLANCY 1985-1986  
LTCOL G.H. KERR 1986-1988  
LTCOL L.W. SMITH III 1988-1990

LTCOL M.A. GISH 1990-1992  
LTCOL M.J. ADAMS 1992-1993  
LTCOL J.J. DEFRANCO 1993-1994  
LTCOL R.W. STRAHAN 1995-PRESENT

#### **2ND BATTALION, 14TH MARINE REGIMENT**

COL R.T. PATTERSON 1965-1965  
MAJ H.L. LAND, JR 1965-1968  
LTCOL C.G. SMITH, JR 1968-1969  
LTCOL H.L. LAND, JR 1969-1970  
LTCOL C.S. JACKON 1970-1972  
LTCOL H.F. BARNES 1973-1975  
LTCOL H.R. CURTIS 1975-1976  
LTCOL M.H. WATERBURY III 1977-1979  
LTCOL G.B. ERWIN 1979-1983  
LTCOL G.B. ERWIN 1982-1983  
LTCOL J.J. DAVID 1983-1985  
LTCOL J.F. RIZY 1985-1987  
LTCOL R.D. PILCHER 1987-1990  
LTCOL M.P. PERRY 1990-1991  
LTCOL C.G. DAHL 1994-1994  
LTCOL J.A. ROBERTS 1994-1996  
LTCOL G.M. STOLAR 1996-PRESENT

#### **3RD BATTALION, 14TH MARINE REGIMENT**

LTCOL J.P. CROWLEY 1965-1965  
LTCOL J.K. GASTROCK III 1965-1966  
LTCOL W.J. SPIESEL 1966-1968  
LTCOL S.G. SHAFER 1969-1971  
LTCOL J.W. SCHWANTES 1972-1972  
LTCOL J.M. COCKEY 1973-1976  
LTCOL R.L. REUTER 1977-1978  
LTCOL C.W. MURRAY 1979-1981  
LTCOL P.R. AADNESEN 1981-1982  
LTCOL P.R. HARPER 1982-1985  
LTCOL F.J. MCGRATH, JR 1985-1987  
LTCOL J.P. HICKMAN 1987-1990  
LTCOL R.J. GRAVS 1990-1993  
LTCOL D.L. SICKINGER 1993-1995  
LTCOL M.E. CLARK 1995-PRESENT

**4TH BATTALION, 14TH MARINE REGIMENT**

MAJ D. PREGNAL 1947-1949  
MAJ M. HOOPER 1949-1952  
LTCOL J. E. KING 1952-1954  
LTCOL E. E. ALLEN 1954-1958  
LTCOL S. L. GRIGSBY 1958-1962  
MAJ R. W. DITMAR 1962-1963  
1ST LT G. W. GORE 1963-1963  
MAJ R. B. METCALFE 1963-1966  
MAJ D. H. BALIUS 1966-1969  
MAJ J. B. WAY 1969-1970  
MAJ R. E. PFRIMMER 1970-1972  
LTCOL J. B. CANTIENY 1972-1976  
LTCOL H. L. RICHEY 1976-1980  
LTCOL J. D. PHILLIPS 1980-1983  
LTCOL H. L. HELMS 1983-1986  
CAPT J. A. CRAWFORD 1986-1986  
LTCOL J. L. SACHTLEBEN 1986-1989  
LTCOL R. WOLF 1989-1992  
LTCOL S. W. WADE 1992-1993  
LTCOL J. R. BUCHANAN 1993-1995  
LTCOL J. L. BACON 1995-PRESENT

**5TH BATTALION, 14TH MARINE REGIMENT**

LTCOL J.D. MCNAMARA 1978-1979  
LTCOL F.L. CAPIN 1979-1981  
LTCOL V. GIANNELLI 1982-1983  
LTCOL J.E. CLANCY 1983-1985  
LTCOL R.A. PRYOR 1986-1987  
LTCOL T.J. ETSSELL 1987-1990  
LTCOL S.P. WATSON 1990-1992  
LTCOL W.L. HINZMAN 1992-1993  
LTCOL R.K. ROTHHELL 1993-1995  
LTCOL M.A. CAGIANO 1995-1996  
LTCOL D.W. ANDERSON 1996-PRESENT

**4TH ASSAULT AMPHIBIAN VEHICLE BATTALION**

LTCOL W.W. DUTTON, JR 1965-1968  
LTCOL W.H. BERRY III 1968-1970  
LTCOL D.C. BIEGER 1970-1972

LTCOL J.M. HEY 1973-1975  
LTCOL J.B. LEGGE 1976-1977  
LTCOL B.R. DELROSE 1978-1979  
LTCOL J.J. BRUCE 1979-1983  
LTCOL L.D. ALEXANDER 1983-1985  
LTCOL K.L. PRIESTLEY 1985-1988  
LTCOL L.D. GEARHART 1988-1990  
LTCOL M.W. SULLIVAN 1990-1991  
LTCOL J.C. KOEN 1991-1993  
LTCOL T.W. MCGOWAN 1993-1995  
LTCOL M. FREITAS 1995-1997  
LTCOL G.H. ROBY 1997-PRESENT

**4TH COMBAT ENGINEER BATTALION**

LTCOL L. CASSEDY 1968-1970  
LTCOL J.M. BUTLER 1971-1973  
LTCOL W.E. PHELPS 1973-1976  
LTCOL K.P. MILLICE 1977-1979  
LTCOL C.A. SAKOWICZ 1979-1980  
LTCOL J.S. WALKER 1980-1983  
LTCOL T.L. KOSCIA 1983-1985  
LTCOL R.I. EDWARDS 1985-1987  
LTCOL K.D. PRICER 1987-1988  
LTCOL F.C. WINTER 1988-1990  
LTCOL D.C. KLEVENO 1990-1992  
LTCOL E.J. MAGUIRE 1992-1993  
LTCOL M.T. PERRY 1993-1995  
LTCOL S.E. FERGUSON 1995-PRESENT

**6TH COMMUNICATION BATTALION**

MAJ L.W. D'ALESSANDRO -1965  
LTCOL D.D. KELLEY, JR 1965-1968  
LTCOL D.L. LINDEMUTH 1968-1970  
LTCOL C.K. BRESLAUER 1970-1972  
CAPT J.D. QUINN 1972-1972  
LTCOL F.J. BADAMO 1972-1975  
LTCOL R.D. BURNETTE 1975-1978  
LTCOL J.L. NEYMAN 1978-1980  
MAJ E. LONG III 1980-1981  
LTCOL J.M. RODOSTA 1982-1984

LTCOL W.W. SAVONE 1987-1989  
LTCOL T.G. HARLEMAN 1989-1991  
LTCOL K.B. JORDAN 1993-1995  
LTCOL L. KUBOW 1995-PRESENT

#### **4TH LIGHT ARMORED RECONNAISSANCE BATTALION**

LTCOL T.A. BROWNE 1987-1990  
LTCOL F. H. WOLFROM 1990-1993  
LTCOL L. W. ROLLINS 1993-1995  
LTCOL T. L. TYRRELL 1995-PRESENT

#### **4TH TANK BATTALION**

LTCOL W.R. COLLINS 1947-1948  
LTCOL A. SWINCESKI 1948-1950  
LTCOL E.G. ROFF 1952-1954  
LTCOL J. MUNDAY 1954-1957  
LTCOL E.L. BALE 1957-1960  
LTCOL D. FOOS 1960-1963  
LTCOL J. HARNEY 1963-1965  
LTCOL W. MERRILL 1965-1967  
LTCOL C. ROSENFELD 1967-1970  
MAJ J. SOUDERS 1970-1973  
LTCOL E.R. LARSON 1973-1977  
LTCOL J.F. BUGBEE 1977-1980  
LTCOL E.P. O'NEIL 1980-1983  
LTCOL W.B. BLACKSHEAR 1983-1986  
LTCOL A.B. DIGGS 1986-1989  
LTCOL S.W. CHAMBERS 1989-1992  
LTCOL W.A. WRIGHT 1992-1995  
LTCOL J.F. HEMLEBEN 1995-PRESENT

#### **8TH TANK BATTALION.**

LTCOL E.S. BAKER 1966-1968  
MAJ E.F. KELLY 1968-1970  
MAJ L.A. GILDERSLEEVE 1970-1973  
LTCOL K.J. CHANDLER 1973-1976  
LTCOL J.J. SUCHA 1976-1979  
MAJ R.D. CASKEY 1979-1982  
LTCOL M.J. FERGUSON 1982-1985  
LTCOL W.R. BRIGNON 1985-1988

LTCOL M.A. SPURGEON 1988-1992  
LTCOL G.R. STEWART 1992-1995  
LTCOL J.M. MC NEAL 1995-PRESENT

#### **4TH RECONNAISSANCE BATTALION**

LTCOL L.C. MARTIN 1965-1966  
LTCOL O.L. GRISHAM 1967-1969  
LTCOL J.G. STEELE, JR 1969-1971  
LTCOL W.H. STROMAN 1971-1972  
LTCOL R.W. HARWOOD 1972-1975  
LTCOL A.L. LUMPKIN 1971-1975  
LTCOL R.H. OATES 1975-1978  
LTCOL G.F. RECZEK 1978-1981  
LTCOL W.G. MCBRIDE 1981-1983  
LTCOL J.U. ARROYO 1983-1986  
LTCOL M.J. TEIXEIRA 1986-1988  
LTCOL M.E. STAHL 1988-1990  
LTCOL F.W. SULTENFUSS 1990-1993  
LTCOL B. CASSIDY 1993-1995  
LTCOL M.A. KACHILLA 1995-PRESENT

# **Appendix D**

## **4th Marine Division Nucleus/Battle Staff**

**31 Dec 1996**

**COMMANDING GENERAL**  
BRIGADIER GENERAL F. R. LOPEZ

**SERGEANT MAJOR**  
SERGEANT MAJOR P. M. GANTE

### **NUCLEUS STAFF**

**CHIEF OF STAFF**

COLONEL R. M. WENZELL, JR

**ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-1**

MAJOR M. L. ROBERTS

**ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-3**

COLONEL H. T. WILLIAMS

**ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-4**

CAPTAIN R. THOMAS

**ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-6**

MAJOR R. A. HOFFMAN

### **BATTLE STAFF**

**CHIEF OF STAFF**

COLONEL W. P. HAVENSTEIN

**ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-1**

COLONEL R. L. URBAN

**ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-2**

COLONEL C. A. RODATZ

**ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-3**

COLONEL A. R. BACON, JR

**ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-4**

COLONEL P. A. KERR

**ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-5**

COLONEL J. B. PETERSON

**ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-6**

COLONEL M. G. MAYDAK

**ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-7**

COLONEL K. D. BUSHEY

**ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-8**

COLONEL J. C. FORNEY

**DIVISION CHAPLAIN**

CAPTAIN S. M. FREEMAN

**DIVISION SURGEON**

CAPTAIN D. S. SMITH

# **Appendix E**

## **4th Marine Division Medal of Honor Recipients**

### **Pfc. R. R. Anderson**

2/23 - Roi Island, Kwajalein Atoll, Marshall Islands - 01Feb44

### **LtCol. J. M. Chambers**

3/25 - Iwo Jima, Volcano Islands - 22Feb45

### **Sgt. D. S. Cole**

1/23 - Iwo Jima, Volcano Islands - 19Feb45

### **LtCol. A. J. Dyess**

1/24 - Namur Island, Kwajalein Atoll, Marshall Islands - 02Feb45

### **Sgt. R. F. Gray**

1/25 - Iwo Jima, Volcano Islands - 21Feb45

### **Pfc. D. T. Jacobson**

3/23 - Iwo Jima, Volcano Islands - 26Feb45

### **GySgt. R. H. McCard**

4th Tank Bn. - Saipan, Marianas Islands - 16Jun44

### **Capt. J. J. McCarthy**

2/24 - Iwo Jima, Volcano Islands - 21Feb45

### **Pvt. J. W. Ozbourn**

1/23 - Tinian Island, Marianas Islands - 30Jul44

### **PhM1/c F.J. Pierce**

2/24 - Iwo Jima - 15,16Mar45

### **1stLt. J. V. Power**

3/24 - Namur Island, Kwajalein Atoll, Marshall Islands - 01Feb44

### **Pvt. R. K. Sorenson**

3/24 - Namur Island, Kwajalein Atoll, Marshall Islands - 02Feb44

## ***Private First Class Richard Beatty Anderson, USMC***

*Unit: Co E, 2d Battalion, 23d Marines, 4th Marine Division*

*Birth: 26 June, 1921, Tacoma, Washington*

### ***Citation:***

*For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of his life above and beyond the call of duty while serving with the Fourth Marine Division during action against enemy Japanese forces on Roi Island, Kwajalein Atoll, Marshall Islands, 1 February 1944. Entering a shell crater occupied by three other Marines, Private First Class Anderson was preparing to throw a grenade at an enemy position, when it slipped from his hands and rolled toward the men at the bottom of the hole. With insufficient time to retrieve the armed weapon and throw it, Private First Class Anderson fearlessly chose to sacrifice himself and save his companions by hurling his body upon the grenade and taking the full impact of the explosion. His personal valor and exceptional spirit of loyalty, in the face of almost certain death, were in keeping with the highest traditions of the U.S. Naval Service. He gallantly gave his life for his country.*

## **Lieutenant Colonel Justice Marion Chambers, USMCR**

Unit: CO, 3d Battalion, 25th Marines, 4th Marine Division

Birth: 2 February 1908, Huntington, West Virginia

### **Citation:**

*For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of his life above and beyond the call of duty as Commanding Officer of the Third Assault Battalion Landing Team, Twenty-Fifth Marines, Fourth Marine Division, in action against enemy Japanese forces on Iwo Jima, Volcano Islands, from 19 to 22 February 1945. Under a furious barrage of enemy machine-gun and small-arms fire from the commanding cliffs on the right, Colonel Chambers, then Lieutenant Colonel, landed immediately after the initial assault waves of his Battalion on D-Day to find the momentum of the assault threatened by heavy casualties from withering Japanese artillery, mortar, rocket, machine-gun and rifle fire. Exposed to relentless hostile fire, he coolly reorganized his battle-weary men, inspiring them to heroic efforts by his own valor and leading them in an attack on the critical, impregnable high ground from which the enemy was pouring an increasing volume of fire directly onto troops ashore, as well as amphibious craft in succeeding waves. Constantly in the front line encouraging his men to push forward against the enemy's savage resistance, Colonel Chambers led the 8-hour battle to carry the flanking ridge top and reduce the enemy's fields of aimed fire, thus protecting the vital foot-hold gained. In constant defiance of hostile fire, while reconnoitering the entire Regimental Combat Team zone of action, he maintained contact with adjacent units and forwarded vital information to the Regimental Commander. His zealous fighting spirit undiminished, despite terrific casualties and the loss of most of his key officers, he again reorganized his troops for renewed attack against the enemy's main line of resistance and was directing the fire of the rocket platoon, when he fell, critically wounded. Evacuated under heavy Japanese fire, Colonel Chambers, by forceful leadership, courage and fortitude in the face of staggering odds, was directly instrumental in insuring the success of subsequent operations of the Fifth Amphibious Corps on Iwo Jima, thereby sustaining and enhancing the finest traditions of the United States Naval Service.*

## **Sergeant Darrell Samuel Cole, USMCR**

**Unit:** Co B, 1st Battalion, 23d Marines, 4th Marine Division

**Birth:** 20 July 1920, Flat River, Missouri

### **Citation:**

*For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of his life above and beyond the call of duty while serving as leader of a Machinegun Section of Company B, First Battalion, Twenty-third Marines, Fourth Marine Division, in action against enemy Japanese forces during the assault on Iwo Jima in the Volcano Islands, 19 February 1945. Assailed by a tremendous volume of small-arms, mortar and artillery fire as he advanced with one squad of his section in the initial assault wave, Sergeant Cole boldly led his men up the sloping beach toward Airfield No. 1 despite the blanketing curtain of flying shrapnel and, personally destroying with hand grenades two hostile emplacements which menaced the progress of his unit, continued to move forward until a merciless barrage of fire emanating from three Japanese pillboxes halted the advance. Instantly placing his one remaining machine in action, he delivered a shattering fusillade and succeeded in silencing the nearest and most threatening emplacement before his weapon jammed and the enemy, reopening fire with knee mortars and grenades, pinned down his unit for the second time. Shrewdly gaging the tactical situation and evolving a daring plan of counter-attack, Sergeant Cole, armed solely with a pistol and one grenade, coolly advanced alone to the hostile pillboxes. Hurling his one grenade at the enemy in sudden, swift attack, he quickly withdrew, returned to his own lines for additional grenades and again advanced, attacked, and withdrew. With the enemy guns still active, he ran the gauntlet of slashing fire a third time to complete the total destruction of the Japanese strong point and the annihilation of the defending garrison in this final assault. Although instantly killed by an enemy grenade as he returned to his squad, Sergeant Cole had eliminated a formidable Japanese position, thereby enabling his company to storm the remaining fortifications, continue the advance, and seize the objective. By his dauntless initiative, unfaltering courage, and indomitable determination during a critical period of action, Sergeant Cole served as an inspiration to his comrades, and his stout-hearted leadership in the face of almost certain death sustained and enhanced the highest tradition of the United States Naval Service. He gallantly gave his life for his country.*

## **Lieutenant Colonel Aquilla James Dyess, USMCR**

Unit: 1st Battalion, 24th Marines, 4th Marine Division

Birth: 11 January 1909, Augusta, Georgia

### **Citation:**

*For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of his life above and beyond the call of duty as Commanding Officer of the First Battalion, Twenty-fourth Marines, Reinforced, Fourth Marine Division, in action against enemy Japanese forces during the assault on Namur Island, Kwajalein Atoll, Marshall Islands, 1 and 2 February 1944. Undaunted by severe fire from automatic Japanese weapons, Lieutenant Colonel Dyess launched a powerful final attack on the second day of the assault, unhesitatingly posting himself between the opposing lines to point out objectives and avenues of approach and personally leading the advancing troops. Alert and determined to quicken the pace of the offensive against enemy fire, he was constantly at the head of advance units, inspiring his men to push forward until the Japanese had been driven back to a small center of resistance and victory assured. While standing on the parapet of an anti-tank trench directing a group of infantry in a flanking attack against the last enemy position, Lieutenant Colonel Dyess was killed by a burst of enemy machinegun fire. His daring and forceful leadership and his valiant fighting spirit in the face of terrific opposition were in keeping with the highest traditions of the United States Naval Service. He gallantly gave his life for his country.*

## **Sergeant Ross Franklin Gray, USMCR**

**Unit:** Co A, 1st Battalion, 25th Marines, 4th Marine Division

**Birth:** 1 August 1920, Marvel Valley, Alabama

### **Citation:**

*For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of his life above and beyond the call of duty as a Platoon Sergeant attached to Company A, First Battalion, Twenty-fifth Marines, Fourth Marine Division, in action against enemy Japanese forces on Iwo Jima, Volcano Islands, 21 February 1945. Shrewdly gaging the tactical situation when his platoon was held up by a sudden barrage of hostile grenades while advancing toward the high ground northeast of Airfield No. 1, Sergeant Gray promptly organized the withdrawal of his men from enemy grenade range, quickly moved forward alone to reconnoiter and discovered a heavily mined area extending along the front of a strong network of emplacements joined by covered trenches. Although assailed by furious gunfire, he cleared a path leading through the minefield to one of the fortifications, then returned to the platoon position and, informing his leader of the serious situation, volunteered to initiate an attack under cover of three fellow Marines. Alone and unarmed but carrying a huge satchel charge, he crept up on the Japanese emplacement, boldly hurled the short-fused explosive and sealed the entrance. Instantly taken under machinegun fire from a second entrance to the same position, he unhesitatingly braved the increasingly vicious fusillades to crawl back for another charge, returned to his objective and blasted the second opening, thereby demolishing the position. Repeatedly covering the ground between the savagely defended enemy fortifications and his platoon area, he systematically approached, attacked and withdrew under blanketing fire to destroy a total of six Japanese positions, more than 25 troops and a quantity of vital ordnance gear and ammunition. Stouthearted and indomitable, Sergeant Gray had singlehandedly overcome a strong enemy garrison and had completely disarmed a large minefield before finally rejoining his unit. By his great personal valor, daring tactics and tenacious perseverance in the face of extreme peril, he had contributed materially to the fulfillment of his company mission. His gallant conduct throughout enhanced and sustained the highest traditions of the United States Naval Service.*

## **Private First Class Douglas Thomas Jacobson, USMCR**

Unit: Co L, 3d Battalion, 23d Marines, 4th Marine Division

Birth: 25 November 1925, Rochester, New York

### **Citation:**

*For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of his life above and beyond the call of duty while serving with the 3d Battalion, 23d Marines, 4th Marine Division, in combat against enemy Japanese forces during the seizure of Iwo Jima in the Volcano Islands, 26 February 1945. Promptly destroying a stubborn 20mm antiaircraft gun and its crew after assuming the duties of a bazooka man who had been killed, Private First Class Jacobson waged a relentless battle as his unit fought desperately toward the summit of Hill 382 in an effort to penetrate the heart of Japanese cross-island defense. Employing his weapon with ready accuracy when his platoon was halted by overwhelming enemy fire on 26 February, he first destroyed two hostile machinegun positions, then attacked a large blockhouse, completely neutralizing the fortification before dispatching the five-man crew of a second pillbox and exploding the installation with a terrific demolitions blast. Moving steadily forward, he wiped out an earth-covered rifle emplacement and, confronted by a cluster of similar emplacements which constituted the perimeter of enemy defenses in his assigned sector, fearlessly advanced, quickly reduced all 6 positions to a shambles, killed 10 of the enemy, and enabled our forces to occupy the strong point. Determined to widen the breach thus forced, he volunteered his services to an adjacent assault company, neutralized a pillbox holding up its advance, opened fire on a Japanese tank pouring a steady stream of bullets on one of our supporting tanks, and smashing the enemy tank's gun turret in a brief but furious action culminating in a singlehanded assault against still another blockhouse and the subsequent neutralization of its firepower. By his dauntless skill and valor, PFC Jacobson destroyed a total of 16 enemy positions and annihilated approximately 75 Japanese, thereby contributing essentially to the success of his division's operations against this fanatically defended outpost of the Japanese Empire. His gallant conduct in the face of tremendous odds enhanced and sustained the highest traditions of the United States Naval Service.*

## **Gunnery Sergeant Robert Howard McCard, USMC**

**Unit:** Co A, 4th Tank Battalion, 4th Marine Division

**Birth:** 25 November 1918, Syracuse, New York

### **Citation:**

*For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of his life above and beyond the call of duty while serving as Platoon Sergeant of Company A, Fourth Tank Battalion, Fourth Marine Division, during the battle for enemy Japanese-held Saipan, Marianas Islands, on 16 June 1944. Cut off from the other units of his platoon when his tank was put out of action by a battery of enemy 77mm, guns, Gunnery Sergeant McCard carried on resolutely, bringing all the tank's weapons to bear on the enemy, until the severity of hostile fire caused him to order his crew out of the escape hatch while he courageously exposed himself to enemy guns by hurling hand grenades, in order to cover the evacuation of his men. Seriously wounded during this action and with his supply of grenades exhausted, Gunnery Sergeant McCard then dismantled one of the tank's machine guns and faced the Japanese for the second time to deliver vigorous fire into their positions, destroying 16 of the enemy but sacrificing himself to insure the safety of his crew. His valiant fighting spirit and supreme loyalty in the face of almost certain death reflect the highest credit upon Gunnery Sergeant McCard and the United States Naval Service. He gallantly gave his life for his country.*

## **Captain Joseph Jeremiah McCarthy, USMCR**

**Unit:** Co, Co G, 2d Battalion, 24th Marines, 4th Marine Division

**Birth:** 10 August 1911, Chicago, Illinois

### **Citation:**

*For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of his life above and beyond the call of duty as commanding officer of a rifle company attached to the 2d Battalion, 24th Marines, 4th Marine Division, in action against enemy Japanese forces during the seizure of Iwo Jima, Volcano Islands, on 21 February 1945. Determined to break through the enemy's cross-island defenses, Captain McCarthy acted on his own initiative when his company advance was held up by uninterrupted Japanese rifle, machinegun, and high-velocity 47mm. Fire during the approach to Motoyama Airfield No.2. Quickly organizing a demolitions and flamethrower team to accompany his picked rifle squad, he fearlessly led the way across 75 yards of fire-swept ground, charged a heavily fortified pillbox on the ridge of the front and, personally hurling hand grenades into the emplacement as he directed the combined operations of his small assault group, completely destroyed the hostile installation. Spotting two Japanese soldiers attempting an escape from a shattered pillbox, he boldly stood upright in full view of the enemy and dispatched both troops before advancing to a second emplacement under greatly intensified fire and then blasted the strong fortifications with a well-planned demolition attack. Subsequently entering the ruins, he found a Japanese taking aim at one of our men and, with alert presence of mind, jumped the enemy, disarmed and shot him with his own weapon. Then, intent on smashing through the narrow breach, he rallied the remainder of his company and pressed a full attack with furious aggressiveness until he had neutralized all resistance and captured the ridge. An inspiring leader and indomitable fighter. Captain McCarthy consistently disregarded all personal danger during the fierce conflict and, by his brilliant professional skill, daring tactics, and tenacious perseverance in the face of overwhelming odds, contributed materially to the success of his division's operations against this savagely defended outpost of the Japanese Empire. His cool decision and outstanding valor reflect the highest credit upon Captain McCarthy and enhance the finest traditions of the United States Naval Service.*

## **Private Joseph William Ozbourn, USMCR**

Unit: Co B, 1st Battalion, 23d Marines, 4th Marine Division

Birth: 24 October 1919, Herrin, Illinois

### **Citation:**

*For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of his life above and beyond the call of duty as a Browning Automatic Rifleman serving with the First Battalion, Twenty-third Marines, Fourth Marine Division, during the battle for enemy Japanese-held Tinian Island, Marianas Islands, 30 July 1944. As a member of a platoon assigned the mission of clearing the remaining Japanese troops from dugouts and pillboxes along a tree line, Private Ozbourn, flanked by two men on either side, was moving forward to throw an armed hand grenade into a dugout when a terrific blasts from the entrance severely wounded the four men and himself. Unable to throw the grenade into the dugout and with no place to hurl it without endangering the other men, Private Ozbourn unhesitatingly grasped it close too his body and fell upon it, sacrificing his own life to absorb the full impact of the explosion, but saving his comrades. His great personal valor and unwavering loyalty reflect the highest credit upon Private Ozbourn and the United States Naval Service. He gallantly gave his life for his country.*

## ***Pharmacist's Mate First Class Francis Junior Pierce, U.S. Navy***

**Unit:**        *Serving with 2d Battalion, 24th Marines, 4th Marine Division*

**Birth:**      *7 December 1924, Earlville, Iowa*

### ***Citation:***

*For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of his life, above and beyond the call of duty, while attached to the 2d Battalion, 24th Marines, 4th Marine Division, during the Iwo Jima campaign, 15 and 16 March 1945. Almost continuously under fire while carrying out the most dangerous volunteer assignments, Pierce gained valuable knowledge of the terrain and disposition of troops. Caught in heavy enemy rifle and machinegun fire which wounded a corpsman and 2 of the 8 stretcher bearers who were carrying 2 wounded Marines to a forward aid station on 15 March, Pierce quickly took charge of the party, carried the newly wounded men to a sheltered position, and rendered first aid. After directing the evacuation of 3 of the casualties, he stood in the open to draw the enemy's fire, and with his weapon blasting, enabled the litter bearers to reach cover. Turning his attention to the other 2 casualties, he was attempting to stop the profuse bleeding of 1 man when a Japanese fired from a cave less than 20 yards away and wounded his patient again. Risking his own life to save his patient, Pierce deliberately exposed himself to draw the attacker from the cave and destroyed him with the last of his ammunition. Then, lifting the wounded man to his back, he advanced unarmed through deadly rifle fire across 200 feet of open terrain. Despite exhaustion and in the face of warnings against such a suicidal mission, he again traversed the same fire swept path to rescue the remaining Marine. On the following morning, he led a combat patrol to the sniper nest and, while aiding a stricken Marine, was seriously wounded. Refusing aid for himself, he directed treatment for the casualty, at the same time maintaining protective fire for his comrades. Completely fearless, completely devoted to the care of his patients, Pierce inspired the entire battalion. His valor in the face of extreme peril sustains and enhances the finest traditions of the United States Naval Service.*

## ***First Lieutenant John Vincent Power, USMCR***

Unit: Co K, 3d Battalion, 24th Marines, 4th Marine Division

Birth: 20 November 1918, Worcester, Massachusetts

### ***Citation:***

*For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of his life above and beyond the call of duty as Platoon Leader, attached to the Fourth Marine Division, during the landing and battle of Namur Island, Kwajalein Atoll, Marshall Islands, 1 February 1944. Severely wounded in the stomach while setting a demolition charge on a Japanese pillbox, First Lieutenant Power was steadfast in his determination to remain in action. Protecting his wound with his left hand and firing with his right, he courageously advanced as another hostile position was taken under attack, fiercely charging the opening made by the explosion and emptying his carbine into the pillbox. While attempting to reload and continue the attack, First Lieutenant Power was shot again in the stomach and head and collapsed in the doorway. His exceptional valor, fortitude and indomitable fighting spirit in the face of withering enemy fire were keeping with the highest traditions of the United States Naval Service. He gallantly gave his life for his country.*

## ***Private Richard Keith Sorenson, USMCR***

*Unit: Co M, 3d Battalion, 24th Marines, 4th Marine Division*

*Birth: 28 August 1924, Anoka, Minnesota*

### ***Citation:***

*For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of his life above and beyond the call of duty while serving with an assault battalion attached to the 4th Marine Division during the battle of Namur Island, Kwajalein Atoll, Marshall Islands, on 1-2 February 1944. Putting up a brave defense against a particularly violent counterattack by the enemy during invasion operations, Private Sorenson and five other Marines occupying a shellhold were endangered by a Japanese grenade thrown into their midst. Unhesitatingly, and with complete disregard for his own safety, Private Sorenson hurled himself upon the deadly weapon, heroically taking the full impact of the explosion. As a result of his gallant action, he was severely wounded, but the lives of his comrades were saved. His great personal valor and exceptional spirit of self-sacrifice in the face of almost certain death were in keeping with the highest traditions of the United States Naval Service.*

# **Appendix F**

## **Acronyms**

<b>ANGLICO</b>	<i>Air/Naval Gunfire Liaison Company</i>
<b>ARVN</b>	<i>Army of the Republic of Vietnam</i>
<b>ATD</b>	<i>Annual Training Duty</i>
<b>AVF</b>	<i>All Volunteer Force</i>
<b>BLT</b>	<i>Battalion Landing Team</i>
<b>CARE</b>	<i>Cooperative for American Relief Everywhere</i>
<b>CAX</b>	<i>Combined Arms Exercise</i>
<b>CinCPOA</b>	<i>Commander in Chief Pacific Ocean Area</i>
<b>CMC</b>	<i>Commandant Marine Corps</i>
<b>FMF</b>	<i>Fleet Marine Force</i>
<b>FSSG</b>	<i>Force Service Support Group</i>
<b>FTS</b>	<i>Full Time Support</i>
<b>GCE</b>	<i>Ground Combat Element</i>
<b>HMMWV</b>	<i>High Mobility Multi-Purpose Wheeled Vehicle</i>
<b>I&amp;I</b>	<i>Inspector/Instructor</i>
<b>JUMPS</b>	<i>Joint Uniform Military Pay System</i>
<b>LAI</b>	<i>Light Armored Infantry</i>
<b>LAV</b>	<i>Light Armored Vehicle</i>
<b>LCI(G)</b>	<i>Landing Craft Infantry - Gunboat</i>
<b>LIC</b>	<i>Low intensity Conflict</i>
<b>MAB</b>	<i>Marine Amphibious Brigade</i>
<b>MAC</b>	<i>Military Airlift Command</i>
<b>MACV</b>	<i>Military Assistance Command in VietNam</i>
<b>MAF</b>	<i>Marine Amphibious Force</i>
<b>MAGTF</b>	<i>Marine Air Ground Task Force</i>
<b>MARCENT</b>	<i>Marine Central Command</i>
<b>MARFORLANT</b>	<i>Marine Forces Atlantic</i>
<b>MARFORPAC</b>	<i>Marine Forces Pacific</i>
<b>MARFORRES</b>	<i>Marine Forces Reserve</i>
<b>MAU</b>	<i>Marine Amphibious Unit</i>
<b>MCAS</b>	<i>Marine Corps Air Station</i>

<b>MCB</b>	<i>Marine Corps Base</i>
<b>MCCRES</b>	<i>Marine Corps Combat Readiness Evaluation System</i>
<b>MEB</b>	<i>Marine Expeditionary Brigade</i>
<b>MEDCAP</b>	<i>Medical Civic Action Program</i>
<b>MEF</b>	<i>Marine Expeditionary Force</i>
<b>MEU</b>	<i>Marine Expeditionary Unit</i>
<b>MEU SOC</b>	<i>Marine Expeditionary Unit, Special Operations Capable</i>
<b>MORDT</b>	<i>Mobilization Operational Readiness Deployment Test</i>
<b>MOS</b>	<i>Military Occupational Specialty</i>
<b>MTU</b>	<i>Mobilization Training Unit</i>
<b>MWTC</b>	<i>Mountain Warfare Training Center (Bridgeport Ca.)</i>
<b>NAL</b>	<i>Norwegian Air Landed</i>
<b>NATO</b>	<i>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</i>
<b>NCO</b>	<i>Non-commissioned Officer</i>
<b>NKPA</b>	<i>North Korean Peoples Army</i>
<b>OIC</b>	<i>Officer In Charge</i>
<b>OMCR</b>	<i>Organized Marine Corps Reserve</i>
<b>OPTEMPO</b>	<i>Operational Tempo Relief</i>
<b>PWST</b>	<i>Peacetime Wartime Support Team</i>
<b>REMPS</b>	<i>Reserve Enlisted Military Pay System</i>
<b>RLT</b>	<i>Regimental Landing Team</i>
<b>R-NET</b>	<i>Reserve Network</i>
<b>ROTC</b>	<i>Reserve Officer Training Corps</i>
<b>RSP</b>	<i>Readiness Support Program</i>
<b>SIA</b>	<i>Station of Initial Assignment</i>
<b>SMCR</b>	<i>Select Marine Corps Reserve</i>
<b>SWA</b>	<i>SouthWest Asia</i>
<b>SWAG</b>	<i>Standard Written Agreement</i>
<b>T/E</b>	<i>Table of Equipment</i>
<b>T/O</b>	<i>Table of Organization</i>
<b>TECC</b>	<i>Tactical Exercise Control Center</i>
<b>VTU</b>	<i>Volunteer Training Unit</i>

# **Appendix G**

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